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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY STRAUSS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DAVID TUSCHMAN, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 044500158 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: October 29, 2007 
The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
October 18 and 19, 2007. Petitioner was. present with Amy Hayes 
Kennedy and Respondent was present with Maria L. Booth. 
BACKGROUND 
This case was filed August 10, 2004. The petition for 
divorce alleged a marriage of July 20, 1996, and a separation of 
May 14, 2004. It alleged one child, Ruzele, was born to 
petitioner on January 17, 1994 before the marriage, but there are 
no children of this marriage. It sought a distribution of assets 
and debts and a reservation of issues relating to the child. 
Respondent filed an answer and counterclaim on September 4, 
2004. It sought a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences and sought parent time with the child, alleging 
respondent was for all practical purposes the father's child. 
Respondent moved for temporary orders on May 12, 2005. After 
hearing on May 13, 2005, the court, the Honorable Deno Himonas, 
granted, pursuant to stipulation, a bifurcated divorce. In the 
written order of July 6, 2005, petitioner was to vacate the home 
in Jeremy Ranch, respondent was given possession of the home, and 
the home was to be listed for sale. Respondent was given parent 
time with the child on Tuesday evenings and every other weekend 
Friday afternoon until Saturday evening. 
The Decree was entered June 10, 2005, effective May 13, 
2005. Then-counsel for petitioner withdrew. 
Respondent moved for temporary orders on June 13, 2005, 
relative to the child. The court held a hearing July 1, 2007, and 
ordered a visitation evaluator be appointed and a GAL be 
appointed. The written order of July 19, 2005, made the 
appointments, found respondent was entitled to visitation, and 
issued other orders relating to personal property and personal 
files. Parent time was set as partially supervised and 
unsupervised. New counsel for petitioner then withdrew. 
On October 5, 2005, the court appointed Dr. Anna Trupp as a 
parent time evaluator. 
The GAL filed an appearance on October 5, 2005. 
On October 13, 2005, respondent moved for an order to show 
cause why petitioner should not be held in contempt over parent 
time issues. On January 4, 2006, the court scheduled an 
evidentiary hearing on the contempt issues. A hearing was held 
before the Honorable Robert K. Hilder on January 27, 2006. A 
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stipulation was reached and contempt was reserved. Reunification 
counseling was to commence and the counselor was to determine the 
frequency of visitation between the child and respondent. An 
order was signed February 27, 2006. 
Petitioner then moved on March 28, 2006, for temporary 
orders relating to alimony and the release of funds from the sale 
of the marital home. An evidentiary hearing was set for August 
23, 2006, but it was continued and the hearing was held before 
Commissioner Michelle Tack on September 27, 2006. The 
commissioner recommended on November 8, 2006, that the request 
for release of funds be denied. Respondent was ordered to pay 
$1300 per month alimony beginning October, 2006. Respondent filed 
an objection to the recommendation. The objection was overruled 
on December 27, 2006. 
After a certificate of readiness was filed December 15, 
2006, by petitioner, the commissioner on January 24, 2007, 
certified all issues for trial. The issues in the pre-trial order 
were established as allocation of home equity, step-parent 
visitation time and attorney fees. 
On April 4, 2007, petitioner moved to have respondent held 
in contempt relative to the payment of temporary alimony. The 
matter was not resolved. 
On April 23, 2007, this trial date was fixed. 
On August 1, 2007, the GAL withdrew and no new GAL was 
-3-
appointed. Neither the court nor either party took steps to have 
another GAL appointed. 
On October 15, 2007, the court ruled on petitioner's motion 
in limine concerning respondent's standing to seek visitation. 
The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument 
of counsel, and is fully advised. The court took the matter under 
advisement. 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were married July 20, 1996. No children 
were born to the parties but petitioner had a child, Ruzele, born 
January 7, 1994, prior to this marriage, from the biological 
father Robert Hayden. Petitioner and Hayden were never married. 
After the marriage petitioner moved to Texas to be with 
respondent, but left Texas and came to Utah in July 1997, and 
brought the child to Utah. The parties separated due to 
disagreements. Respondent remained in Texas working at his own 
property/apartment management business until approximately July 
2002 when he moved to Utah and the parties reconciled. During the 
five year separation the parties remained in contact. During that 
separation respondent came to Utah approximately monthly and 
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petitioner and the child went to Texas a few times to visit 
respondent. Minimal financial support was provided to petitioner 
during that time and petitioner worked with her family on and 
off. Petitioner and the child lived with petitioner's mother and 
sister during this time of separation until 2002. 
2. The parties moved into the marital home, the Jeremy 
Ranch home, in July 2002 and remained together until July 2003 
when petitioner again moved out with the child and rejoined her 
family, her mother and sister. The parties reconciled again in 
February 2004 until May 2004 when petitioner again left and 
rejoined her mother and sister. Petitioner remained out of the 
marital home except for a one week period when she returned, when 
respondent was gone, in early 2005. This case was filed in August 
2004. 
3. During the separations respondent saw Ruzele (the child) 
and did things with and for her on occasion. When the parties 
did live 'together respondent did things with and for the child, 
including providing financial support. He went with her to 
activities and participated in her school activities. 
4. The home was purchased in 2002 for the price of $391,000. 
The contract papers were in the name of respondent but the 
property upon sale was titled in the names of the parties as 
joint tenants. Shortly thereafter, in October 2002, another 
warranty deed was prepared by the parties conveying the property 
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to them as tenants in common, each with an undivided one half 
interest. 
5. Respondent had a family trust and inheritance before the 
marriage. The Texas business he ran was taken over from his 
father in approximately 1991 and the trust had as its corpus 
various apartment buildings in Texas. Respondent earned 
approximately $35,000 per year in 2000, 2001, and 2002, from that 
business but received substantial sums regularly from the trust. 
He used some of that trust money for purchase of the Jeremy home 
which was paid for and thus there was no mortgage. The entirety 
of the purchase price came from respondent's inherited trust 
funds. Petitioner was never made a beneficiary of the trust. All 
of the insurance and taxes were paid by respondent from those 
trust funds. Shortly after purchase the home was remodeled with 
trust fund money. The amount of that remodel expense was not 
demonstrated convincingly to the court but he testified, through 
an exhibit, that approximately $50,000 of trust funds was put 
into the remodel. There was no supporting documentation as to 
that amount however. Those trust funds became depleted in 2004 
with the sale of the final asset and there are no more trust 
funds. 
6. Respondent testified he only put the name of the parties 
on the title because petitioner promised him she would allow 
respondent to adopt the child if he did so. Petitioner denied 
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that. The court makes no finding in that regard but does find, 
as detailed below, that respondent wanted to adopt the child. 
7. Respondent did not work productively in the sense that he 
earned an income upon his return to Utah in 2002 but tried "day 
trading" and other evidently entrepeneurial ventures. He later 
obtained his realtor license in 2004 and became a licensed agent 
in 2004 but earned no income until 2005. 
8. Petitioner worked early in the marriage as an airline 
reservationist paid by the hour, earing approximately $7.50 per 
hour. She did not contribute any funds to the marital home and 
improved it only in terms of living in it and taking care of the 
home. 
9. Respondent received monthly distributions from his 
family trust in varying amounts and those were put into a 
checking account. No records from that account were furnished to 
the court from that time period of 2002-2003. The court was 
furnished checking account records in the name of respondent for 
the periods July 2006 through September 2007, two separate 
accounts in the name of respondent, one evidently that he used 
for business purposes and one for personal purposes. Exhibits 
showed in summary fashion amounts that went through respondent's 
account, the first date being June 2005. The court, based 
thereon, from the exhibits and records, must find that the 
account into which the trust funds were placed was in the name of 
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respondent but that the funds were used and spent on joint living 
expenses of the parties. Petitioner has evidently not, during 
the marriage or after, had a checking account in her name. 
During the time from respondent's return to the family in 2002 
until the separation in 2004 neither party had any direct or 
earned income but lived completely off the trust funds of 
respondent. Only when respondent got his realtor license later 
in 2004 did he have any earned income and those records are 
before the court. 
10. Petitioner in her divorce petition did not seek alimony. 
In March 2006 she sought a temporary order asking for alimony and 
listed her monthly expenses at approximately $6800 per month. 
Respondent was ordered to pay $1300 in temporary alimony on a 
temporary basis. Petitioner's current financial declaration at 
the time of trial lists petitioner's expenses at $3876 and some 
of those clearly include expenses that involve the child. 
11. The court finds the financial declarations of petitioner 
to be less than credible and trustworthy. Similarly with 
respondent in some respects. 
For example, petitioner lists substantial medical expenses 
for various providers. Included in the March 2006 declaration 
was a debt to University of Utah Hospitals. Various components 
of that showed she claimed to owe at that time approximately 
$41,000. As noted, petitioner is not employed and claims no 
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income whatever from any source except the temporary alimony. 
Somehow, that debt at the time of trial was reduced to her 
claimed amount of $23,777. There have been withdrawals from the 
home equity and perhaps that was the source of payment to the 
medical providers, but that was not revealed by the testimony nor 
any records. Her claimed expenses show only $300 per month 
payments toward those medical obligations, however. That cannot 
rationally amount to a reduction of $18,000 in a medical bill 
with no income and with other expenses of approximately $3500 per 
month on $1300 per month alimony. Petitioner claims utility 
bills in the sum of $333 per month for electrical and $250 for 
natural gas. Petitioner admitted a mistake as to the natural gas 
but explained that these amounts were her one-third share of the 
condo expenses she now lives in with her mother and sister and 
her sister's two children. That would mean, of course, that the 
electric bill is $1000 per month. She explained there are past 
due amounts in that figure from a former home of her mother. 
Further, petitioner claims expenses that clearly include the 
child as part of the expense, for example food and clothing. 
Yet, her position is that respondent has no standing whatever to 
even see the child, yet she evidently believes he should pay for 
some of her expenses, even though petitioner has refused child 
support from respondent. Those factors give the court little 
confidence in the truthfulness of the claimed expenses by 
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petitioner. 
In short, the court has no basis to find the claimed 
expenses of petitioner credible or accurate. The court reduces 
the amounts claimed by petitioner in the areas of utilities, 
telephone, laundry, clothing, dental, entertainment, gifts and 
donations, grooming, auto expense and finds the reasonable 
expenses of petitioner are $2566. The court remains uncertain of 
petitioner's family involvement. There was testimony that before 
living in the condo currently occupied, petitioner lived with her 
mother and sister in the "Solamere" home or "big" house it was 
called, described as being over 10,000 square feet and having a 
housekeeper. That area is known to be in Deer Valley. The court 
is familiar with that area of Summit County and it is a luxurious 
area. Thus, whether petitioner actually pays any rent at all or 
other housing expenses further clouds the court's ability to find 
meaningful the expenses claimed by petitioner. She has no income 
yet drives a car valued at $17,000, a 2002 Toyota Sequoia 4WD 
SR5. That was evidently purchased by respondent with trust funds 
during the marriage. It is paid for and there are no car 
payments. Petitioner lists no other consumer debt other than 
household living expenses. She claims a total owed for medical 
bills to be $66,661 and has no health insurance. While most of 
her claimed expenses are reasonable in amount and not in any 
sense outrageous, the court simply attaches very little 
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credibility to the claims given the evident ability of petitioner 
to survive on seemingly nothing. 
Respondent's claims also reasonable and are not in any sense 
outrageous except for the notion of having mortgage payments on 
two residences, each with a first and second mortgage. The other 
claims seem reasonable largely as discussed below. However, the 
court also attaches little credibility to respondent in most 
financial matters because of one simple fact. He recently in 
2005 purchased a condo for just under $200,000 and a home in 2007 
for over $500,000. No lender the court is aware of would 
possibly lend such money to a person who claims income as 
respondent lists in.his current filings. Obviously he has either 
inflated to the lender his income or has decreased it for court 
purposes. In either event, it shows a lack of complete candor. 
It is just totally inconceivable that a lender would provide a 
loan with payments over $3000 per month on a stated income of 
just over $4000. Everyone with rational thought or experience 
knows that is not what respondent told his lender and if he can 
engage in such activity (possibly conduct that could amount to a 
felony if proven) his credibility before this court in matters 
financial is very low. 
12. Petitioner is obviously intelligent and well spoken and 
testified with convincing force. Her background and education 
were not revealed. Her age was not revealed but she appears from 
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her life description and from appearances to be approximately 40 
years of age. From her description of her life, however, it 
appears she has not had meaningful and long lasting employment 
other than as an airline reservationist for approximately 2 years 
early in the marriage, earning approximately at that time in the 
mid- to late 1990s approximately $7.50 per hour. She describes 
herself as being in good mental health but poor physical health, 
having had gastric bypass surgery in 1991 and being hypo-glycemic 
and having been on various medications for many years. She has 
taken iron infusions but it was not clear exactly when that began 
or if it has ended nor what effects that has on her ability to 
work. She had back surgery at a young age, age 14, fusing several 
vertebrae, and has had back problems through her life. She did 
some work for her sister's construction company fairly recently 
involving light office work and telephone calling. Based on all 
that was revealed, the court finds that petitioner could work and 
earn could earn $1500 per month in Summit County. 
13. Since earning his realtor's license respondent has 
earned strictly commission and that is currently his only source 
of income. The trust fund is depleted. He works full time and 
more as a realtor. There are ongoing expenses associated with 
such work. His education level was not revealed but obviously he 
has been the recipient of his family trust funds which are now 
depleted and liquidated. In 2005 he earned gross commissions of 
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$2121 per month, in 2006 gross commissions of $7025 per month, 
and through August 2007 he has earned gross commissions of $5961 
per month. Of course in real estate the work precedes the 
commission payment and there are ongoing expenses that often are 
"advanced'' by the realtor and not recovered until commission is 
received. He claims business expenses from those gross 
commissions of $400 per month average. Both parties agree his 
gross commissions have been, give or take a few dollars, $157,452 
in the past 37 months, or an average gross income of $4255 per 
month, which the court finds to be his gross income per month. 
14. Respondent claims monthly expenses of $10,363. Those 
include mortgage payments on a home he recently purchased in 
Wasatch County in approximately March 2007 for the sum of 
$524,510. The first mortgage payment is $3065 and there is a 
second mortgage payment of $971, which was recently increased as 
respondent borrowed $50,000 against the home to pay off other 
things. The current balance on that second mortgage is 
approximately $104,000. The balance of the first mortgage was not 
revealed but with a purchase in March 2007 the court would expect 
the balance owed to still be well over $500,000. These claimed 
expenses also reflect mortgage payments on a small condo 
respondent purchased in 2005 just after the bifurcated divorce. 
Respondent is trying to sell that unit currently at approximately 
$187,000. There is a mortgage on it, as well as a second 
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mortgage which he recently increased to borrow $25,000 to pay off 
other things. The first mortgage is $1033 and the second is 
$233. The balances owing were not fully revealed but evidently 
are in the vicinity for both of $147,000. Those four mortgage 
payments alone amount to $5302 per month, more than respondent 
earns on average. Both the condo and the residence were purchased 
after the bifurcated decree and up until early 2006 petitioner 
did not seek alimony in her petition nor was it ordered in the 
first temporary order. Thus, the purchase of the condo was at 
least made by petitioner with an understanding there would not be 
alimony payments he would be making. The purchase of the big new 
house with over $4000 in payments was made after he was ordered 
to pay temporary alimony, however. His claimed monthly expenses 
include some business expenses as well as the court-ordered 
temporary alimony. The court reduces those amounts in the areas 
of food, his claimed business expenses, dry cleaning and 
miscellaneous. Respondent also has borrowed from his family in 
the amount of approximately $25,000 which remains unpaid. Because 
respondent anticipates selling the condo soon, where he hopes to 
realize approximately $40,000 plus eliminate the mortgage 
payments ($1033 + 233 =$1266) the court finds his monthly 
expenses to be $7906. Of course, again, that amount is very 
largely a function of the first and second mortgages on a new 
half million dollar home. The two mortgages on this primary 
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residence alone amount to $4036. If the $40,000 profit from the 
sale of the condo is applied to the second mortgage on the home 
rather than repaying the money borrowed from family that second 
mortgage would be reduced but it is currently approximately 
$104,000, so it would be reduced but not eliminated and seemingly 
the payment could go down to some extent. Thus, the court finds 
respondent's monthly expenses are or should soon be $7000 per 
month, which again still includes a mortgage on a new home of 
over $3000 per month and a second mortgage as well. The wisdom 
and ethics of such a payment, given that petitioner is living in 
a condo with her mother and sister (again her family assistance 
is unknown but appears perhaps to be substantial), and given that 
petitioner can work but is clearly and admittedly not in the best 
of health nor does she have great qualifications for employment 
nor does she have much work experience, makes it difficult for 
the court to countenance such monthly expenses. Obviously if 
respondent is allowed to continue in his big new home he cannot 
afford any alimony, there is no ability to pay at all as his 
expenses, even reducing most everything he claims and eliminating 
two current mortgage payments on the condo and reducing the 
second mortgage on the home, far exceeds his average income. He 
testified the real estate market in Summit County is not 
improving but going soft and he does not anticipate higher income 
in the near future. That is, of course, open to a good deal of 
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speculation and the court is certainly not able, based on the 
testimony nor its general knowledge of this area, to adequately 
predict what respondent's income may be. When respondent 
obtained his realtor license real estate was certainly a 
lucrative field in this area of the State. Thus, the court can 
only find his income is what it has historically been, a gross of 
just over $4200 per month. However, even if a "normal" or mor 
acceptable reduced mortgage or rent payment were included and 
calculated rather than two mortgages on a big new home, for 
example assuming he spent $1500 per month rent or for a mortgage, 
his expenses would still be $4500 ($7000-2500, reducing the 
mortgages from approximately $4000 to 1500). Having reduced 
petitioner's claimed expenses to the very bare bones, and 
assuming her family has been helping her greatly and imputing 
just above minimum income to her, her reasonable needs still 
exceed her ability to provide for herself. Still, the 
calculations do now show respondent can make up the difference in 
what petitioner can provide for herself and what her needs are. 
An additional complicating factor, of course, is the child. 
Petitioner indicates she has never asked for and has not accepted 
and would not accept child support from respondent. However, 
with the recent re-introduction of the child"s biological father 
Hayden into the equation, petitioner has the ability to seek 
child support from him. She testified she has not done so and may 
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not do so as he is not "warm" to the idea and petitioner believes 
it is more important for him to have a good relationship with the 
child than it is for the child to receive his financial support. 
If that is petitioner's decision then part of her financial 
difficulty is attributable to that decision and she and the child 
to some extent bear the consequences of that decision. 
Considering all of the factors mentioned the court finds 
petitioner should receive from respondent some alimony and she is 
in need of it. However, he is not able to pay alimony and none 
is ordered. 
The court finds respondent is current in his court ordered 
temporary alimony. The "bounced check" for an alimony payment 
shortly after the temporary order has been remedied and is found 
not to have been wilful. The request of petitioner for contempt 
on behalf of respondent is denied and no contempt is found on 
behalf of respondent. 
15. The marital home in Jeremy Ranch was sold in July 2005 
for $575,000. The net proceeds were $534,781 after commissions 
and closing costs. The increase in equity was $133,602 from the 
time of purchase in 2002. By stipulation of the parties, as 
noted, $60,000 of the proceeds was given to petitioner and she 
was to pay her previous attorney, medical bills, and the 
remainder was for her use. Respondent has previously borrowed 
$100,000 for his use and has withdrawn another $167,390, meaning 
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he has so far realized $267,390, one half of the proceeds from 
the sale of the home. The sum of $167,390 remaining was 
deposited with petitioner's counsel and it remains available for 
distribution. Previous orders have allocated the above funds. 
16. While the parties were separated from 1997 to 2002 
respondent had limited contact with the child, at least weekly by 
phone and in person over the weekend perhaps monthly for those 
five years. When the parties were then together in Utah from 
July 2002 to July 2003 living in the marital Jeremy home 
respondent was involved with and had a valuable relationship with 
the child, engaging in what the court will call normal father-
daughter activities. 
17. The court finds, based on all the testimony of the 
parties and the experts, that respondent had indeed formed a 
strong bond of love and affection with the child prior to the 
final separation in May 2004 when the child was age 10. 
Respondent supported petitioner and the child in Utah through the 
trust funds available to him. Respondent has sought, through 
petitioner, to adopt the child but she rebuffed those requests 
and would not consent to it. Initially even in this case 
petitioner did not seek to halt visitation by respondent and 
agreed in an earlier hearing he could have visitation. 
18. As time passed visitation became increasingly rare and 
difficult to attain for respondent because of petitioner"s 
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conduct. Respondent sought relief from the court and petitioner 
responded by alleging there was no relationship between 
respondent and the child. Thus, a visitation evaluation was 
ordered and performed at the request of respondent. The order 
granting the appointment of Anna Trupp, LCSW, was made in October 
2005 but petitioner did not fully cooperate and did not make her 
payment to the evaluator until the end of March 2006. Visitation 
still remained a problem and respondent sought a contempt 
finding, and that issue was reserved for this trial. At that same 
time reunification counseling was ordered by the court. That 
occurred but was terminated in March 2007 ostensibly by the 
child. 
19. The court finds that the child as of this date states 
and verbalizes that she does not want to see respondent, does not 
want him part of her life, and that she wants to be involved with 
Hayden, her biological father. The court finds that there has 
been alienation on behalf of petitioner, however. The testimony 
revealed, at worst for respondent, that he had yelled in the past 
at the child and at respondent in the presence of the child, in 
earlier times and in early 2004. The court finds rationally that 
such is not enough for the average child to maintain that such a 
person, the only "father figure"' the child had met up until early 
2005, to retain such memories that she would never want to see 
that person again and would want nothing to do with him. While 
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reasonable persons can disagree about the degree of harm that 
results from yelling at or in the presence of a child, the court 
finds such is not sufficient to result in the attitudes expressed 
by the child currently. She views respondent as all evil and 
wrong and states she cannot recall any fun or good times she had 
with him, despite clear evidence to the contrary in the form of 
pictures and notes and such which the court has viewed as part of 
the evidence. The court has available to it to DVDs which have 
not been viewed. The court attempted to view them both but even 
with court staff help was unable to view the proffered pictures. 
The court finds, nevertheless from the testimony and other 
pictures and notes that have been viewed, that at some time in 
the past the child enjoyed many activities with respondent and 
they did in fact have fun and good times together. The court 
finds that the attitude expressed by the child has to have come 
from petitioner, directly or covertly based on petitioner's 
attitude. Petitioner during the trial called David Tuschman, the 
man to whom she was married for 9 years, and who bought a home 
for her and her child to live in and who paid all expenses while 
they lived in a home, "respondent." She did not call him David, 
Mr. Tuschman, but "respondent." Respondent during the trial 
called petitioner "Tracy" and the child "Ruzele." The court 
attaches little credibility to petitioner and her denials of this 
alienation. For example, she testified that the visitation 
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evaluator met with her only for 10 minutes when she, petitioner 
and her mother, just happened to drop in. The evaluator testified 
they exchanged numerous calls and emails and the in-person visit 
was for two hours. During the reunification counseling the child 
indicated she did not want to be there, did not want to talk with 
respondent, and could recall no good memories even when shown 
photographs of herself and respondent obviously enjoying "good 
times'' in her younger years. Petitioner chose Father's Day to 
tell the child that respondent was not her real father and that 
she had a father named Hayden. The child and Hayden did not meet 
for several years after the child was told of her biological 
father, but in May 2005 petitioner took the child to California 
to meet with Hayden and his family, and the timing of that trip 
was just when visitation became most difficult for respondent. 
According to the evaluator, the child states that her real father 
Hayden is all good and she loves him and respondent is all bad 
and evil and she wants nothing to do with him. There appears no 
valid reason for this feeling other than petitioner's influence 
on the child as the historical facts do not justify such a strong 
anti-respondent belief or feeling, even though the feelings must 
be considered. Hayden had no role whatever in the child's life 
until May 2005, though he could not as petitioner told him in the 
pregnancy that she had miscarried and that she then wanted 
nothing to do with him and did not want to see him. He did not 
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even know of Ruzele until May 2005 when petitioner told him of 
her. Hayden has had 5 physical visits with the child and numerous 
phone contacts but he has provided no support financially other 
than the "vacations" they have had together. 
Thus, the court finds and concludes there appears no reason 
observable to the court based on the facts presented by 
petitioner, taken at their best for her, that justify this 
attitude of the child that is against respondent. The court 
could conclude or find that this attitude might just be "odd" or 
in someway irrational, but rather the court finds and concludes 
that the child's attitudes, expressed as they are to the 
professionals, are based on something else-namely, what 
petitioner and perhaps her family have inculcated in the child. 
Certainly any child can be mad at a parent who yells, or worse, 
but to the court normally a child who experiences such an event 
will be mad or upset with such a person for a time but will not 
retain that feeling for years and forevermore. Further, after 
some of the events in the life of this child that petitioner 
claims are at the bottom of this alienation, this child did 
indeed have visitation with respondent allowed by petitioner, 
after the separation in May 2004. Nothing has shown the court 
that there have been any significant events in 2005 to the 
present that would justify such an attitude and the court does 
not believe the child is simply "wrong headed." The bond between 
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petitioner and the child is described as particularly close and 
strong and petitioner's views about respondent have, directly or 
covertly, been passed on to this child. 
Petitioner testified that respondent tried to kill her when 
she accidently overdosed on prescription medication because he 
did not call emergency personnel quickly enough after he 
discovered her in a largely comatose state. Whether that event 
and petitioner's belief concerning it has been conveyed to the 
child is unknown, but the court finds it not to be factual in any 
event-that is, the court has not been shown respondent attempted 
to cause the death of petitioner. Nevertheless, shortly after 
that event, whatever it was, petitioner allowed respondent to 
have visitation and then lack of visitation occurred later. To 
the extent such attitudes clearly residing within petitioner have 
been conveyed to the child, that may answer why the child feels 
she wants nothing whatever to do with respondent. 
As further indications of the alienation the therapist and 
visitation evaluator and respondent all combine to relate an 
incident in March 2007 wherein the child ended the reunification 
session abruptly upon entering the session. The child said she 
was not doing this anymore and called her mother and left the 
room within moments of entering the room. Less than 2 minutes 
later, and by some accounts within a minute, the child was with 
her mother outside the office of the therapist and the child was 
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getting into the car driven by petitioner. Petitioner explained 
she was shopping and got a call and arrived in 10 minutes. The 
court discredits that in the face of three others and the court 
finds that session ended as a result of a planned event with 
petitioner awaiting outside and fully anticipating the child 
would enter, announce she was not participating any further, end 
the session, and leave. 
Petitioner testified that the child has xvcalled the shots'" 
and that is the reason there is no visitation because the child 
does not want to see respondent and petitioner has merely 
acquiesced and allowed the child to have the final say on this 
issue. While that may possibly be true in one sense, the court 
finds petitioner has alienated the child from respondent and has 
done so wrongly. 
20. The child's therapist for the past two years plus, since 
May 2005, testified the child has made clear to her throughout 
that the child has no desire whatever to see respondent, to be 
with him, or to talk to him. The therapist, Roxi Nelson, was of 
the opinion that the child who will be age 14 in January is 
frustrated because she does not see her desires as being taken 
seriously and she does not want to be forced to see someone she 
does not want to see. The court finds the therapists concerns 
valid to a certain degree but failing ultimately in their 
persuasiveness. That is because as is obvious most 13 year olds 
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(soon to be 14) often do not want to do many things that are 
either good for them or that are simply necessary as part of 
life-to get up on time to go to school, clean their room, 
practice the piano, go to bed early, do their homework, eat their 
vegetables, and on and on. Most parents "force" compliance with 
such actions not because the parents do not "honor" or respect 
the child's wishes, but because most adult parents believe they, 
unlike their children, know what is best for that child when the 
child does not. Parents and adults are not always right of 
course but all throughout our lives we are somehow coerced or 
"forced" to do things we do not want to do. The wise parent does 
not require homework be done at the point of a gun, but 
techniques and tactics are employed to get the job done often. 
The court views this situation as the same. It would be most 
unwise to physically lasso the child and drag her to see 
respondent, just as it would unwise to beat a child until they 
clean their room. It is generally good for children, and this 
child in this case, the court finds, to realize that a 
relationship cannot be broken and others' feelings and emotions 
stepped on merely because of the way we feel at the moment or for 
a time. No one should try to force this child to love respondent 
but he is factually entitled, and the court finds it would be in 
the best interests of this child that this lesson be conveyed to 
her in these proceedings, that she be in a position where she can 
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on her own, without undue or unfair input from others, decide if 
she wants respondent in her life. She ought not to be able, for 
whatever reason, to simply eliminate a relationship that did 
exist at one time. Much of humanity perhaps ends some 
relationship in their lives, from failure to see old friends to 
breaking up as teenage sweethearts, but those ought to be done 
humanely and with consideration. The court believes that is a 
good lesson for this and any child, and a relationship ought not 
to be ended cruelly and without reason. 
Further, the child appears to be a "victim" at this point 
and feels to be such, that respondent has been abusive and unfair 
and it will be beneficial in the life of this child to work 
through her feelings with the help of neutral persons rather than 
perpetuate the feelings she now has that she cannot seem to 
overcome. The fact remains, however, that the child feels this 
way and those feelings are real and not to be overlooked, 
whatever their source. 
At least in this case the court does not now see a reason 
for such attitudes and failure of this child to allow respondent 
to be a part of her life. Once a few more years pass this child, 
as with all children of this age, will be in a better position as 
far as maturity to fully make such a decision-I do or do not want 
to see this person. For now, the court finds and concludes that 
the court appointed visitation evaluator was fair and unbiased in 
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her investigation. The court does not fully subscribe to her 
recommendations, but those recommendations come pretty close to 
the court's view. 
However, and alas, given the decision in this case those 
recommendations are not to be fulfilled and these views of the 
court are legally irrelevant and occupy so much paper without 
much purpose other than to express the court's view of this 
situation. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The issue of the ability of respondent to have visitation 
was raised in a motion in limine which was brought to the 
attention of the court shortly before the trial, wherein 
petitioner sought to disallow respondent's evidence as to the 
best interests of the child. The court realized that was a 
substantive and difficult issue and indicated it would hear the 
evidence and argument at trial, which it did, and then rule. The 
issue is complex and difficult and the court has struggled. The 
above findings and discussion demonstrate that the court fully 
-27-
believes respondent SHOULD have visitation but the court does not 
believe legally he is entitled to such visitation. 
Respondent has petitioned the Court in his counterclaim for 
visitation rights with the minor child of the petitioner 
following the divorce. The child's biological mother wishes to 
prevent respondent's visitation with the child and claims he has 
no standing to seek or obtain visitation. Respondent has 
nonetheless petitioned the Court arguing that under Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5(5)(a), as an immediate family member of the child, 
he has standing to petition for and obtain visitation. The court 
has struggled with this issue, and has considered the relevant 
statutes, case law, and the arguments of counsel. 
The court determines that a stepparent does not have 
standing to petition the court for visitation with a non-
biological child following a divorce, when the child's biological 
parent who has not been declared unfit, seeks to deprive that 
step-parent of visitation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5) (a) states, NX[i]n determining 
parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of 
grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court 
shall consider the best interest of the child." The statute thus 
requires the court to make a two-part determination: (1) whether 
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a petitioner seeking parent time or visitation falls among those 
people with parent time or visitation rights and if so, (2) 
whether visitation with that person would be in the child's best 
interests. 
The first question before the court is purely a matter of 
law as the facts surrounding it are not in dispute. The court 
has found, and neither party disputes, this child is the 
biological daughter of petitioner, and she was never adopted by 
respondent, though he desired to do so. The question then 
becomes whether, having married petitioner respondent/step-father 
has standing as a parent or "other members of the immediate 
family" under § 30-3-5(5) (a) to petition for visitation with the 
child. Only if respondent has such standing would the court 
consider what is in the child's best interests. 
Step-father's status as a legal parent 
Obviously respondent is not a parent as he is not the 
biological father of the child. 
In Jones v. Barlow, 2001 UT 20, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that the non-biological mother of a child who had 
cohabited with the biological mother was not entitled to petition 
for visitation under statutory or common law. (OT 40-41). The 
Court reasoned that because the Legislature had defined a mother-
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child relationship in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-201 and outlined 
exceptions for visitation for grandparents and other immediate 
family members, the cohabiting partner of the child's biological 
mother, who had not (and in fact could not) adopt the child, was 
not among those people the legislature intended to have the right 
to petition for visitation. 
This case is distinguishable from Jones in several respects. 
Unlike the two mothers in Jones, the instant parties consummated 
a legal marriage in the state of Utah. Respondent is a person who 
could legally adopt the child. The step-father is asserting his 
right to visitation under the statute, not common law. However, 
similar to Jones, the step-father never adopted the biological 
daughter of his legal wife, though he expressed interest in doing 
so and is a person who would be, unlike the Jones case, legally 
able to adopt. Although the court notes that he may have desired 
to adopt, the mutual consent to adoption was never given and no 
adoption was actually undertaken and certainly not finalized. 
The Legislature has defined father-child relationships. 
Relevant to the case at hand such a relationship may be 
established through paternity or a man's legal adoption of the 
child to whom he is not the biological father. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-45g-201(2)(d). 
In Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), the Utah 
Supreme Court would have required a step-parent show he stood in 
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loco parentis to a child before a court could consider whether 
visitation was in the child's best interests. The Gribble Court 
noted that if Utah had a statutory provision obligating the step-
parent to support the child, the stepparent would have the same 
status as a parent or at least a relative and would be entitled 
to a hearing on visitation. However, because no such statute 
existed at the time, the court required the stepparent to stand 
in loco parentis to the child. State in Interest of J.W.F., 799 
P.2d 710, 715 (Utah 1990) (citing Gribble). 
The Jones Court modified Gribble when it determined that 
even if a parent stood in loco parentis to a child, that in loco 
parentis relationship was temporary and could be terminated at 
the will of the surrogate parent, the child and the biological or 
legal parent. Jones, at li 17-24. The step-father in the instant 
case is not arguing that he stood in loco parentis to the child, 
nor could he, as the biological mother of the child has 
terminated any potential that he could stand in loco parentis to 
this child. 
The Jones Court majority did not include a surrogate mother 
in its definition of immediate family, because: 
[G]ranting visitation rights to de facto parents 
contradicts the legislature's narrow grant of standing 
to certain immediate family members to petition for 
visitation. . . . The grant of standing to immediate 
family members under certain well-defined 
circumstances, however, creates the negative 
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implication that all other categories of nonparents are 
prohibited from seeking visitation rights. Otherwise, 
the standing requirement would not serve its function 
as a jurisdictional bar to litigation because every 
unmentioned class of nonparent could attempt to 
establish visitation rights under the common law. We 
decline to expand the common law into an area occupied 
by statute so as to contradict the apparent legislative 
intent. 
Jones, f 41. In her dissent, Chief Justice Durham would have 
found the non-biological mother had standing as an immediate 
family member because of how that term was defined in other 
statutes, even though none explicitly dealt with custody or 
visitation rights. Jones, at % 48. The majority disagreed, 
however, and found that common law principles: 
[M]ilitate[d] against a common law right of visitation 
for nonparents. . . .Other relatives of a child merely 
have Asome dormant or inchoate right or interest in the 
custody and welfare of children' that matures only upon 
the death or termination of the rights of the parents. 
. . .[C]ourts may not make a 'best interests' inquiry 
into nonparent custody of a child absent a 
determination that the legal parents are unfit. . . . 
Although our precedent in this area involves custody 
rather than visitation, the common law nevertheless 
evidences a strong presumption that parental rights 
shall not be disturbed absent a determination that the 
legal parents are unfit. 
Jones, H39 (noting that Utah Code §§ 30-3-5(5) (a) and 30-5-2, 
"stand as statutorily created exceptions to this general rule 
because they grant standing to seek visitation rights even 
against the objections of fit parents." Id. at n.ll. 
-32-
Thus, without adoption or actual paternity, a man who 
marries a woman with her own biological children is never under 
the statute their "legal" father. Further, under Jones, without 
the ability to stand in an in loco parentis relationship to the 
child and when the child's biological parent has not been 
determined legally unfit, a step-parent's rights are severely 
curtailed and subject to the desires of the biological parent. 
Step-parents as immediate family members 
The question then becomes, if the step-father is not a legal 
parent, is he among those "immediate family" members entitled to 
petition for and receive visitation? The term 'immediate family' 
is not defined in § 30-3-5, nor did the Jones Court define the 
term although a surrogate parent was found not to be immediate 
family to a child. As noted, Chief Justice Durham addressed 
several other explanations of who was Ma member of the child's 
immediate family" in other statutes, none of which, however dealt 
with custody or visitation rights, nor did any of those deal with 
the rights, of a step-parent. 
While Chief Justice Durham would have given a surrogate 
parent standing under the definition of immediate family found in 
other statutes she did not discuss the standing of a step-parent. 
Counsel for the step-father in the instant case argued that Jones 
did not address step-parent rights and in a footnote left the 
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issue open. However in footnote six, which the court suspects 
counsel was referring to, the Jones Court states: MWe do not have 
before us, and we do not decide, whether a person who is or once 
stood in loco parentis to a child has standing to seek visitation 
or custody in the absence of a fit legal parent." Jones, at 1 28 
n.6. Although the step-father has suggested he wished to 
challenge petitioner's fitness as a parent to her daughter, that 
issue is not properly before the Court at this time.1 
In a 2005 decision the Utah Court of Appeals addressed which 
family members were entitled to use an easement under an 
agreement. Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351. The agreement in 
that case entitled a man and "his immediate family to the first 
degree of consanguinity and their spouses and children'' to have 
access to the easement. The Court of appeals noted, "[njormally 
one's ^immediate family' would reasonably be defined as including 
one's spouse as well as one's children." Id. at I 22 
1
 The juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over a 
.petition to terminate a biological parent's parental rights. 
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104(1)(g)). The only exception to this 
exclusive jurisdiction is when a petitioner files for termination 
of parental rights in conjunction with an adoption proceeding. 
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-7.1) (see also J.CO. v. Anderson, 734 
P. 2d 458, 464 (1987), and State in Interest of Summers v. 
Wulffenstein, 616 P.2d 608, 610 (1980) finding that district 
courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate adoption petitions). While 
there have been allegations that an adoption was to occur in this 
case, neither an adoption petition nor a petition to terminate 
parental rights have been filed. Thus, the court does not believe 
it has jurisdiction to consider the biological mother's fitness 
as a parent at this stage in the proceedings. 
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n.10) (surveying other provisions of the Utah Code as well as 
cases from other jurisdictions). Nowhere in the Court of Appeals 
discussion of immediately family in Gillmor did it include a 
step-parent. The Gillmor Court specifically found that because 
the grant of access was narrow, the step-children of the grantee 
were not entitled to receive the benefit of use of the easements 
"as they are not related to [the grantee] . . . by any degree of 
consanguinity." (Id. at 1 23). 
In a recent decision from the Colorado Court of Appeals, 
released in August 2007, that Court explained at length the 
history and development of non-parents' rights to visitation with 
children. In re C.I.G., 2001 Colo. App. LEXIS 1561, *7-10 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 2001). That Court noted that at common law third parties 
had no rights to visitation, but xxby 2005, all fifty states had 
enacted statutes conferring on grandparents the right to seek 
visitation with their grandchildren in various situations." Id. 
at *8. The Colorado Court, similar to the Jones Court, agreed 
that limitations on third party visitation were designed to 
respect the biological parents' desires concerning how to raise 
their family. Id. at *9. Citing an Iowa court's decision, the 
Colorado Court noted that without these limitations courts: 
A[W]ould have no clear guidelines as to where such 
[third-party] visitation should stop. For example, claims 
for visitation could arise from siblings, aunts, uncles, and 
other persons with special relationships. With so many 
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potential petitioners, a court would have to decide which 
petitioners are more deserving of visitation than others, 
and how much time each petitioner should receive with the 
child. It could be chaotic, at best, assigning so many 
diverse visitations to an already limited number of weekends 
and holidays.' 
(Id. at *10)(citing In re Ash, 507 N.W.2d 400, 402-03 (Iowa 
1993)(citations omitted). This underlying policy argument echoes 
in the Jones Court's refusal to abrogate any of the biological 
mother's parental rights to someone not already sharing them. 
Jones, at 1 42. This policy underlies this court's resolution of 
this matter. 
The court takes from these decisions that unless a third 
party's relationship has been specifically defined by statute, an 
immediate family member, in the context of visitation and 
custody, that relationship must be defined in relationship to the 
child and not to the parent. Or, otherwise stated, the 
relationship family members have to a child defines whether they 
are immediate or not for purposes of being able to petition for 
visitation. While this does not clearly limit who may petition, 
it does require that to petition for or be entitled to 
visitation, a third party must have some direct legal or 
biological relationship to the child, and not just to the parent 
of that child. To define immediate family otherwise, as 
respondent suggests,'would permit the scenario of an endless 
stream of competing visitation petitions, and unnecessarily 
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subject children to disputes between family members all claiming 
to act in the best interests of the child. 
Consequently, a step-parent who has not adopted a child is 
not among those members of the "immediate family" for whom a 
court can determine visitation rights over the objections of a 
biological parent, because none of the various definitions of 
"immediate family" found in Utah statutes or case law consider a 
step-parent as immediate family to a child. Further, the Jones 
Court made clear its preference for permitting only a biological 
parent to determine how to raise their child. 
Respondent's argument that he is a member of the immediate 
family because he is the spouse (was the spouse at the time of 
the petition in the counterclaim) of the parent is rejected based 
on the above reasoning. The relationship that gives standing to 
seek visitation "rights" in the child must stem from the 
relationship to the child, not that child's parent. 
Where a step-parent has not created a direct relationship to 
a child through adoption the court does not believe that in the 
absence of a determination that the biological parent is unfit, 
that a court can permit a step-parent to petition for visitation 
over the objections of a biological parent. Such a step-parent is 
precluded from petitioning a court for visitation over a 
biological mother's objections. 
While this may result in what the step-father's counsel 
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argued in court is an inequitable result and contrary to wise 
public policy, where step-parents have no interest in investing 
in a step-child's well being, the court believes the contrary. 
Respondent's argument is not without merit that if a step parent 
knows he or she may be without any claim t«© see the child in case 
of a divorce that step parent will not much sacrifice for that 
child. However, there are other policies involved that compete 
with and prevail against that sound policy. Such a rule as this 
court adopts will encourage step-parents to take a far more 
active role in their step-children's lives by adopting them 
whenever possible. Most importantly, it upholds the ultimate 
authority of biological parents to determine how they wish to 
raise their children which policy was firmly declared in Jones. 
Here, as often noted, respondent did desire to adopt but if the 
biological parent will not consent such may not occur. 
As discussed in the findings, the court believes respondent 
SHOULD have visitation with this child. Had the court been 
required to analyze the facts with the best interest of the child 
in mind, as noted, the basic recommendations of the evaluator 
would largely have been adopted. However, as a legal 
determination the court rules it cannot and does not examine the 
best interest of the child as respondent has no legal right to 
seek or obtain visitation with a step child that has not been 
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adopted. 
2. As to the division of the sale proceeds from the marital 
home, the only issue deals with the $167,390 in the trust account 
of petitioner's counsel. As found, the home was certainly and 
beyond dispute purchased with pre-marital and separate funds, all 
funds coming from the trust of respondent, including the down 
payment and purchase price, as well as remodel cost, insurances 
and taxes. The trust funds the parties lived on before 
separation were put into a checking account that bore the name of 
respondent, not petitioner, but the funds were spent on marital 
expenses and living expenses. The residence, however, was titled 
in both names, as joint tenants then as tenants in common. 
In considering this issue the court is to consider when the 
property was acquired, its source, the standard of living of the 
parties, their respective financial conditions, their need and 
earning capacity, the duration of marriage, the health of the 
parties, children, any relationship to alimony.and child support, 
the contributions by one party, and any enhanced value of the 
property. Normally interest or enhanced value on pre-marital 
property remains pre-marital unless it has become commingled. 
Petitioner contends that the home is marital property as it 
has become commingled. 
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Both the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court 
have long held that "once a court has determined that something 
is marital property, the court may distribute it equitably, 
notwithstanding which party's name appears on the title." 
Hoagland v. Hoagland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (citations omitted). The Utah Code permits parties to 
transfer premarital property into marital property: "[a] 
conveyance, transfer or lien executed by either husband or wife 
to or in favor of the other shall be valid to the same extent as 
between other persons." Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-3 (1953). 
Nonetheless, NNthe state of title to marital property prior to a 
divorce decree is not necessarily binding on the trial court in 
its distribution of such property pursuant to such decree. The 
trial court is empowered to make such distributions as are just 
and equitable, and may compel such conveyances as are necessary 
to that end." Jackson v. Jackson, 611 P.2d 338, 340-341 (Utah 
1980) . 
MIn appropriate circumstances, one spouse may be awarded 
property which the other spouse brought into the marriage. The 
rationale behind this exception to the general rule is that 
^marital property ^encompasses all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever 
source derived,'' . . . . and that the trial court may, in the 
exercise of its broad discretion, divide the property equitably 
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regardless of its source or time of acquisition." Rogue v. Rogue, 
831 P.2d 120, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
Notwithstanding a trial court's broad power to divide 
marital property equitably, x'[i]n some instances, equity will 
require that each party to a divorce recover the separate 
property he or she brought to the marriage. E.g., Preston v. 
Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982). However, that rule is not 
invariable." Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1982). 
In Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 881 (Ut. App. 1999), relied on 
by petitioner, the Utah Court of Appeals looked to the intent of 
the parties when transferring premarital property to the marital 
estate and whether there was an evident intent to change the 
nature of that property to marital property. Where there is no 
intention to create a one-half property interest in the other 
spouse nor any expectation on the part of the other spouse that 
he or she has received a one-half property interest, a court may 
freely confer the property to the party who brought it into the 
marriage. See generally Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 
(Utah 1980) . 
The original rule for what courts should do with such 
property and when exceptions may apply was determined in 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 160 P.2d 304, 309 (Utah 1988), where the 
Court stated: 
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[I]n Utah, trial courts making "equitable" property division 
pursuant to section 30-3-5 should . . . generally award 
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance 
during the marriage (or property acquired in exchange 
thereof) to that spouse, together with any appreciation or 
enhancement of its value, unless (1) the other spouse has by 
his or her efforts or expense contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, 
thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, Dubois v. 
Dubois, supra, or (2) the property has been consumed or its 
identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the 
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to 
the other spouse. Cf. Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 
(Utah 1980). An exception to this rule would be where part 
or all of the gift or inheritance is awarded to the nondonee 
or nonheir spouse in lieu of alimony . . . The remaining 
property should be divided equitably between the parties as 
in other divorce cases, but not necessarily with strict 
mathematical equality. . . . in making that division, the 
donee or heir spouse should not lose the benefit of his or 
her gift or inheritance by the trial court's automatically 
or arbitrarily awarding the other spouse an equal amount of 
the remaining property which was acquired by their joint 
efforts to offset the gifts or inheritance. Any significant 
disparity in the division of the remaining property should 
be based on an equitable rationale other than on the sole 
fact that one spouse is awarded his or her gifts or 
inheritance. The fact that one spouse has inherited or 
donated property, particularly if it is income-producing, 
may properly be considered as eliminating or reducing the 
need for alimony by that spouse or as a source of income for 
the payment of child support or alimony (where awarded) by 
that spouse. Such property might also be utilized to provide 
housing for minor children or utilized in other 
extraordinary situations where equity so demands. These 
rules will preserve and give effect to the right that 
married persons have always had in this state to separately 
own and enjoy property. It also accords with the normal 
intent of donors or deceased persons that their gifts and 
inheritances should be kept within their family and 
succession should not be diverted because of divorce. 
The Bradford Court noted that in Mortensen the property was 
inherited while the couple was married, however other courts have 
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also applied the Mortensen rule to property inherited before 
marriage. This trust fund was established before the marriage but 
distributed before and during the marriage. Bradford quoted 
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 814 P.2d 843, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
stating "Each party should, in general, receive the real and 
personal property he or she brought to the marriage or inherited 
during the marriage." 
In Bradford the husband "conveyed his interest in the home 
to himself and his wife as xjoint tenants with full rights of 
survivorship and not as tenants in common'" and intended at the 
time of the conveyance to give a one-half interest in the home to 
his wife. The Court consequently concluded that the transfer of 
the husband's separate property to his wife as a joint tenant 
with himself effectively transformed the subject property from 
Mr. Bradford's separate property into marital property. 
In making its conclusion a court may consider many factors, 
including whether other significant and compensating factors in 
its division of marital property justify its decision. See 
Finlayson at 849 stating, "[i]n determining whether a certain 
division of property is equitable, neither the trial court nor 
[the appellate court] considers the property division in a 
vacuum. The amount of alimony awarded and the relative earning 
capabilities of the spouses to support themselves after the 
divorce are pertinent to an equitable division of the fixed 
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assets of the marriage/'. The court may also consider the intent 
of the spouses during the conveyance, and whether the other 
spouse has acquired an equitable interest in the property by 
contributing to its upkeep, in dividing the property. 
Here, the court concludes that the actions in titling this 
property were not intended fully as gifting half the interest in 
the home to petitioner. Respondent testified that was not his 
intent, though the re-titling of the property from joint tenants 
to tenants in common appears to have been done to allow the child 
to have half the home as the heir of petitioner. ALL funds 
expended on the home were from respondent and his inheritance and 
trust fund. All remodel expenses, all insurance and taxes, and 
daily living during the basic one year the parties were together 
from July 2002-2003 came from respondent. Respondent bought a 
vehicle from inherited funds, now valued at approximately $17,000 
which petitioner drives and will retain. The titling of the 
property is not determinative, but re-titling the property as 
tenants in common shows again the desire of respondent to provide 
for the child as if petitioner died the child would be entitled, 
as envisioned by the parties at that time, to petitioner's half 
interest in the property. That conforms with the intent to aid 
the child and eventually adopt her, not with the intent of merely 
giving petitioner half the home. The adoption, as noted, never 
did occur. The court has not found factually whether there was 
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such an adoption-for-the-house discussion, but in any event there 
was no adoption. There would be very little reason for the 
tenancy in common to occur without that reason and from that the 
court concludes respondent did not intend to fully grant 
petitioner a half interest in the house absent the adoption. She 
has already received in any event $100,000 from the home, plus 
the vehicle from pre-marital funds. Respondent has not sought a 
return of those funds. 
Based on all the circumstances the court believes that 
respondent is entitled to retain the bulk of the remaining funds 
from the sale of the home that remain in the trust fund of 
counsel for petitioner. The court awards respondent $135,000 of 
the $167,390 and those amounts should be distributed immediately 
to the parties, petitioner receiving the remaining amount. The 
court believes that provides equity to the parties. The property 
remained largely pre-marital but there is some indication of an 
intent to commingle the property. An equal distribution does not 
seem equitable under all the circumstances. Respondent moved 
away from his family and life long home in Texas, provided for 
petitioner and the child with pre-marital funds, and ought to 
retain the bulk of what he brought into the marriage. Again, 
petitioner did not contribute to the home in any way other than 
living in it and presumably doing normal cleaning and basic 
maintenance on the home, though there was no testimony concerning 
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anything she did. Petitioner probably has the greater need but 
all factors discussed lead the court to this conclusion that 
respondent is awarded $135,000 of the funds remaining and 
petitioner is awarded the remainder. 
3. As to alimony the court considers the statutory and case 
law factors including the finances and needs of petitioner, the 
earning capacity and ability to produce of petitioner, the 
ability of respondent to provide support, the length of marriage, 
any children, what work petitioner did to help respondent with 
his income production, whether petitioner helped increase the 
skill or education of respondent, the debts of parties, their 
standard of living, what each party gave and gave up, what each 
party brought into marriage, their ages, health, overall 
abilities, any extraordinary sacrifice, and the court may 
consider fault. 
As discussed to some extent above the court concludes 
respondent is simply not able to provide any support to 
petitioner. She has need, probably more than the court has 
found, but respondent, even "taking away" his large house 
payments cannot provide support based on his last three year 
income. Prior to that he had a trust fund which is now depleted. 
He works full time in an occupation that ought to provide at some 
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time but now that income is simply and altogether insufficient to 
provide for two households. 
The court finds it ironic that petitioner in fact is 
including in her needs some expenses for the child, yet her 
position is that respondent has no right or ability to have 
visitation. The court has agreed with that legal position but 
does not agree that any need expressed by petitioner should 
include any expenses of her child. 
The parties spent a good deal of time on fault, petitioner 
claiming respondent yelled, tried to kill her, and watched 
pornography. Respondent, as all courts have come to expect, 
responded that petitioner yelled, she watched more pornography 
than he did, and he did not attempt kill her and that she laid in 
bed all day and overdosed intentionally on prescription drugs at 
least twice. That is precisely the reason fault is a minimal 
factor, at least to this court, in awarding alimony. Neither 
party was all right or all wrong. Fault is not a significant 
factor at all in this case. 
Weighing and considering all factors and as discussed above, 
despite the need, respondent is not able to provide support to 
petitioner and no alimony is awarded. 
4. As to the contempt of petitioner the court finds 
respondent has not proven contempt for the reasons discussed. 
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The court has expressed its complete dissatisfaction with 
petitioner's behavior and has basically found, though it is 
really irrelevant given what the court has done, that petitioner 
is the cause of the failure of visitation. Still, the court 
cannot find that the failure to follow the temporary orders was 
done in such a way that contempt would have any meaning in this 
case. There would be no purpose in "punishing" petitioner at 
this point. Any theory of punishment, retribution or specific 
deterrence, has no meaning in this context as this will not be 
repeated. The court could merely punish petitioner but again the 
court sees no value in doing so. Respondent's request to have 
petitioner found in contempt for failure to provide visitation 
according to the temporary orders is denied. 
5. As to attorney fees given what has been discussed it is 
apparent that neither party is financially able to pay the fees 
of the other party. Each party will receive some of the trust 
fund money currently held by counsel that remains from the sale 
of the home and each is able now to provide for their own 
attorney fees. Neither party has prevailed in such a way that 
the court believes that party is entitled to attorney fees. In 
addition, neither is able to provide for the fees to the other. 
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The visitation time issue has been difficult for the court. 
The court comments that it wishes there could be some 
reunification. The only consolation to the court in making this 
difficult decision that takes this child out of the life of 
respondent and is not in her best interests is that as a 
practical matter this probably is effective for only a couple of 
years. Normally when children are approximately age 16 they 
pretty much see who they want to see in any event after they 
become "mobile" and able to drive, and that is absolutely true 
legally at age 18. When this child is more mature perhaps she 
will see things differently. A child normally cannot have too 
many people who love that child. 
The parties are to work together to prepare an order in 
compliance with URCP, Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. THIS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION IS HEREBY INCORPORATED INTO THE FINAL DECREE 
AND IS CONSIDERED PART OF THE COURT'S ORDER. The order the court 
signs must fully incorporate this decision into the final order. 
No additional findings of fact are needed and the supplemental 
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decree is to conform to this order. 
1/ / ( f 
DATED this L__ \ day of *-• ' ' , 2007 
H 
BY THE COURT: ^ 
—. - >- ^ : Z, 
BRUCE C. L U B E C K : | T 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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ReidTateoka(3193) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
170 South Main Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
6300 North Silver Creek Road, park City, Utah 84098 
TRACY STRUASS, TEMPORARY ORDERS 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DAVID TUSCHMAN, 
Respondent. 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on Petitioner's Motion for Temporary 
Orders before the Honorable Bruce Lubeck at 1:30 p.m. on June 30, 2005. Petitioner, Tracy 
Strauss, was present, represented by her counsel, Reid Tateoka of McKay, Burton & Thurman. 
Respondent, David Tuschman was present, represented by his counsel, Maria L. Booth. Having 
heard the argument of counsel and good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The Court approves the appointment of a visitation evaluator to assist the Court in 
determining appropriate visitation for this matter. 
2. The Court will approve an evaluator agreed upon by the parties. If the parties 
cannot agree the Court requests that each party select three evalu^tors and submit them to the 
] M » „ 19 PHI?: 
as 
Civil No. 044500158 
Judge Bruce Lubeck 
Court and the Court will select one of the evaluators. 
3. The parties shall refrain from making derogatory comments about the other in the 
presence of Ruzele Strauss. 
4. The parties shall instruct third parties not to make derogatory comments regarding 
Tracy Strauss or David Tuschman in the presence of Ruzele and that Ruzele should be removed 
from the presence of third parties who are making derogatory comments regarding Tracy Strauss 
or David Tuschman. 
5. The Court orders that a Guardian ad Litem be appointed in this case. 
6. The Court finds that a relationship has been established between minor child, 
Ruzele Strauss, and her stepfather, Respondent, David Tuschman. 
7. The Court finds that support has been paid. 
8. The Court finds that David Tuschman is entitled to visitation. 
9. The Court orders that pornography not be available in the home during visitation 
with the minor child, Ruzele Struass. 
10. The Court orders that any and all personal property taken by Petitioner from 
Respondent must be returned to him. 
11. The Court orders that any files, including financial and legal files of Respondent 
which may have been taken by Petitioner, must be returned to him or immediately destroyed. 
12. Respondent is granted visitation with the minor child as follows: 
a. Week 1; visitation will begin on Saturday, July 2 with visitation on Thursday, 
July 7 and Friday, July 8. Each of these visits will be for a period of 1 hour and will be in the 
home of Ruzele Strauss. 
b. Week 2; visitation will be three supervised visits of 2 hours each.. 
c. Week 3; visitation will be three 1 hour unsupervised visits of 1 hour each, 
conditioned upon Respondent's enrollment in an anger management class or an evaluation showing 
that such class is not necessary. 
d. Week 4; visitation shall be as stipulated pursuant to the November Stipulation 
of the parties, ie, Tuesday afternoons 3:00 p.m. - 6:30 p.m. and Friday 3:00 p.m. overnight until 
Saturday at 6:30 p.m. 
e. Telephone calls should be allowed on a regular frequent basis. The parties have 
agreed that Respondent should be entitled to a daily telephone call with Ruzele at 7:00 p.m. 
DATED this \ H day of July, 2005. 
£/ 
Bruce Lubeck 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
lik cP - "'V,'<'///,,m,,\\v\S'-X <J> 
Maria t/. Booth 
Attorney for Respondent 
Approved as to form: 
Reid Tateoka^ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY STRAUSS, 
Petitioner, 
PARENT TIME EVALUATION 
SUMMARY 
vs. 
DAVID TUSCHMAN 
Respondent, 
Civil No.044500158 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
Commissioner 
MINOR CHILD AND DATE OF BIRTH: 
Ruzele Carol Ann Strauss DOB: January 17, 1994 
APPOINTED EVALUATOR: Anna Trupp, L.C.S.W. 
DATE OF REPORT: July 31, 2007 
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER: Amy E. Hayes Kennedy 
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT: Maria L. Booth 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM: Marianne McGregor Guelker 
Nature of Evaluation 
Initially, with the assistance of a mediator, Ms. Strauss and Mr. Tuschman were able to 
reach an agreeable visitation schedule but experienced a great deal of conflict with 
implementing the schedule. After several failed attempts to facilitate visitation and a 
long lapse in contact between Mr. Tuschman and Ruzele, the Court ordered a parent-time 
evaluation be completed. Although the evaluation was ordered in October 2005, the 
process did not begin until March 2006 as Ms. Strauss had not returned the necessary 
form to the evaluator nor had she paid her portion of the initial retainer until March 21, 
2006. 
Case History 
Ms. Strauss and Mr. Tuschman were married in June 1996. They separated numerous 
times throughout the marriage and permanently separated in May 2004. Prior to 
marrying, Ms. Strauss and Mr. Tuschman engaged in a long distance relationship. Ms. 
Strauss lived in California and Mr. Tuschman lived in Texas. Their courtship lasted 
approximately two years prior to them marrying. During the courtship, the parties 
frequently visited each other and had significant phone contact when not visiting. During 
Parent-time bvaluation 
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this time Mr. Tuschman became acquainted with Ms. Strauss's 8 month old daughter, 
Ruzele, who Ms. Strauss conceived in a prior relationship. Ms. Strauss did not maintain 
contact with Ruzele's biological father and he had no contact with Ruzele. In June 1996 
Ms. Strauss and Mr. Tuschman married and she and Ruzele, who at the time was two and 
a half years, moved to Texas where Mr. Tuschman lived. 
Early in the marriage Mr. Tuschman and Ms. Strauss began experiencing marital 
difficulties. Ms. Strauss indicated that Mr. Tuschman became increasingly controlling 
and verbally abusive towards her. In 1997, during a visit from her mother, Ms. Strauss 
decided to separate from Mr. Tuschman and move back to her mother's home in Park 
City, Utah. Ms. Strauss indicated that her decision to move was a result of her 
experiencing ongoing verbal abuse by Mr. Tuschman as well as an incident where Mr. 
Tuschman became angry with her and "raged" at her in the presence of Ruzele. Ms. 
Strauss indicated that witnessing this incident traumatized Ruzele to the point that Ruzele 
was fearful of being around Mr. Tuschman. 
Mr. Tuschman perceived Ms. Strauss's decision to separate as being strongly motivated 
by Ms. Strauss's mother, Carol, as well as by her heightened reliance and dependence on 
her mother. Furthermore, Mr. Tuschman did not perceive the move as a separation in the 
marriage as he indicated that he and Ms. Strauss were still very much in love and were 
not considering divorce. While living apart Mr. Tuschman indicated that he engaged in 
counseling and worked with Ms. Strauss to improve their marital relationship. They 
maintained daily phone contact with her and Ruzele and he visited them every 3-6 weeks. 
After three years of living separately Mr. Tuschman and Ms. Strauss decided to purchase 
a home in Jeremy Ranch. Mr. Tuschman moved into this home in November 2000. Ms. 
Strauss followed in January 2001, after Mr. Tuschman completed some household 
repairs. Over the next two years Ms. Strauss and Mr. Tuschman continued to have 
marital problems and engaged in frequent arguments which at times became verbally 
heated. As a result Ms. Strauss moved out of the Jeremy Ranch home on several 
occasions, each time returning to her mother's home. After the situation calmed down, 
Ms. Strauss would return home. 
During this time Mr. Tuschman indicated that he noticed a marked change in Ms. 
Strauss's behaviors. He indicated that she displayed increased depressive symptoms and 
found her to be sleeping a great deal of the time, isolating herself and refusing to get out 
of bed for extended periods of time. She also displayed increased instability in mood and 
was increasingly irritable. Mr. Tuschman also became progressively more concerned 
about Ms. Strauss's use of prescription medication during this time. Mr. Tuschman 
reported that Ms. Strauss struggled to maintain normal daily activities and became less 
involved in Ruzele's care and activities. Although already very involved, Mr. Tuschman 
assumed more responsibility for caring for Ruzele. He provided daily care and 
participated in her academics, attending school functions and assisting Ruzele with the 
majority of her home work. Mr. Tuschman also said that he spent a great deal of time 
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with Ruzele since she was very young and that he was mutually responsible for ensuring 
that her basic physical and emotional needs were met. 
In May 2004 Ms. Strauss was hospitalized after overdosing on prescription drugs. While 
in the hospital, Ms. Strauss began questioning Mr. Tuschman's handling of the situation, 
feeling that he delayed in seeking medial attention for her by waiting until Ms. Strauss's 
mother arrived at the home and encouraged him to call for assistance. She views his 
delay as negligent and felt he was attempting to allow her to die. As a result of this, Ms. 
Strauss again moved from the marital home and moved back to her mother's. Ms. 
Strauss and Mr. Tuschman never reconciled after this. 
After permanently separating, Mr. Tuschman began exercising visitation with Ruzele and 
voluntarily began paying child support. Mr. Tuschman indicated that visitation became 
increasingly inconsistent and in November 2004 he and Ms. Strauss went to mediation. In 
mediation they were able to develop an agreed upon visitation schedule. Ms. Strauss 
agreed to allow Mr. Tuschman visitation as outlined in Utah Code Annotated section 30-
3-35. 
Mr. Tuschman visited with Ruzele as agreed to in the mediation for approximately two 
months. In early 2005, Mr. Tuschman again began to experience difficulties in receiving 
visitation. He indicated that Ruzele would frequently have other obligations that 
conflicted with his visits or simply would not be available when he attempted to visit. 
Furthermore, Mr. Tuschman also noticed that Ruzele becoming increasingly dependant 
on Ms. Strauss. She began contacting Ms. Strauss numerous times during visitation and 
would contact her for permission to engage in activities and for food selection advice 
when they were at a restaurant together. Mr. Tuschman found these calls and text 
messages to be extremely disruptive as Ruzele would communicate with her mother for a 
large portion of the visit and was becoming increasingly detached and less responsive to 
him. He also was concerned that Ruzele was becoming less self reliant than she had 
previously been and was not developing a relationship with her mother similar to that Ms. 
Strauss has with her own mother. 
In January 2005, Ms. Strauss elected to facilitate contact between Ruzele and her 
biological father, Robert Hayden. Prior to January 2005, Mr. Hayden had been unaware 
that he and Ms. Strauss had a child as Ms. Strauss's mother had told him that the 
pregnancy had not been successful and that Ms. Strauss had experienced a miscarriage. 
Ms. Strauss says that this contact occurred because Ruzele had been told when she was 
five years old that Ms. Tuschman was not her biological father and in January 2005 made 
the decision to initiate contact with Mr. Hayden. After ensuring that Mr. Hayden was 
receptive to having a relationship with Ruzele, Ms. Strauss arranged for contact to begin. 
Ruzele indicates that she is very attached to her biological father and her half siblings. 
She has accepted Mr. Hayden as her father and is very interested in continuing this 
relationship with him and her half siblings. Mr. Hayden and Ruzele continue to have 
contact by telephone on a regular basis, but have visited on a very limited basis. 
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Over the next few months visitation between Mr. Tuschman and Ruzele occurred less 
frequently and eventually stopped occurring at all. In May 2005, while Mr. Tuschman 
was away on business, Ms. Strauss took possession of the Jeremy Ranch home, a home 
that Ms. Strauss had not lived in since separating from Mr. Tuschman in May 2004. Ms. 
Strauss also moved her mother, Carol, and Ruzele into the home with her. Upon 
returning from his business trip, Mr. Tuschman found that Ms. Strauss had changed the 
locks on the home and he was unable to access the home and his possessions. When 
unable to resolve this situation with the assistance of police, Mr. Tuschman sought 
assistance from the court. In the motion that he filed he asked the court to allow him 
access to the home. He also requested the court enforce the already agreed to visitation 
schedule as he had not visited with Ruzele since approximately March 2005. On May 15, 
2005 the court ordered Ms. Strauss to vacate the home and awarded Mr. Tuschman 
visitation with Ruzele as previously agreed to, which consisted of Tuesday's from 3:30 
to7:00 p.m. and every other weekend from Friday at 1:30 until Saturday at 8:00 p.m. 
While in the home Ms. Strauss indicated that she accidentally found "hard core" 
pornography on Mr. Tuschman's computer. Ms. Strauss indicated that Mr. Tuschman 
admitted to having a pornography addiction shortly after moving into the Jeremy Ranch 
home, but had promised to never look it pornography again. After finding this material, 
Ms. Strauss became extremely worried about Ruzele's safety as the pornography was 
found on a computer that Ruzele was allowed to use and could be easily located. Mr. 
Tuschman denies these allegations and claims that Ms. Strauss took a great deal of his 
personal possessions including legal files, tax documents and the majority of the 
memorabilia of their marriage and his time with Ruzele. 
Shortly after the May 2005 court ordered that visitation occur, Ms. Strauss enrolled 
Ruzele in counseling with Roxi Nelson, L.C.S.W. Ms. Strauss indicated that she sought 
treatment for Ruzele as she was concerned that Ruzele did not want a relationship with 
Mr. Tuschman and feared that this was abnormal. Ruzele regularly attended counseling 
with Ms. Nelson until summer 2006. Ms. Nelson indicated that she had not seen Ruzele 
consistently in over one*year stated that appointments were scheduled more on an as 
needed basis. 
Mr. Tuschman continued to experience difficulties with visitation and again asked the 
Court to assist with enforcing the prior order. On June 30, 2005 the Court entered a 
finding that a relationship between Ruzele and Mr. Tuschman had been established and 
that Mr. Tuschman was entitled to visitation. The Court again ordered visitation to occur 
but developed a graduated schedule. The outlined schedule was to begin with short 
contacts that occurred at the home of Ms. Strauss than move to supervised visits with the 
goal of moving towards resuming the previously agreed upon visitation schedule. 
The initial visitation at the Strauss home was extremely difficult. Ruzele was very 
resistant to having any contact with Mr. Tuschman and Mr. Tuschman was met with a 
great deal of resistance. Mr. Tuschman reported several incidents of Ruzele responding 
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to him abruptly or in a hostile fashion. He stated that contact often did not occur because 
either Ruzele would refuse to see him and close the door on him or that he would be 
informed by Ms. Strauss or one of her family member that Ruzele was refusing to visit. 
Mr. Tuschman also reported incidents where Ruzele would covertly act affectionate 
towards him or quietly tell him she loved him, acting this way in an attempt not to be 
caught by her mother or her maternal family members being affectionate towards him. 
In July 2005 after completing the mandatory number of visits at the Strauss's home, Mr. 
Tuschman began visiting Ruzele under the supervision of Willwin staff. Ruzele 
continued to express resistance to visiting with Mr. Tuschman. Willwin reported 
experiencing difficulties at the beginning of visitation and at times found it necessary to 
try to persuade Ruzele to participate, frequently giving then eleven year old Ruzele the 
opportunity to select activities for them to do during the visit or to structure the visit the 
way she wanted, even allowing the maternal grandmother to attend a visit as this was the 
only way that Ruzele would agree to go. 
During these struggles, Willwin found Ms. Strauss, her mother and her sister to be less 
than supportive of the visitation and indicated that at times they made things more 
difficult by dismissing suggestions that the supervisor made to encourage Ruzele. They 
also noted incidents of Ms. Strauss "circling" the park during visitation time. Although 
Ruzele continued to be resistant to visitation and maintained her stance of not wanting to 
see Mr. Tuschman, Willwin noticed Ruzele's demeanor improved as the visit progressed 
and found that Ruzele appeared to be more relax and interact more with Mr. Tuschman, 
at times even appearing to be enjoying herself. They also notice a remarkable change in 
Ruzele demeanor towards the end of visits in that Ruzele became more sullen and quieter 
than she had been during their interaction. 
Once the mandatory number of supervised visits where completed, Mr. Tuschman 
attempted to begin exercising unsupervised visitation. After arriving at the Strauss home 
on the previously agreed to dates and times that visitation had been ordered to occur, and 
being met with resistance and refusal, Mr. Tuschman stopped attempting to visit and 
again sought assistance from the court. Mr. Tuschman has not had regular visitation with 
Ruzele since approximately March 2005. 
Current Perspectives 
Petitioner (Ms. Tracy Strauss) 
Ms. Strauss does not want the Court to order Mr. Tuschman to receive visitation rights 
with Ruzele. She does not believe that visitation is warranted as Mr. Tuschman "is not 
her biological father", nor does she believe that visitation is in Ruzele's best interest as 
"Ruzele is afraid of David." She questions Mr. Tuschman's motivation for seeking 
visitation and believes that he is not genuinely interested in Ruzele or Ruzele's best 
interest. She believes Mr. Tuschman is more concerned about "his appearance and what 
people think of him" as opposed to caring for Ruzele and wanting a relationship with her. 
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She believes Mr. Tuschman is very embarrassed by Ms. Strauss's decision to divorce him 
and by the negative appearance that may accompany this decision, and thinks that he is 
pursuing visitation with Ruzele as a way to improve his image and to gain retribution 
against her. 
Ms. Strauss is aware of Mr. Tuschman's accusation that she is alienating Ruzele and 
vehemently denies doing this. She believes she has been supportive of Ruzele and has 
encouraged Ruzele to maintain a relationship with Mr. Tuschman. She indicates that she 
has encouraged Ruzele to call and visit with Mr. Tuschman and has even attempted to 
force her to have a relationship. She views her seeking treatment for Ruzele as evidence 
to support this claim. 
Although she indicates that she is supportive of the relationship, Ms. Strauss admits that 
she does not believe that forcing Ruzele to have a relationship with Mr. Tuschman is best 
for Ruzele. Ms. Strauss is very concerned that Mr. Tuschman continues to struggle with 
managing his anger and fears that Ruzele will be susceptible to witnessing his "rages." 
She is also concerned that Ruzele may be exposed to pornographic material as she 
believes Mr. Tuschman is addiction to "hard core" pornography and fears that Ruzele 
may accidentally find this on his computer. 
Ms. Strauss is very confused that the court is even entertaining Ms. Tuschman's request 
for visitation and felt that their long periods of separation should not be considered even 
though Mr. Tuschman maintained regular contact and continued to financially support 
them. She does not view his support and contact as being related to the level of his 
attachment to the child and does not believe that contact and financial support alone 
should constitute a relationship. She believes that Ruzele's has been consistent in her 
desire to not have a relationship with Mr. Tuschman and stated that Ruzele has "never" 
been emotionally close to Mr. Tuschman nor did she view him as a father figure. Ms. 
Strauss indicated that she believes Ruzele has never had a strong attachment to Mr. 
Tuschman and reports that Ruzele has "made if clear her entire life that she does not want 
to be with David." She also indicates that Ruzele is afraid of Mr. Tuschman and that she 
has been throughout the entire relationship. Ruzele's fear stemmed from her being 
exposed to and a victim of Mr. Tuschman's verbal abuse and rages. She says that while it 
may have appeared that Ruzele was connected to Mr. Tuschman it was simply Ruzele's 
way of keeping the peace and preventing Mr. Tuschman from becoming verbally abusive. 
Ms. Strauss indicates that she does not believe that it is in her best interest to be forced to 
have contact with Mr. Tuschman and is very concerned about the emotional toll that this 
will have on Ruzele. She indicates that Ruzele has struggled immensely since Mr. 
Tuschman began fighting for visitation and believes that Ruzele continues to 
decompensate as this fight goes on. She has seen a decline in Ruzele's academic 
performance and in her ability to manage on a daily basis. She reports that when forced to 
have contact Ruzele experiences increased anxiety and stress and has emotional problems 
that manifest through bed wetting, excessive crying and self harming behaviors. She also 
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endorses that Ruzele experiences an increase in somatic and legitimate physical 
complaints when she is forced to have contact with Mr. Tuschman. She reports that 
Ruzele is angry at Mr. Tuschman for trying to force her to visit him and upset that he is 
not honoring his promise to not force her to visit. 
Respondent (Mr. Tuschman) 
Mr. Tuschman believes that he should be granted parent-time with Ruzele Strauss 
because he has acted as her father since Ruzele was merely 8 months old. He believes he 
has treated Ruzele as though she were his biological child and claims that he "was the 
only father that she knew" prior to January 2005 when Ms. Strauss initiated contact 
between Ruzele and her biological father. Mr. Tuschman perceives Ms. Strauss's choice 
to introduce Ruzele to her biological father as manipulative and an attempt to negatively 
impact his motion for visitation. Although not against Ruzele having a relationship with 
her biological father, Mr. Tuschman is fearful that this relationship will also be 
minimized and removed once Ms. Strauss and her family feel the biological father is no 
longer beneficial in the court proceeding. 
Mr. Tuschman indicated he has always felt as though he was Ruzele's father. He 
indicated that he and Ms. Strauss have discussed the possibility of him adopting Ruzele 
on several occasions, the first occurring shortly before marrying. Mr. Tuschman 
indicated that they did not proceed with the adoption at that time as Ms. Strauss changed 
her mind after being informed that it was necessary to notify the biological father and get 
his consent. Mr. Tuschman again reiterated his desire to adopt in 2001 at the time that he 
and'Ms. Strauss were purchasing the Jeremy Ranch home and again he stated that Ms. 
Strauss agreed but asked that they wait a few months. Although he was unable to adopt 
Ruzele, he continues to view her as his daughter and reports loving her as though she was 
his biological daughter. 
Mr. Tuschman believes that he and Ruzele had a close relationship and is saddened by 
the distance that exists between them now. He perceives Ruzele's resistance as being 
motivated by her mother and maternal family members and fears that Ruzele is acting 
this way to ensure acceptance from the maternal family members. He denies Ms. 
Strauss's claims that Ruzele was never attached to him and describes them as having a 
very good and loving relationship since before he and Ms. Strauss married. He described 
times when Ms. Strauss would teasingly call Ruzele "daddy's girl" as they spent so much 
time together and Ruzele frequently wanted to be with him. Mr. Tuschman indicated that 
he has always been actively involved in raising Ruzele and was involved in Ruzele's 
academics and frequently participated in the classroom activities or attended field trips. 
While living apart, Mr. Tuschman indicated that he ensured that he had daily contact with 
Ruzele and saw her frequently. After moving to Utah, he became more involved with 
providing care for Ruzele as Ms. Strauss become increasingly unable to provide care as 
her physical and mental health decompensate. 
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Mr. Tuschman indicates his motivation for pursuing court ordered visitation with Ruzele 
is based solely on the fact that he loves Ruzele and he wants to help her grow into an 
independent and strong adult. He believes he has a lot to offer her in accomplishing 
independence and is very concerned that Ruzele's long-term well being will be 
significantly compromised by the dependence and enmeshment that her current 
environment endorses. He believes he could be a wonderful role model for her and that 
she would have a better chance to develop emotional independence if he were allowed to 
be involved in her life and believes that he could assist her in developing into a strong 
and independent person. He wants Ruzele to develop skills that will help her develop 
healthy inner personal relationships in her adulthood and that will assist her in gaining 
independence. He is fearful that the current environment that she is in and the lack of a 
significant positive male role model could result in her experiencing difficulties in 
achieving these skills. He is further concerned by what he perceives to be exposure to a 
heightened level of hostility directed at males in her current environment as he fears it 
may instill a level of hatred towards men, similar to that he believes the maternal family 
has. He is worried that Ruzele will struggle with independence and mental health issues 
similar to her mother as the environment and the authority figures that she is residing 
with encourages and reinforces these characteristics. 
Child (Ruzele Strauss) 
Ruzele consistently indicates that she is not interested in having a relationship with Mr. 
Tuschman. She has not wavered in her stated lack of desire to have a relationship with 
Mr. Tuschman. She maintains that she is fearful of him and describes him as being 
"abusive" towards her and her mother throughout the marriage. Her memories of Mr. 
Tuschman all focus on him yelling, screaming, and him being abusive towards her and 
her mother. In an effort to ensure that visitation did not occur, Ruzele told the examiner 
that she had previously informed her therapist, Ms. Nelson, that Mr. Tuschman had 
sexually abused her. She recanted this statement shortly afterward, saying that she only 
said this because she thought it would "get him out of her life." 
Ruzele said that she is very confused by Mr. Tuschman's insistence to have visitation 
with her and views this as his attempt to "cause pain." She believes if he truly loved her 
he would do what she wanted which is to have him leave her alone. Being that he 
continues to pursue visitation, Ruzele views his efforts as being negative and maliciously 
motivated. 
During the evaluation Ruzele said she had never felt attached to Mr. Tuschman and 
refused to recall any positive memory that she had with Mr. Tuschman. She was unable 
remember times with Mr. Tuschman that was good or enjoyable and at times simply had 
no memories that included him. She indicated that Mr. Tuschman had not been actively 
involved in raising her nor did he participate in providing care for her when her mother 
was. married to him. In a further attempt to minimize Mr. Tuschman's involvement in her 
life, Ruzele stating he visited only three times per year after she and her mother moved 
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from Texas to Utah, a statement that did not correlate with what Ms. Strauss or Mr. 
Tuschman said as they stated visiting occurred approximately every three to six weeks. 
Ruzele denies the claim that her mother or maternal family members are discouraging her 
from having a relationship with Mr. Tuschman and indicates that her desire is based 
solely on her own feelings. She indicated that her mother has pushed her to attend 
visitation and to communicate with him and has been very supportive of her having 
contact with Mr. Tuschman. She denies that her mother shared information related to the 
divorce with her and when asked how she became aware of the courts ordered visitation 
stating "my mom, no not my mom but my aunt and grandma would tell me and I would 
get really upset." She indicated that the Guardian ad Litem had sent her a document that 
contained information related to Mr. Tuschman being addicted to pornography, an issue 
that was also very concerning to Ruzele. 
Therapeutic perspective (Roxi Nelson, L.C.S.W and Dr. Lynn Maynes: 
Ruzele began treatment with Roxi Nelson, L.C.S.W in May 2005. She attended on a 
regular basis for approximately one year at which time her attendance became sporadic 
and more on an as needed basis. Mr. Nelson met with Ruzele in April 2007 and again 
shortly after this evaluator requests to speak with Ms. Nelson. Ms. Nelson focus in 
therapy has been to assist Ruzele in processing her relationship with Mr. Tuschman as 
well as to focus on Ruzele and assist her in her emotional issues. Ms. Nelson said Ruzele 
remained resistant to discussing issues about Mr. Tuschman and when she did she was 
superficial. Ruzele has informed Ms. Nelson that she is fearful of Ms. Tuschman, but 
does not elaborate and discussed it in a very generic and unspecific manner. Ruzele 
maintained her desire to not have a relationship with Mr. Tuschman and her position that 
she was "afraid" of him and abusive towards her and her mother. She denies ever feeling 
attached to Mr. Tuschman and had told Ms. Nelson that she "detests" Mr. Tuschman. 
Ms. Nelson does not believe that it would not be in Ruzele best interest to be forced to 
have a relationship with Mr. Tuschman as she has not been given the impression that 
Ruzele has ever had a meaningful relationship with him. Furthermore, Ms. Nelson 
questions the level of Mr. Tuschman's sincerity as it is her understanding that he has not 
consistently maintained contact with Ruzele. 
Also given the fact that Ruzele endorses symptoms of trauma as a result of Mr. 
Tuschman, Ms. Nelson is concerned that Ruzele will continue to be afraid of Mr. 
Tuschman and will be repeatedly re-traumatized if forced to have contact. She is also 
concerned that the maternal family dynamics and how strongly emeshed the family unit 
is that Ruzele would never allow herself to trust Mr. Tuschman nor did she believe 
therapy will improving this relationship as Ruzele is strongly influenced by the opinions 
of her maternal family and reliant on them and going against them would be to difficult 
and costly for Ruzele. Ms. Nelson also believes that forced contact will only increase 
Ruzele's anxiety and her inability to function emotionally. 
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Although attending counseling with Roxi Nelson, L.C.S.W., the court ordered Ruzele to 
participate in Therapeutic Visitation Counseling with Dr. Lynn Maynes. Ruzele began 
attending Therapeutic Visitation Services in June 2006. After attending a few sessions, 
Ruzele discontinued her attendance as she had become upset with Dr. Maynes because 
she had allowed Mr. Tuschman to begin email communication with Ruzele. Ms. Strauss 
indicated that this contact induced a great deal of anxiety in Ruzele and resulted in 
Ruzele missing many days of school as she was emotionally distraught. 
Dr. Maynes began working with Ruzele again in January 2007, conducting five sessions 
between Ruzele and Mr. Tuschman over a two month period of time. Upon arriving to 
the first session Ruzele presented as extremely anxious and fearful. She was very distant 
and refused to interact with or look at Mr. Tuschman throughout the entire session and 
was emotional upon leaving. After the first session, which Ruzele was transported to by 
Ms. Strauss, arrangements were made for this evaluator to transport Ruzele and observe 
sessions. The decision for alternative transportation was made in an attempt to reduce 
any stress or anxiety that Ruzele may have experienced in relation to Ms. Strauss being 
present and Ruzele's need to act in a manner that would support the beliefs that she 
perceived Ms. Strauss would want. Throughout the following three sessions Ruzele 
appeared to be more relaxed and able to communicate directly with Mr. Tuschman as the 
sessions progressed. While being transported, Ruzele was relaxed, talkative and did not 
present as anxious or emotional. Ruzele also presented similarly at the conclusion of 
sessions when she was being taken to meet her mother. 
The final session was March 6, 2007. Although similar to the prior three in terms of how 
it started, who transported, etc., this visit ended abruptly only minutes after Ruzele 
entered the room where Mr. Tuschman was waiting for her. Upon entering Ruzele 
angrily stated that did not want to ever see Mr. Tuschman again and exited. In less than 
two minutes her mother and grandmother were waiting in their car by the front door. No 
further sessions occurred and Ruzele has had no communication with Mr. Tuschman 
since. 
Dr. Maine's sessions focused on providing Ruzele with a safe and secure environment 
that would allow her expression of and validation of her feelings. Ruzele was 
encouraged to identify and express her feelings and fears related to Mr. Tuschman 
without fear of him becoming angry or defensive towards her. She was asked to explore 
her relationship with Mr. Tuschman prior to the divorce and to work on identify feelings, 
both positive and negative, associated with these times. Ruzele, again, was very resistant 
to this exercise and to any discussion about her relationship with Mr. Tuschman. She 
frequently denied experiencing any positive or good times with Mr. Tuschman and only 
spoke of past times in a negative and vague manner. She was unwilling to identify 
anything positive about Mr. Tuschman or the relationship that they previously had, 
simply indicating that she could not remember. 
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During sessions Ruzele did not waiver in her lack of desire to have contact or a 
relationship with Mr. Tuschman and continued to endorse feeling fearful of Mr. 
Tuschman. Ms. Strauss reported that Ruzele was experiencing increased anxiety related 
to the therapeutic visitation and that the sessions were extremely disruptive to Ruzele's 
daily functioning. Not only did they require Ruzele to be released from school early, Ms. 
Strauss indicated that she frequently kept Ruzele home from school as she was to 
emotionally distraught to function. Ms. Strauss also reported Ruzele to be experiencing 
sleep problems and emotional disturbance. She also indicated that Ruzele appeared to be 
more depressed and had episodes of uncontrollable crying for hours. 
Clinical Impressions: 
Although she indicates otherwise it is clear that Ms. Strauss is not in support of Mr. 
Tuschman and Ruzele having a relationship. Her position is clearly demonstrated in her 
legal pleading as well as in her interpretation of events. Ms. Strauss' attempt to validate 
her cooperativeness in the process is countered with statement regarding the lack of 
attachment that existed between Ruzele and Mr. Tuschman and with statements 
questioning Mr. Tuschman's motivation. 
Ms. Strauss has provided limited and misleading information to Ms. Nelson which has 
contributed to Ms. Nelson's negative view of Mr. Tuschman and her perception that he is 
"insincere" and "uninterested." She and her family have interfered with visitation and 
have prevented it from occurring. They have not been supportive of suggestions offered 
that may have reduced Ruzele's level of resistance regarding visitation with Mr. 
Tuschman. Additionally, she clearly demonstrated a lack of support for the therapeutic 
visitation process as demonstrated by her conveniently being available at the front of Dr. 
Maynes office after Ruzele walked out of therapy only minutes after it began. Not only 
was her availability suspicious but her willingness to allow Ruzele to leave therapy with 
no encouragement to return clearly demonstrated her desire for the process to be 
unsuccessful. 
Ms. Strauss's decision to introduce Ruzele to her biological father in the middle of such 
emotional turmoil in Ruzele's life is questionable as this choice increased Ruzele's 
emotional instability and created confiision. This introduction added distress and 
uncertainty in Ruzele as she is now confronted with rejecting one father figure and 
replacing him with her biological father, a stranger whom she has not been allowed 
contact with for the first 11 years of her life. Further, this appears to be another attempt 
by Ms. Strauss to minimize the role that Mr. Tuschman had historically played in 
Ruzele's life. This evaluator is greatly concern that in future Ruzele's may again be 
placed in the position of rejecting her biological father as he may become expendable or 
to difficult for Ms. Strauss or her family, just as Mr. Tuschman has. 
Ms. Strauss and Ruzele share a similar pattern in that they appear to only endorse one 
side of a situation, in that it is either all good or all bad. Although Ms. Strauss used 
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yelling as a way of expressing herself when in conflict with Mr. Tuschman, she views 
Mr. Tuschman's yelling as "extremely abusive." She indicates that Ruzele has been so 
traumatized by Mr. Tuschman's to the extend that she is displays symptoms consistent 
with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder yet neither abusive behavior but neither she or 
Ruzele can elaborate on any specific incident or series of incidents that may have lead to 
her reported feelings of being traumatized. Any references were vague and ambiguous 
and frequently were simply terms like "he yelled" or he had "rages" and was "abusive." 
This ambiguity is not consistent with the level of anxiety and stress that Ms. Strauss 
indicates Ruzele experiences as a result of Mr. Tuschman pursuing a relationship. 
It is my impression that the core issue for Ms. Strauss is her struggle to understand and 
accept the importance that Mr. Tuschman has played in Ruzele's life. She minimizes the 
fact that Mr. Tuschman has acted in the role of Ruzele's father since she was an infant 
and is unable to validate any positive experiences either between her and Mr. Tuschman 
or Mr. Tuschman and Ruzele. She perceives his involvement as minimal and 
unimportant, although he was clearly an attachment figure to Ruzele. 
Ruzele demonstrated similar coping mechanisms as her mother in that she has frequent 
somatic complaints, struggles to manage her emotion and is extremely dependant and 
influenced by the maternal relatives she resides with. She is clearly a sensitive and 
loving child who has been forced to reject her feelings for Mr. Tuschman. This behavior 
is understandable as her alliance to her mother and maternal relatives, and the fear of 
loosing their acceptance and love, outweighs any benefit that maintaining a relationship 
with Mr. Tuschman may offer. Ruzele accommodates this struggle by refusing to 
remember or believe anything positive about Mr. Tuschman. This dynamic is also 
present in the way she views her biological father, who at present is accepted by and 
approved of by Ms. Strauss and her family. She only sees him as positive and has, in a 
short period of time, become very attached to him and her half siblings. 
Ruzele appears to be stuck in her current perception that Mr. Tuschman is all bad. She is 
unable to identify anything positive or good about him and when confronted with 
information that would contradict her position, she emotionally shuts down and refuses to 
talk. Even after being involved in counseling for over two years, Ruzele continues to be 
unable to verbalize any form of prior attachment to Mr. Tuschman, although becoming 
attached to him would be a natural response to someone who had been involved in her 
life for over ten years. She refuses to explore the sudden and drastic shift in her feelings 
or to acknowledge she was loving and responsive towards Mr. Tuschman prior to his and 
Ms. Strauss's divorce. She continues to be resistant to addressing her perceived fears and 
concerns and is only able to classify issues under the label of "abuse" but is unable to 
define the meaning that "abuse" holds to her. 
Mr. Tuschman's doggedness to maintain his relationship with Ruzele is admirable. He 
does not appear to be using his relationship with Ruzele to make trouble for Ms. Strauss 
nor does he appear to be pushing visitation with Ruzele as a way to cause her pain or hurt 
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her. Mr. Tuschman's appears to be purely motivated by his love and concern for Ruzele. 
He continued to pay child support because of his sense of responsibility for the child and 
is now ordered to pay alimony to Ms. Strauss, although she is claiming the marriage only 
lasted for one year. 
Although Ms. Strauss has raised concerns related to Mr. Tuschman's ability to manage 
his anger and accused him of being addicted to pornography, Mr. Tuschman has 
undergone evaluations that have found no major psychopathology on psychological 
issues, he has no legal history and there is nothing to indicate that his presence would be 
a danger to the child. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
It is evident by his report as well as numerous reports from others who knew Ruzele and 
Mr. Tuschman and had the opportunity to observe them together that Ruzele had some 
level of attachment to Mr. Tuschman. At present Ruzele is completely polarized against 
Mr. Tuschman and has been provided a replacement "father figure", her biological father. 
Ruzele has avowed deep affection and attachment for her biological father, which is 
unlikely given her limited contact with him. 
Ruzele has been given the strong impression that her preference predicts exactly what 
will happen in terms of her contact with Mr. Tuschman. She is very aware of her 
mother's, the maternal grandmother's and maternal aunt's feelings for Mr. Tuschman. 
The level of hostility that they have for Mr. Tuschman is evident and could not fail to 
escape Ruzele. Additionally, the cost of pitting herself against her maternal family 
members is too great to risk as she is completely dependant and reliant on them. Thus she 
has no other option but to adopt the history of her attachment with Mr. Tuschman as it 
has been rewritten by her mother and grandmother. 
Although continued contact between Ruzele and Mr. Tuschman would ultimately be in 
Ruzele's best interest, it is highly unlikely that forced therapy or visitation at this juncture 
would have any success. Ms. Strauss does not believe that she should facilitate the 
relationship as per the court's order, no matter how many times she is ordered to do so. 
Sadly, Ruzele believes visitation with her stepfather, whom she once was very attached 
to, should be based strictly on her opinion. Although it is clear to this evaluator that Mr. 
Tuschman played an integral role in raising Ruzele and that Ruzele had been very 
attached to him, her opinion of him has been so influenced by the beliefs of her mother 
and maternal relatives that she cannot allow Mr. Tuschman to have any positive 
attributes. She is also unable to accept that his perseverance to have visitation with her is 
genuinely motivated. 
Additionally, Ruzele may need Mr. Tuschman to limit his efforts because she is 
exhausted by the pressure her mother and maternal relatives place on her. She needs to 
be allowed the opportunity to either enmesh or individuate from her mother and the 
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maternal family without feeling pressured from both sides, and than be provided the 
opportunity to assess her feelings at a later time. 
For these reasons it is recommended that: 
1. The Guardian ad Litem should remain in contact with Ruzele until she reaches 
the age of 18. Ruzele should be informed of all contact information about Mr. 
Tuschman (e.g. cell phone, physical location, email address) twice per year in 
the Guardian's office. During the visit with the Guardian ad Litem, Ruzele 
should be given any letters received from Mr. Tuschman, which should be 
read and remain in the possession of the Guardian ad Litem. 
2. Ms. Strauss and her family actively work with a therapist who can assist them 
in understanding the effects that broken attachments can have on children and 
who can help them to incorporate and deliver to Ruzele a more appropriate 
and supportive messages related to Mr. Tuschman. 
3. Mr. Tuschman and Ruzele visit four times per year either with a therapist 
approved by Dr. Maynes, Roxi Nelson and the Guardian ad Litem or at the 
Guardian ad Litem's office. It is important that neither Ms. Strauss, her 
maternal grandmother or her maternal aunt not be involved in this meeting in 
any manner and that a neutral third party provides transportation to these 
meetings. It is important that the dates and times be scheduled one year in 
advance and be unchangeable. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
AnnaTrupp, L.C.S.W. 
Parent-Time Evaluator 
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On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals 
PARRISH, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
K 1 Defendant Cheryl Barlow asks this court to 
overturn the district court's order granting Barlow's 
former domestic partner, Keri Jones, visitation of 
Barlow's daughter. Because Jones has no biological 
or legal relationship with the child, she has no stat-
utory standing to seek visitation. The district court, 
however, granted standing under the common law 
doctrine of in loco parentis. We must now decide 
whether Utah courts have *810 recognized, or 
should adopt, a common law doctrine granting 
standing for domestic partners of fit legal parents 
FN1
 to seek visitation of children for whom they 
had acted as parents. 
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FN1. Because biological and adoptive par-
ents enjoy identical rights under the law, 
our use of the term "legal parent" 
throughout this opinion refers equally to 
both classes of parents. 
f 2 We hold that the doctrine of in loco parentis, as 
recognized by the courts of this state, does not inde-
pendently grant standing to seek visitation after the 
in loco parentis relationship has ended. Although 
this court recognized the right of stepparents to 
seek visitation in Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 
(Utah 1978), standing in that case arose out of an 
interpretation of statutory law granting such rights, 
not from an independent common law source. We 
decline to extend the common law doctrine of in 
loco parentis to create standing where it does not 
arise out of statute. We accordingly overturn the tri-
al court's grant of visitation rights and hold that the 
common law doctrine of in loco parentis does not 
independently grant standing to seek visitation 
against the wishes of a fit legal parent. 
BACKGROUND 
11 3 Cheryl Pike Barlow and Keri Lynne Jones 
began a romantic relationship, and in time, they 
moved in together. They ultimately traveled to Ver-
mont, where they entered into a civil union. 
H 4 In November 2000, around the time they made 
their decision to enter into a civil union, Barlow 
and Jones decided to have a child together. They 
planned that Barlow would be artificially insemin-
ated and bear the child and that Jones would be arti-
ficially inseminated and bear a second child at a 
later date. Jones and Barlow selected a sperm donor 
who shared both of their characteristics and began 
the artificial insemination process. Barlow con-
ceived in February 2001. During the pregnancy, 
Jones participated in prenatal care with Barlow and 
her physician. 
H 5 On October 4, 2001, Barlow gave birth to a 
baby girl (the "child"). The birth certificate listed 
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the child's surname as "Jones Barlow." For the first 
two years of her life, both Barlow and Jones cared 
for the child. And in May 2002, the parties obtained 
an order from the Third District Court designating 
Jones and Barlow as co-guardians of the child. 
K 6 Jones and Barlow ended their relationship 
around October 2003, soon after the child's second 
birthday. Subsequently, Barlow and the child 
moved to a separate residence, and Barlow eventu-
ally ended all contact between Jones and the child. 
Barlow also petitioned the district court for an order 
removing Jones as the child's co-guardian. Jones 
objected, but the district court granted the petition. 
U 7 In December 2003, Jones brought suit in district 
court seeking a "[d]ecree of custody and visitation," 
claiming that she had standing under the common 
law doctrine of in loco parentis. The district court 
found that the doctrine of in loco parentis could 
confer standing and ordered that the proceedings be 
bifurcated. First, the parties would participate in an 
evidentiary hearing to assess whether Jones stood in 
loco parentis to the child. If the court found that 
Jones established the elements of in loco parentis, 
then the court would proceed with a best interests 
of the child analysis to determine visitation and 
custody. 
1) 8 At the conclusion of the first phase of trial, the 
district court held that Jones was in loco parentis to 
the child and thus had standing to argue that visita-
tion was in the child's best interest. The district 
court limited the second phase of the trial to issues 
of visitation and child support after finding that 
Utah's adoption statutes precluded a consideration 
of custody. Following the conclusion of the second 
phase of trial, the district court found that continued 
contact with Jones would be in the child's best in-
terest and ordered visitation. In addition, the court 
ordered Jones to provide financial support to the 
child. 
U 9 Barlow appeals the district court's 
decision.FN2 She presents five arguments: (1) the 
*811 trial court lacks jurisdiction in this case be-
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cause the in loco parentis doctrine does not grant 
Jones standing to seek visitation; (2) the trial court's 
application of the in loco parentis doctrine violates 
Barlow's constitutional rights; (3) the visitation or-
der violates Barlow's right to privacy; (4) Jones was 
never truly in loco parentis to the child; and (5) 
Jones' claims are barred by res judicata. Because 
we hold that Jones lacks standing, we reverse the 
trial court's order and decline to reach the merits of 
the remaining arguments. 
FN2. We note that the docket number for 
this case, 20040932, was originally as-
signed to a string of interlocutory appeals 
filed with the Utah Court of Appeals be-
fore the entry of final judgment by the dis-
trict court. A second docket number, 
20041031, was assigned after Barlow filed 
a direct appeal from the final judgment. On 
December 17, 2004, the court of appeals 
certified this consolidated case number to 
the Utah Supreme Court. Although this 
case number was originally assigned to the 
interlocutory appeals, we decide this case 
as an appeal from a final judgment and 
deem all unresolved interlocutory appeals 
moot under this decision. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2][3] |^ 10 In reviewing questions of common 
law standing, this court recognizes three possible 
standards of review. Determinations of the legal re-
quirements for standing are reviewed for correct-
ness. Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist. v. 
Morgan, 2003 UT 58, % 18, 82 P.3d 1125. 
However, we give deference to the district court on 
factual determinations that bear upon the question 
of standing. Id. (citing Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. 
Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997)). Finally, 
we give minimal discretion to the district court in 
its application of the facts to the law. Id. 
If 11 Because we confine our review to the district 
court's interpretation of the doctrine of in loco par-
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entis and do not address its findings of fact or ap-
plication of those facts to the law, the appropriate 
standard of review is correctness. We therefore 
grant no discretion to the district court. 
ANALYSIS 
[4][5] [6] f 12"[S]tanding is a jurisdictional require-
ment that must be satisfied" before a court may en-
tertain a controversy between two parties. Wash. 
County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 
UT 58, H 6 n. 2, 82 P.3d 1125; accord Harris v. 
Springviile City, 712 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986) 
("[L]ack of standing is jurisdictional."); Jenkins v. 
Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) ("[T]he 
moving party must have standing to invoke the jur-
isdiction of the court."). Under the traditional test 
for standing, "the interests of the parties must be 
adverse" and "the parties seeking relief must have a 
legally protectible interest in the controversy." 
Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148. A party may assert an 
interest that is legally protectible under either stat-
ute or the common law. See Morgan, 2003 UT 58, 
TI 17, 82 P.3d 1125. Recognizing that no Utah stat-
ute confers a right to seek visitation of the child, 
Jones bases her claim of a legally protectible right 
on the common law doctrine of in loco parentis. 
[7] [8] [9] K 13 The doctrine of in loco parentis is ap-
plied when someone who is not a legal parent nev-
ertheless assumes the role of a parent in a child's 
life. Cribble v. Cribble, 583 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 
1978) ("The term 'in loco parentis' means in the 
place of a parent...."); Black's Law Dictionary 803 
(8th ed. 2004) ("Of, relating to, or acting as a tem-
porary guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on 
all or some of the responsibilities of a parent."). An 
individual attains in loco parentis status by assum-
ing the "status and obligations of a parent without 
formal adoption." Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66; accord 
Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P. 457, 
459 (1925). While an individual stands in loco par-
entis to a child, he or she has the "same rights, du-
ties, and liabilities as a parent." Sparks v. 
Hinckley, 78 Utah 502, 5 P.2d 570, 571 (1931); ac-
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cord Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66; McDonald v. Texas 
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 267 S.W. 1074, 1076 
(Tex.App.1924) ("All such are said to stand in loco 
parentis, and, as long as the relation exists, the 
rights and duties with reference to the child are the 
same as those of the natural parent."). 
% 14 The central question now presented to us is 
whether the in loco parentis doctrine contemplates 
perpetuating these parent-like rights and obligations 
after a legal parent has ended the in loco parentis 
relationship. *812 Because at common law all 
rights and obligations end with the termination of 
the in loco parentis relationship, and because the 
doctrine in no way abrogates a parent's right to ter-
minate such a relationship, we conclude that Jones 
lacks standing to seek visitation. And we decline to 
expand the in loco parentis doctrine to permanently 
diminish parental rights. 
I. THE IN LOCO PARENTIS DOCTRINE DOES 
NOT CONFER STANDING TO SEEK VISITA-
TION AFTER THE PARENT-LIKE RELATION-
SHIP HAS ENDED 
[10][11] f 15 Unlike the relationship arising from 
adoption, the in loco parentis relationship is tem-
porary in nature. 59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child § 
9 (2002); Babb v. Matlock, 340 Ark. 263, 9 S.W.3d 
508, 510 (2000). In Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 
Utah 261, 236 P. 457 (1925), we endorsed the com-
mon law principle that where an individual enters 
into an in loco parentis relationship with a child, 
"the reciprocal rights, duties, and obligations of 
parent and child continue as long as such relation 
continues." Id. at 459; accord59 Am.Jur.2d Par-
ent and Child § 9 (2002) ("Once the person alleged 
to be in loco parentis no longer discharges all the 
duties incident to the parental relationship, the per-
son is no longer in loco parentis."). Thus, the ter-
mination of the in loco parentis relationship also 
terminates the corresponding parent-like rights and 
responsibilities. 59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child § 9 
(2002); State v. Randall S. (In re Interest of Des-
tiny S.)t 263 Neb.255, 639 N.W.2d 400, 406 (2002). 
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K 16 Because it is clear that Barlow effectively 
ended the in loco parentis relationship when she 
moved to another residence and refused to allow 
Jones to interact with the child, the only question 
that remains is whether such an act by a legal par-
ent qualifies as a valid termination of an in loco 
parentis relationship under the common law. Stated 
differently, the question is whether a legal parent 
may terminate the in loco parentis status by remov-
ing the child from the relationship with the surrog-
ate parent or whether the in loco parentis doctrine 
allows the surrogate parent to extend the relation-
ship against the legal parent's will. 
H 17 Before addressing the question of how an in 
loco parentis relationship may be terminated, we 
first correct a misstatement this court has made as 
to the status of the common law on this issue. It is 
universally recognized that, "[u]nlike natural and 
adoptive parenthood, the status of being in loco 
parentis is temporary; it may be abrogated at will 
either by the surrogate parent or by the child." 59 
Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child § 9 (2002) (emphasis 
added). In Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 
1978), we misconstrued this principle when we as-
serted that "[t]he common law concerning termina-
tion of the [in] loco parentis status is that only the 
surrogate parent or the child is able to terminate the 
status at will." Id. at 67 (emphasis added). This as-
sertion that the common law recognized disavowal 
by either the surrogate parent or the child as the ex-
clusive method of dissolving an in loco parentis re-
lationship was incorrect. 
f 18 When we review the authorities cited by this 
court in Gribble, we find no support for the propos-
ition that only the surrogate parent or the child may 
terminate the in loco parentis relationship. In sup-
port of that proposition, the Gribble court, 583 P.2d 
at 67 n. 13, cited two cases: the Washington Su-
preme Court decision of Taylor v. Taylor, 58 
Wash.2d 510, 364 P.2d 444 (1961), and the South 
Carolina decision of Chestnut v. Chestnut, 247 S.C. 
332, 147 S.E.2d 269 (1966). Both of these cases in-
volved attempts by men who stood in loco parentis 
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to a child to avoid child support upon divorce or 
separation from their wives. Taylor, 364 P.2d at 
444-46; Chestnut 147 S.E.2d at 270. In declaring 
that these men could avoid a support obligation, 
both courts directly quoted the following statement 
from the Iowa Supreme Court as representing the 
accepted common law: 
One important qualification is that one merely 
standing in the place of a parent may abandon the 
burdens attendant upon such status at any time. In 
McDonald v. Texas Employers' Insurance Associ-
ation it is said: "... the status of one in loco par-
entis is temporary, and may be abrogated*813 at 
will by either the person thus standing in loco 
parentis or by the child." To the same effect is 
this language from In re McCardie's Estate (95 
Colo. 250, 35 P.2d 850 (1934) ]: "It (loco par-
entis) is not, as argued, to be likened to that of 
adoption. The one is temporary in character, the 
other permanent and abiding." 
State ex rel. Gilman v. Bacon, 249 Iowa 1233, 91 
N.W.2d 395, 399 (1958) (citations omitted), quoted 
in Taylor, 364 P.2d at 445-46; Chestnut, 147 
S.E.2dat270. 
H 19 That the surrogate parent is in no way bound 
by the obligations of the in loco parentis relation-
ship does not support the somewhat contrary con-
clusion that the doctrine entitles the surrogate par-
ent to unilaterally extend the rights pertaining to 
such a relationship. In fact, there is nothing in the 
authorities we cited in Gribble justifying the con-
clusion that the in loco parentis status may be ter-
minated by only the surrogate parent or the child. 
% 20 Our research has failed to uncover a single in-
stance where a court has endorsed the proposition 
that the inherent power of the surrogate parent or 
the child to terminate the relationship is exclusive 
in nature. Quite the opposite, cases recognizing that 
the relationship may be abrogated at will by either 
party emphasize the transitory nature of the rela-
tionship, rather than the Gribble formulation of a 
relationship that is essentially permanent at the op-
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tion of the surrogate parent. See Harmon v. Dep't 
of Soc. & Health Servs., 134 Wash.2d 523, 951 
P.2d 770, 775 (1998) ("At common law the status 
of one standing in loco parentis is voluntary and 
temporary and may be abrogated at will by either 
the person standing in loco parentis or ... the 
child."); In re Agnes P., 110 N.M. 768, 800 P.2d 
202, 205 (N.M.Ct.App.1990) ( "Furthermore, an in 
loco parentis status is temporary and may be abrog-
ated at will by either the child or the surrogate par-
ent."); McDonald v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 
267 S.W. 1074, 1076 (Tex.App.1924) ("[T]he rela-
tion existing between an adopting parent and the 
child is permanent, continuing, and cannot be ab-
rogated by the parent; whilst the status of one in 
loco parentis is temporary, and may be abrogated at 
will by either the person thus standing in loco par-
entis or by the child."). In fact, a New Mexico ap-
pellate court that cited this proposition found that 
nothing within the in loco parentis doctrine prohib-
ited the state from terminating the relationship 
against the objection of the surrogate parents. Ag-
nes P., 800 P.2d at 205. The court held that the sur-
rogate parents were not entitled to termination hear-
ings because they did not have the same due pro-
cess rights as legal parents. Id. 
K 21 In short, the fact that the in loco parentis status 
could be terminated by the surrogate parent or by 
the child does not suggest any limitation or restric-
tion on the rights of a fit legal parent to terminate a 
surrogate parent's relationship with his or her child. 
We thus conclude that our statement in Gribble re-
garding termination of the in loco parentis status, 
insofar as it restricted the authority to terminate the 
relationship to either the surrogate parent or the 
child, was incorrect as a statement of the historical 
common law rule. 
[12] T| 22 Indeed, there is no principle within the in 
loco parentis doctrine that purports to abridge a fit 
legal parent's right to govern her children's associ-
ations. The in loco parentis status is "temporary by 
definition and ceases on withdrawal of consent by 
the legal parent." Carvin v. Britain (In re Parent-
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age of LB.), 155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161, 168 
n.7 (2005).FN3 In other words, a legal parent may 
freely terminate the in loco parentis status by re-
moving her child from the relationship, thereby ex-
tinguishing all parent-like rights and responsibilit-
ies vested in the former surrogate parent. 
FN3. The Washington Supreme Court has 
recognized that the in loco parentis doc-
trine is temporary in nature and does not 
extend permanent rights akin to those held 
by actual parents. L.B., 122 P.3d at 168 n. 
7; Luby v. Da Silva (In re Custody oj 
Brown), 153 Wash.2d 646, 105 P.3d991, 
994 (2005) ("[N]o Washington case recog-
nizes that nonparents are guaranteed the 
fundamental rights of parents under the 
doctrine of in loco parentis.")- However, 
the court has chosen to "adapt [their] com-
mon law" to recognize a "de facto parent" 
doctrine which does confer rights equal to 
that of a legal parent. L.B., 122 P.3d at 
176-77. 
*814 | 23 Other courts have recognized that the 
temporary nature of the in loco parentis status milit-
ates against using the doctrine to grant continual 
parent-like rights after the legal parent has termin-
ated the in loco parentis relationship. When con-
fronted with a situation where a former partner as-
serted in loco parentis standing to seek visitation of 
a child after the natural parent unilaterally removed 
the child from the relationship, the Texas Court of 
Appeals found that 
[o]nce [the biological parent] and the child 
moved out, however, any possible claim [the sur-
rogate parent] may have had for standing in loco 
parentis ended. The common law relationship is 
temporary and ends when the child is no longer 
under the care of the person in loco parentis. 
Coons-Andersen v. Andersen, 104 S.W.3d 630, 
635-36 (Tex.App.2003). Indeed, the Texas court 
described "the very cornerstone of the doctrine" of 
in loco parentis as the "central common feature 
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[that] the person deemed to be standing in loco par-
entis had actual care and custody of a child in a par-
ent's absence." Id. at 636. Thus, the assignment of 
permanent rights is repugnant to one of the defining 
features of the in loco parentis doctrine-its tempor-
ary status. 
K 24 This temporary status is reinforced by the fact 
that the surrogate parent may arbitrarily cast the re-
lationship aside at any time and thus terminate all 
parent-like obligations and rights. 67A CJ.S. Par-
ent and Child § 348 (2002); Taylor v. Taylor. 58 
Wash.2d 510, 364 P.2d 444, 445 (1961). It would 
be a perverse doctrine of law that left a legal parent 
unable to enforce support obligations against a sur-
rogate parent's will because of the temporary status 
of the in loco parentis relationship but allowed a 
surrogate parent to extend her parent-like rights 
against the legal parent's objections for as long as 
she saw fit. Under such a distorted legal regime, the 
parent-like rights and responsibilities are permanent 
and abiding for as long as the surrogate parent 
wants them to be, yet transitory and fleeting when 
the legal parent seeks to enforce a parental obliga-
tion against the surrogate parent.™4 Such an in-
equitable result, which would prioritize the rights of 
the surrogate parent over the needs of the child, 
demonstrates that the in loco parentis doctrine does 
not contemplate a perpetual grant of rights and is, 
in fact, ill-suited to convey such rights. 
FN4. Although hypothetically the surrog-
ate parent would be burdened by parental 
responsibilities for as long as he or she 
chose to extend parental rights, this does 
not change the fact that the power of 
choice remains entirely the prerogative of 
the surrogate parent. The legal parent 
would have no right to exclude the surrog-
ate parent from the child's life, while 
neither the legal parent nor the child would 
have the right to enforce a support obliga-
tion once the surrogate parent has opted to 
cast the relationship aside. 
1f 25 Despite the common law principle that the in 
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loco parentis doctrine is temporary and does not 
convey rights that survive the termination of the 
parent-like relationship, Jones asserts that Utah 
cases have conferred standing to seek visitation 
upon those who had stood in loco parentis to a 
child. A close examination of these cases, however, 
reveals that this court has never granted standing to 
seek visitation solely on the basis of this common 
law doctrine. 
H 26 In Ghhble, 583 P.2d at 66, this court based a 
stepparent's standing to seek visitation upon an in-
terpretation of a Utah divorce statute, which states 
in part that "[visitation rights of parents, grandpar-
ents and other relatives shall take into consideration 
the welfare of the child." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 
(1953) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 
30-3-5(5)(a) (Supp.2006)). We read this phrase to 
"indicate[ ] the legislative intent to protect the rela-
tionships which affect the child whose parents are 
being divorced" and reasoned that an individual 
who "stand[s] in the relationship of parent, grand-
parent, or other relative" had standing under the 
statute to seek visitation. Gribhle, 583 P.2d at 66. 
Although we used the in loco parentis doctrine as 
an interpretive tool to guide the inquiry as to who 
stands in one of these relationships, the ultimate 
source of standing was the statute itself-not the 
common law doctrine of in loco parentis.FN5 
*815M at 68 ("If appellant is in loco parentis, he 
should be considered a parent for purposes of Sec. 
30-3-5."); State ex rel J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 715 
n. 5 (Utah 1990) (finding that the court in 
Gribble"vtas interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 
(1953)"). In this case, however, Jones does not rely 
upon any interpretation of statutory law. Rather, 
she relies solely upon the common law for standing. 
We therefore conclude that Gribble is inapplicable. 
FN 5. We make no determination whether 
the Gribble interpretation of the prior ver-
sion of Utah Code section 30-3-5 applies 
to the slightly modified wording contained 
in the current version of the code. SteeUtah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5)(a) (Supp.2006). 
1f 27 Equally unavailing to Jones is our holding in 
J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710. In that case, a wife left her 
husband and subsequently bore a child fathered by 
another man. Id. at 712. Soon after, both the natur-
al father and mother abandoned the child, and the 
state of Utah eventually terminated their parental 
rights. Id. Although the husband was still technic-
ally married to the wife, he did not learn of the 
child's existence until the child was nine months 
old. Id. Upon learning that he had a stepson, the 
husband petitioned for custody. Id. In conferring 
standing to the stepfather to seek custody, this court 
relied upon two rationales. First, we reasoned that 
this court had granted to stepparents standing to be 
heard on matters of custody. Id. at 716. Second, 
because the Utah legislature had imposed a support 
obligation upon stepparents for the duration of the 
marriage to the legal parent, we reasoned that this 
support obligation was sufficient to confer stand-
ing. Id. Neither rationale applies to Jones. 
U 28 We explicitly did not rely upon the in loco par-
entis doctrine in J.W.F. because no such relation-
ship existed in that case. Id. at 715 n. 5. In a foot-
note, however, we opined that perhaps other types 
of relationships could give rise to standing: "[I]t is 
conceivable that persons who are not related by 
blood or marriage, although not presumptively en-
titled to standing, could show that they had a rela-
tionship with the child that would warrant a grant 
of standing. We have no such situation before us 
today." Id. at 715 n. 4. As confessed dicta, this 
musing on the potential outcome of a hypothetical 
situation is not binding upon this court. And per-
haps this court would have been less inclined to en-
tertain the notion of throwing open the gate to parti-
cipation in a child's life if a fit legal parent had 
been involved, as in the present case.FN6 
FN6. We do not have before us, and we do 
not decide, whether a person who is or 
once stood in loco parentis to a child has 
standing to seek visitation or custody in the 
absence of a fit legal parent. 
[13][14] Tf 29 In summary, traditional common law 
154P.3d808 
154 P.3d 808, 571 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 2007 UT 20 
(Cite as: 154 P.3d 808) 
principles counsel that the in loco parentis status is 
of temporary duration and may be terminated 
"[o]nce the person alleged to be in loco parentis no 
longer discharges all duties incident to the parental 
relationship." Hamilton v. Foster, 260 Neb. 887, 
620 N.W.2d 103, 116 (2000). While Jones may 
have stood in loco parentis to the child during the 
time she was actually living with her and providing 
for her care, her in loco parentis status terminated 
when Barlow and the child moved out. According 
to common law principles, Jones does not have 
standing to extend the in loco parentis relationship 
against Barlow's wishes. Finally, Jones is not pro-
ceeding under the divorce statutes as did the step-
parent in Gribble. We conclude that recognizing a 
legally protectible right under the rubric of in loco 
parentis would be "an unwarranted expansion of an 
otherwise well-established common law 
doctrine," Coons-Andersen, 104 S.W.3d at 636, and 
therefore decline to do so. 
II. WE DECLINE TO JUDICIALLY CREATE 
VISITATION RIGHTS BY ADOPTING A "DE 
FACTO PARENT" OR "PSYCHOLOGICAL PAR-
ENT" DOCTRINE 
[15] ^ 30 What Jones essentially asks us to do is re-
cognize a new judicial doctrine in Utah that creates 
in a third party the right to seek visitation with a 
child in contexts outside those recognized by this 
state's domestic relation laws. Whatever label is ap-
plied to such a doctrine, it is clear that the common 
law concept of in loco parentis does not reach so 
far. Were we to recognize such a right in this case, 
it would have to be under one of several judicially 
created doctrines that have been used recently in 
other jurisdictions to confer visitation rights upon 
*816 someone other than a parent. Most prominent 
among these other doctrines are those labeled 
"psychological parent," or "de facto parent." }N7 
E.g., Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of LB.), 
155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161, 163 (2005); V.C. 
v. M.J.B., 163 NJ. 200, 748 A.2d 539 passim 
(2000); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 711 
N.E.2d 886, 891 (1999). Rather than creating tern-
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porary rights and obligations that last as long as a 
surrogate parent stands in the place of an actual 
parent, these doctrines create permanent and abid-
ing rights similar to those of an actual parent. See 
LB., 122 P.3d at 177 ("We thus hold that hence-
forth in Washington, a de facto parent stands in leg-
al parity with an otherwise legal parent, whether 
biological, adoptive, or otherwise."); V.C, 748 
A.2d at 552 ("[A] psychological parent-child rela-
tionship ... may not be unilaterally terminated after 
the relationship between the adults ends."). 
FN7. For a more detailed description of 
these doctrines, see Chief Justice Durham's 
dissent. Infra at ffi[ 63-90. 
T[ 31 We decline to craft such a doctrine. First, ad-
opting a de facto parent doctrine fails to provide an 
identifiable jurisdictional test that may be easily 
and uniformly applied in all cases. A de facto par-
ent rule for standing, which rests upon ambiguous 
and fact-intensive inquiries into the surrogate par-
ent's relationship with a child and the natural par-
ent's intent in allowing or fostering such a relation-
ship, does not fulfill the traditional gate-keeping 
function of rules of standing. Under such a doc-
trine, a party could try the merits of her case under 
the guise of an inquiry into standing, unduly bur-
dening legal parents with litigation. We agree with 
the Supreme Court of Vermont that 
jurisdiction should not rest upon a test that in ef-
fect would examine the merits of visitation or 
custody petitions on a case-by-case basis. In real-
ity, such a fact-based test would not be a 
threshold jurisdictional test, but rather would re-
quire a full-blown evidentiary hearing in most 
cases. Thus, any such test would not prevent par-
ents from having to defend themselves against 
the merits of petitions brought by a potentially 
wide range of third parties claiming a parent-like 
relationship with their child. 
Titchenal v. Dexter, 166 Vt. 373, 693 A.2d 682, 
687-88(1997). 
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% 32 In addition to providing an unsure jurisdiction-
al threshold, adopting a de facto parent doctrine 
would exceed the proper bounds of the judiciary. 
The essential questions presented to the court in 
this case are some of the most intimate and import-
ant that our society faces. In the abstract, we are 
asked to define perhaps the most influential and 
personal relationship ever experienced-that of par-
ent and child. In particular, we are asked to determ-
ine the future upbringing of a child and Jones' con-
tinued participation in that process. 
<| 33 Faced with these questions, and without the 
benefit of binding applicable law, Jones asks us to 
craft a judicial doctrine with broad social implica-
tions that attempts to adjudicate between competing 
policy considerations. On the one hand, we recog-
nize that mutual bonds of affection can be formed 
between a child and an adult who does not fit with-
in the traditional definition of a parent and that such 
a relationship has the potential to enrich the lives of 
both the surrogate parent and the child. However, in 
carving out a permanent role in the child's life for a 
surrogate parent, this court would necessarily sub-
tract from the legal parent's right to direct the up-
bringing of her child and expose the child to inevit-
able conflict between the surrogate and the natural 
parents. Such a doctrine raises concerns that a legal 
parent could be deprived of a portion of her parent-
al rights on the basis of "elusive factual determina-
tions" as to whether she intended to relinquish 
those rights to a third party.™8 Van v. Zahorik, 
227 Mich.App. 90, 575 N.W.2d 566, 570 (1997) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
FN8. Chief Justice Durham's dissent pro-
poses the adoption of a modified version of 
the test to determine de facto parent status 
in which "a third party claiming de facto 
parent status [must] establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that (1) the legal par-
ent intended to create a permanent parent-
child relationship between the third party 
and the child, and (2) an actual parent-
child relationship was formed." Infra f 68. 
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*817 [16] U 34 Although principled arguments can 
be made for the adoption of a de facto parent doc-
trine, such arguments are ultimately based upon 
policy preferences, rather than established common 
law. In such situations, we find the Michigan Su-
preme Court to be persuasive when it stated: 
As a general rule, making social policy is a job 
for the Legislature, not the courts. This is espe-
cially true when the determination or resolution 
requires placing a premium on one societal in-
terest at the expense of another: The responsibil-
ity for drawing lines in a society as complex as 
ours-of identifying priorities, weighing the relev-
ant considerations and choosing between compet-
ing alternatives-is the Legislature's, not the judi-
ciary's. 
Van v. Zahorik, 460 Mich. 320, 597 N.W.2d 15, 18 
(1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also State ex rel. Sheen v. Ogden Rapid 
Transit Co., 38 Utah 242, 112 P. 120, 125 (1910) 
(holding that exceeding the judiciary's own author-
ity results in an undue usurpation of legislative 
powers). 
T| 35 Jones asks this court to exercise the wisdom of 
Solomon by adopting a de facto parent doctrine 
based upon our weighing of the competing policies 
at play. Although this court is routinely called upon 
to make difficult decisions as to what the law is, or 
even to fill the interstices of jurisprudence, in this 
case we are asked to create law from whole cloth 
where it currently does not exist. While the distinc-
tion between applying the law to unique situations 
and engaging in legislation is not always clear, by 
asking us to recognize a new class of parents, Jones 
invites this court to overstep its bounds and invade 
the purview of the legislature. 
1 36 Courts are ill-suited for such ventures. Courts 
are unable to fully investigate the ramifications of 
social policies and cannot gauge or build the public 
consensus necessary to effectively implement them. 
Unlike the legislature, which may craft a compre-
hensive scheme for resolving future cases and then 
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may repeal or amend it at any time should it prove 
unworkable, courts are not agile in developing so-
cial policy. If we miscalculate in legislating social 
policy, the harm may not be corrected until an ap-
propriate case wends its way through the system 
and arrives before us once again-a process that may 
take years or even decades. Moreover, our attempt 
to correct a prior misstep could then damage the 
legal system's reliance upon the principle of stare 
decisis. 
H 37 In addition to our reticence to assume an es-
sentially legislative role, the creation of a de facto 
parent rule absent any precedent in Utah law would 
be an unwarranted expansion of the common law. 
We agree with the dissent that the common law is a 
"dynamic and growing thing." 15A Am.Jur.2d 
Common Law § 2 (2000); see infra ffl] 60-61. 
However, "the common law decisionmaking pro-
cess is inherently incremental in nature; the very 
'genius of the common law is that it proceeds em-
pirically and gradually, testing the ground at every 
step'... [and] calls for devising a rule that does not 
stray too far from the existing regime." PM Group 
Life Ins. Co. v. W. Growers Assurance Trust, 953 
F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting R. Aldisert, 
Logic for Lawyers 8 (1989)); accord McClure v. 
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 84 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th 
Cir.1996); Falcone v. Middlesex County Med. Soc, 
34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791, 799 (1961) ("The per-
sistent movement of the common law towards satis-
fying the needs of the times is soundly marked by 
gradualness. Its step by step process affords the 
light of continual experience to guide its future 
course."). Creating a de facto parent doctrine for 
Utah would be a dramatic expansion of the com-
mon law thereby defying the principle of incre-
mental development. 
[17] K 38 Such a divergence from Utah's established 
common law is also inappropriate because there are 
no broadly accepted principles to guide us to a de 
facto parent doctrine. We agree that "our courts 
should avoid effecting change in the common law 
of this State when there is no substantial body of 
agreement that such change is necessary and when 
it is patent that such change can be better effected 
by legislative action." Duhan v. Milanowski, 75 
Misc,2d 1078, 348 N.Y.S.2d 696, 701 
(Sup.Ct.1973). As we have noted, this case presents 
us with conflicting policies upon which there is no 
broad consensus. There are simply no bedrock prin-
ciples upon *818 which to construct a doctrine cre-
ating visitation rights for nonparents. 
[18] K 39 To the extent that there are guiding prin-
ciples within the common law, they militate against 
a common law right of visitation for nonparents. It 
is a fundamental tenet of our common law that "the 
only persons having any actually vested interest in 
the custody of a child cognizable by the law are the 
parents." Wilson v. Family Servs. Div., 554 P.2d 
227, 229 (Utah 1976). Other relatives of a child 
merely have "some dormant or inchoate right or in-
terest in the custody and welfare of children" that 
matures only upon the death or termination of the 
rights of the parents.™9 Id. at 230-31. Finally, 
courts may not make a "best interests" inquiry into 
nonparent custody of a child absent a determination 
that the legal parents are unfit. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 
1364, 1368-69 (Utah 1982); see also A.N. v. 
M.I.W. (In re Adoption of P.N.), 2006 UT 64, % 15, 
148 P.3d 927.FN,° Although our precedent in this 
area involves custody rather than visitation, the 
common law nevertheless evidences a strong pre-
sumption that parental rights shall not be disturbed 
absent a determination that the legal parents are un-
fit.™11 This presumption is in direct contradic-
tion to a de facto parent doctrine, which interferes 
with a parent's right to direct the upbringing of her 
child. Thus, adopting such a doctrine would not be 
a natural development of the common law, but 
rather a legislative act in derogation of recognized 
common law principles. 
FN9. We note that the language quoted by 
the dissent from State ex rei J.W.F., 799 
P.2d 710, 714 (Utah 1990), that nonparents 
need not "stand as a total stranger to the 
child" makes sense in the context of these 
154P.3d808 
154 P.3d 808, 571 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 2007 UT 20 
(Cite as: 154 P.3d 808) 
Page 13 
inchoate rights. See infra K 51. Taken as a 
whole the passage reads: 
It may be that no one has the same rights 
toward a child as his or her parents. See 
Wilson v. Family Services Div., Region 
Two, 554 P.2d 227, 230 (Utah 1976). 
However, the fact that a person is not a 
child's natural or legal parent does not 
mean that he or she must stand as a total 
stranger to the child where custody is 
concerned. 
J.W.F., 799 P.2d at 714. Thus J.W.F. 
does not stand for the proposition that 
nonparents may have common law 
standing to assert visitation rights 
against fit parents. In fact, this decision 
affirms that "no one has the same rights 
toward a child as his or her parents." 
Id. This passage merely confirms the 
proposition asserted in Wilson that other 
relatives may have standing to seek cus-
tody in the absence of a fit parent. This 
is born out by the facts of J.W.F.. where 
a stepfather was granted standing to seek 
custody only when both of the biological 
parents had their parental rights termin-
ated. Id. at 712, 716. 
FN 10. In the case of P.N., the child's biolo-
gical mother relinquished her parental 
rights and gave custody of the child to a 
couple seeking to adopt him. 2006 UT 64, 
% 3, 148 P.3d 927. The district court later 
found the mother's relinquishment to be in-
effective. The mother and biological father 
both opposed the adoption and sought cus-
tody of the child, who, at the time, was in 
the custody of the prospective adoptive 
parents. Id. ffl[ 3-4, 5. The trial court 
found no basis for terminating the parental 
rights of either of the biological parents 
and therefore dismissed the petition for ad-
option. Id. % 8. It then scheduled a "best 
interests trial" and awarded custody of the 
child to the prospective adoptive parents. 
Id. ^ 9. We reversed, holding that it was 
error for the court to award custody of P.N. 
to legal strangers in the absence of an or-
der terminating the parental rights of his fit 
natural parents. Id. % 15. We therefore re-
manded the case for a determination of 
custody as between the biological parents. 
Id. f 18. Although the case involved cus-
tody rather than visitation and was based 
upon an analysis of the statute governing 
adoption, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.16 
(Supp.2006), it is nevertheless illustrative 
of the proposition that a child's fit legal 
parent is presumed to act in his best in-
terests. Therefore, absent a statutory basis 
for doing so, it is improper for a court to 
second-guess the decision of the fit legal 
parents by conducting a "best interests" 
analysis. 
FN11. We note that Utah Code sections 
30-3-5(4)(a) and 30-5-2, discussed below, 
stand as statutorily created exceptions to 
this general rule because they grant stand-
ing to seek visitation rights even against 
the objections of fit parents. 
% 40 Finally, the de facto parent doctrine conflicts 
with Utah statutory law. The legislature has defined 
the manner in which a parent-child relationship is 
established. The mother-child relationship is estab-
lished by 
(a) the woman's having given birth to the child, 
except as otherwise provided in Part 8, Gestation-
al Agreement; 
(b) an adjudication of the woman's maternity; 
(c) adoption of the child by the woman; or 
(d) an adjudication confirming the woman as a 
parent of a child born to a gestational mother if 
the agreement was valid *819 under Part 8, Gest-
ational Agreement, or is enforceable under other 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-201 (Supp.2006). The le-
gislature has also designated which nonparents 
have standing to seek visitation of a child. Statutes 
grant standing to an immediate family member to 
seek visitation in the context of a divorce, id.§ 
30-3-5(4)(a), and to grandparents in certain circum-
stances, id.§ 30-5-2. 
Tf 41 Because the legislature has spoken in this area, 
we are reluctant to adopt a common law doctrine 
that implicitly controverts this statutory scheme. 
The addition of a new class of de facto parents 
would conflict with the legislature's apparently ex-
haustive list of who is considered a mother under 
the law. Also, granting visitation rights to de facto 
parents contradicts the legislature's narrow grant of 
standing to certain immediate family members to 
petition for visitation. As the dissent notes, the le-
gislature has not explicitly addressed the standing 
of a surrogate parent. See infra ^ 46. The grant of 
standing to immediate family members under cer-
tain well-defined circumstances, however, creates 
the negative implication that all other categories of 
nonparents are prohibited from seeking visitation 
rights. Otherwise, the standing requirement would 
not serve its function as a jurisdictional bar to litig-
ation because every unmentioned class of nonparent 
could attempt to establish visitation rights under the 
common law. We decline to expand the common 
law into an area occupied by statute so as to contra-
dict the apparent legislative intent. 
K 42 In sum, we decline to adopt a de facto parent 
doctrine because it would be an improper usurpa-
tion of legislative authority and would contradict 
both common law principles and Utah statutory 
law. Although we have no reason to doubt the sin-
cerity of Jones' parental feelings for the child, we 
are unwilling to craft a doctrine which would ab-
rogate a portion of Barlow's parental rights. 
CONCLUSION 
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TJ 43 We hold that the district court erred in grant-
ing Jones standing to seek visitation. The common 
law doctrine of in loco parentis does not convey 
perpetual rights that survive the termination of the 
parent-like relationship. And we decline to create 
such perpetual rights by adopting a doctrine similar 
to that of "psychological parent" or "de facto par-
ent." We therefore reverse the district court order 
granting visitation and requiring Jones to pay child 
support. 
K 44 Associate Chief Justice WELKINS, Justice 
DURRANT, and Justice NEHRING concur in 
Justice PARRISH's opinion. 
DURHAM, Chief Justice, dissenting: 
K 45 I respectfully dissent. The facts of this case 
mirror a typical divorce-two parents separated and 
are quarreling over child visitation and custody. In 
this case, however, the parents are both women, 
only one of whom is the biological parent of the 
child they mutually decided to bring into their rela-
tionship. Although this situation is becoming more 
and more common, it presents this court with a 
question of first impression: Does the nonbiological 
mother have standing to petition for visitation with 
the child despite the objections of the biological 
mother? I would hold that she does, provided that 
she and the child have, with the consent of the bio-
logical parent, created a de facto parent-child rela-
tionship. 
I. THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT ADDRESSED 
A SURROGATE PARENT'S STANDING 
K 46 I disagree with the majority's assertion that the 
"legislature has spoken in this area." Supra H 41. 
The majority specifically references Utah Code sec-
tion 30-3-5 (Supp.2006), which gives the trial court 
discretion to grant visitation to immediate family 
members, and section 30-5-2, which governs grand-
parent visitation. Supra f 40. While these statutes 
address visitation rights, they do not speak to the 
circumstances in this case. For obvious reasons, the 
grandparent visitation statute does not apply to 
Jones. The immediate family member provision is 
154 P.3d 808 
154 P.3d 808, 571 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 2007 U T 20 
(Cite as: 154 P.3d 808) 
inapposite because it is included within the 
"Divorce" chapter of the "Husband and Wife" title 
of the Utah Code. Furthermore, its specific terms 
limit its applicability to divorces. For example, sec-
tion 30-3-5(1 )*820 states that the section applies 
only "[w]hen a decree of divorce is rendered." 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp.2006). Because 
Jones and Barlow could not legally marry, their 
separation cannot constitute a divorce, and thus the 
immediate family member visitation provision does 
not address the situation at hand. And although the 
majority does not mention the provisions regarding 
parent-time for divorced or divorcing parents, 
id. §§ 30-3-32 to -38 (Supp.2006), I likewise do not 
believe that the parent-time provisions govern the 
case before us. 
f 47 The policy considerations underlying the visit-
ation statutes would nevertheless be served by per-
mitting Jones to visit the child. A child has a need 
and a right to maintain a relationship with both par-
ents. For example, section 30-3-32(2)(b)(i), which 
governs visitation between divorced, divorcing, or 
adjudicated parents, states that "it is in the best in-
terests of the child of divorcing ... parents to have 
frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to each 
parent following separation." Likewise, section 
30-3-5(5)(a) recognizes that, in some circum-
stances, visitation with "immediate family" mem-
bers may serve a child's best interests. 
K 48 Jones has been, literally and for all intents and 
purposes, a member of the child's immediate family 
since her birth. The term "immediate family mem-
ber" is not defined in conjunction with section 
30-3-5 or anywhere else in Title 30. However, the 
term is defined in other sections of the Utah Code. 
The Utah Code definition of "immediate family 
member" generally includes spouses, children, par-
ents, and siblings, id. §§ 7-9-3(7) (2006), 
76-8-316(4)(a) (2003), but it also may include 
grandparents, grandchildren, and nieces and neph-
ews. See id § 26-2-22(3)(a) (Supp.2006) 
(including grandparents and grandchildren in defin-
ition); id § 34A-2-103(5)(a)(ii) (Supp.2006) 
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(including grandparents, grandchildren, nephews, 
and nieces in definition); id. § 36-11-102(5) (2005) 
(defining immediate family as a spouse or child 
residing in the household). The most expansive 
definition of immediate family member is found in 
Utah Code section 76-5-106.5, which addresses 
stalking. In that section, an immediate family mem-
ber is defined as "a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or 
any other person who regularly resides in the 
household or who regularly resided in the house-
hold within the prior six months." Id. § 
76-5-106.5(l)(b) (2003) (emphasis added). Under 
this definition, Jones would be an immediate family 
member because she regularly resided in the same 
household as the child within six months prior to 
the initiation of this suit. 
K 49 I believe Jones satisfies any reasonable defini-
tion of immediate family member because she was, 
de facto, the child's parent. By caring for the child 
from her infancy and for the first two years of her 
life, Jones, with the acquiescence and encourage-
ment of Barlow, acted as the child's "other parent." 
Although the reality and nature of this relationship 
has not been explicitly acknowledged by Utah's 
statutory law, Jones and Barlow did everything 
within their power to make Jones the legal equival-
ent of a parent. When Jones and Barlow solemnized 
their relationship with a Vermont civil union, the 
state of Vermont endowed Jones with the same 
rights granted to a spouse. SeeWt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, 
§ 1204 (2002). Under Vermont law, the civil union 
makes Jones an immediate family member and 
grants her the same rights as a spouse with respect 
to a child born to Barlow during the civil union. 
Id. § 1204(f). Although the parties have not ad-
dressed the effect of their Vermont civil union on 
their rights, the undertaking of that status conclus-
ively demonstrates that when the parties entered in-
to it, they intended Jones to be a parent to any chil-
dren born to them. Likewise, the guardianship peti-
tion, which was filed and granted under Utah law, 
strongly supports the conclusion that the parties re-
garded Jones as a full-fledged parent. Indeed, the 
guardianship petition stated that "[Jones] is the only 
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other parent that [the child] knows or will know," 
and the supporting memorandum stated that 
"[s]ince [the child's] birth, [Jones] has served as her 
other parent in all regards." Based on the parties' 
actions, it is clear that the parties did everything 
they could to make their relationship, with regard to 
themselves and the child, as much like the 
"traditional family"-two married parents and chil-
dren-as possible. There were virtually no functional 
differences*821 from a traditional union insofar as 
the care and treatment of their child was concerned. 
Nevertheless, the statutes do not address either 
Jones' or the child's rights in this situation. 
K 50 As the legislature recognized by enacting visit-
ation statutes, children have the right to maintain 
relationships with their parents as well as with per-
sons with whom they have formed deep, parent-like 
bonds. A child's rights and best interests do not 
change depending on whether his or her parental 
figures are recognized as parents under the law or 
whether they are simply parents in fact. Thus, in 
this case, the child's need for, and right to, a con-
tinuing relationship with both of her parents is not 
diminished by the fact that only one is a biological 
parent or that her parents were not legally married. 
Therefore, granting standing to Jones would further 
the legislative policy of protecting children who 
have formed such bonds, even though the statutes 
do not specifically apply. 
II. BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT 
SPOKEN ON THIS ISSUE, THIS COURT 
SHOULD LOOK TO THE COMMON LAW 
K 51 In the absence of a controlling statutory provi-
sion, I look to our common law. This court has re-
cognized that a person who is not a child's natural 
or legal parent does not necessarily "stand as a total 
stranger to the child." State ex rel J.W.F., 799 
P.2d 710, 714 (Utah 1990). Traditionally, a third 
party's right to visitation has arisen under the doc-
trine of in loco parentis. For example, in Gribble v. 
Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), this court relied 
on the doctrine of in loco parentis to hold that a 
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stepparent was a parent for purposes of the divorce 
statute and, accordingly, granted the stepparent 
standing to petition for visitation. Id. at 66-68. 
Tf 52 While we applied in loco parentis in the con-
text of a statutory divorce proceeding in Gribble, I 
reject the notion that in loco parentis applies only in 
conjunction with a statute. In loco parentis is a 
common law doctrine. That a common law doctrine 
may inform our statutory interpretation in some 
cases does not strip the common law of its ability to 
stand on its own in the absence of an applicable 
statute. Nothing in Gribble, or in any subsequent 
case, limits the doctrine of in loco parentis to di-
vorce proceedings, and I believe it can apply not-
withstanding the absence of a controlling statute in 
this case. In fact, as common law, it is arguably 
more pertinent in a case such as the one before us, 
where there is not a relevant statute, than in 
Gribble, where there was a statute applying to the 
dissolution of legal marriages. 
K 53 Nevertheless, I concede that the doctrine of in 
loco parentis has its limitations. As the majority re-
cognizes, in loco parentis is a temporary status that 
lasts only as long as the third party assumes the role 
of a parent in the child's life. See59 Am.Jur.2d 
Parent and Child § 9 (2002); supra Tf 15. It does not 
grant rights or impose duties-such as visitation or 
support-once either the surrogate parent or the child 
has decided to end the relationship. 
t 54 I likewise agree with the majority's assertion 
that the Gribble court erred in concluding that only 
the surrogate parent or the child can terminate the 
parental relationship. Supra ^ 17. I disagree, 
however, with the majority's analysis as to why that 
conclusion was erroneous. Gribble's conclusion 
that only the surrogate parent or child can terminate 
an in loco parentis relationship is not erroneous be-
cause the cases on which it relies or legal encyclo-
pedias state only that an in loco parentis relation-
ship "may" be terminated by either the surrogate 
parent or the natural parent. While legal comment-
ary or case law from our sister states, even case law 
on which we have relied, may differ from our state-
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ment of the law, such variances do not abrogate our 
conclusions. We are not bound to interpret our 
common law in the same way as our sister states or 
other commentators. Thus, even though the cases 
cited in Gribble do not state that "only" the surrog-
ate parent or the child can terminate the relation-
ship, that does not necessarily mean that we 
reached a faulty conclusion. 
If 55 Rather, I believe Gribble's statement that only 
the surrogate parent or the child can terminate an in 
loco parentis relationship *822 is erroneous be-
cause, as a matter of principle, it gives an unfair ad-
vantage to surrogate parents, essentially allowing 
them to use in loco parentis as both a shield and a 
sword. To use the majority's example, it allows sur-
rogate parents to use in loco parentis as a way to 
shield themselves from support obligations by ar-
guing they have terminated the relationship, while 
in other instances, it allows the surrogate parent to 
continue the in loco parentis relationship despite 
the objections of the biological parent. Supra \ 24. I 
agree with the majority that this is an absurd result 
and, on policy grounds, likewise reject the notion 
that a biological parent cannot sever an in loco par-
entis relationship. Thus, I agree that Jones' in loco 
parentis status terminated when Barlow and the 
child moved out. 
Tf 56 This conclusion does not, however, change my 
belief that Jones has standing under our common 
law. Perhaps due to the limitations of the doctrine 
of in loco parentis, this court's decisions to grant 
standing to third parties have not been limited to in 
loco parentis cases. For example, in J.W.F., we 
granted a petitioner standing to petition for custody 
of his estranged wife's child. 799 P.2d at 712. In 
that case, the petitioner had never acted as a parent 
toward the child because the child was born while 
the petitioner and his wife were separated, although 
they remained legally married. Id. In fact, the peti-
tioner did not even know about the child until after 
his wife had abandoned the child and the state had 
filed a neglect and abandonment petition. Id. We 
granted the petitioner standing based on his step-
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parent status and his legal support obligations. Id. 
at 716. In so holding, we recognized that "[c]ertain 
people, because of their relationship to a child, are 
at least entitled to standing to seek a determination 
as to whether it would be in the best interests of the 
child for them to have custody." Id. at 714; see 
also Wilson v. Family Servs. Div.} 554 P.2d 227, 
230-31 (Utah 1976) (granting grandmother a hear-
ing on her petition to adopt grandchild after the par-
ents' rights were terminated). 
1 57 In J.W.F., we recognized several factors that 
may justify granting standing to a third party, such 
as financial obligations or the person's status or re-
lationship to a child. 799 P.2d at 715. We noted 
that the relationship of a close relative who has the 
child's best interests at heart "would seem to war-
rant a grant of standing." Id. However, we spe-
cifically declined to limit standing to a petitioner 
related to a child by marriage FNI or to divorce 
proceedings, noting that "it is conceivable that per-
sons who are not related by blood or marriage, al-
though not presumptively entitled to standing, 
could show that they had a relationship with the 
child that would warrant a grant of standing." Id. 
at 715n.4. 
FNI. The parties have not raised or argued 
the effect of their lawful civil union in 
Vermont, but its existence does enhance 
the analogy of Jones' status to that of a 
stepparent in that these parents took the 
only step available to them to legalize their 
relationship. 
f 58 I would therefore conclude that Jones has 
standing under our common law. My conclusion is 
not based on the doctrine of in loco parentis, nor is 
it based on any specific prior case issued by this 
court. Indeed, as the majority points out, there is no 
binding case law regarding an unmarried partner's 
standing rights. Supra ^ ^ 1-2. Rather, I would re-
cognize that Jones has standing because she is a de 
facto parent. 
f 59 Like a person holding in loco parentis status, a 
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de facto parent FN2 is a person "who, on a day-
to-day basis, assumes the role of parent, seeking to 
fulfill both the child's physical and psychological 
needs." LF. v. KM (State ex rel CM.), 2000 UT 
App 115, f 3 (citing In re Hirenia C, 18 
Cal.App.4th 504, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 443, 448 (1993)); 
see also Miller v. Cal Dep't of Soc. Servs., 355 
F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir.2004). There are, 
however, some differences between the in loco par-
entis*823 and de facto parenthood doctrines. There 
are certain evidentiary criteria, which I will discuss 
in Section III, that are not required in in loco par-
entis cases but that are required in de facto parent 
cases in order for a third party to show that he or 
she has, with the legal parent's intent, formed a par-
ent-child relationship with the child. Further, while 
in loco parentis imposes only temporary rights and 
obligations on a surrogate parent, de facto parent-
hood is permanent. Functionally, a de facto parent 
is just like the child's legal parent. The only differ-
ence is that a de facto parent is not biologically re-
lated to the child and does not have an adjudicated 
parental status such as adoption. Because de facto 
parenthood is more akin to actual parenthood, de 
facto parents cannot unilaterally sever their obliga-
tions to the child. Nor can a legal parent independ-
ently sever a de facto parent's rights. Rather, once a 
child shares a de facto parent relationship with a 
third party, the child has a vested right to support 
from the de facto parent as well as to maintain a re-
lationship with that parent, despite the objections of 
either the de facto or legal parent.FN3 
FN2. Some courts have used the term psy-
chological parent to refer to a third party 
who has, with the consent of the legal par-
ent, assumed a parent-like relationship 
with a child. See, e.g., V.C v. M.J.B., 163 
N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539, 555 (2000) 
(holding that "[t]hird parties who live in 
familial circumstances with a child and his 
or her legal parent may achieve, with the 
consent of the legal parent, a psychological 
parent status vis-a-vis a child" (emphasis 
added)). While cases using the term psy-
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chological parent are very similar to this 
case, I consider the term de facto parent 
more descriptive functionally. 
FN3. De facto parenthood is a two-way 
street. While de facto parent status entitles 
a third party to standing for visitation, it 
also requires a de facto parent to provide 
financial support for the child. See Cham-
bers v. Chambers, 2005 WL 645220, *7 
2005 Del.Fam. Ct. LEXIS 1, *22 (holding 
that a de facto parent could be equitably 
estopped from denying she owed a support 
obligation to her former partner's child). 
This is entirely consistent with the purpose 
of de facto parenthood: to provide children 
with the parental support and protection to 
which they are entitled. In fact, the district 
court in this case ordered Jones to pay 
child support, a result that will presumably 
be impossible under the majority's analys- is. 
If 60 I recognize that de facto parenthood has never 
been recognized by this court. The absence of a 
binding judicial pronouncement on an unmarried 
surrogate parent's right to standing does not mean 
that we must conclude that Jones does not have 
standing under the common law. In fact, in the 
arena of domestic relations, "judges have tradition-
ally decided ... questions using common law meth-
ods," Ann Laquer Estin, Family Governance in the 
Age of Divorce, 1998 Utah L.Rev. 21.1, 238, and the 
"common law is not static, but is rather a dynamic 
and growing thing," 15A Am.Jur.2d Common Law § 
2 (2000). Our ability to decide cases on common 
law grounds is therefore not limited to common law 
doctrines that have been explicitly developed in pri-
or case law. See Housing Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. 
Ferguson, 91 Hawai'i 81, 979 P.2d 1107, 1115 
(1999) (noting that the common law is not "limited 
to published judicial precedent"). Rather, the com-
mon law embodies "broad and comprehensive un-
written principles, inspired by natural reason and an 
innate sense of justice." 15A Am.Jur.2d Common 
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Law § 1 (2000). It "is constantly expanding and de-
veloping in keeping with advancing civilization and 
the new conditions and progress of society." Id. § 2. 
f 61 The common law is able to adapt and grow be-
cause the common law system endows courts with 
"judicial inventiveness to meet new situations." 
Id. Indeed, by definition, the common law is 
"judge-made" law. M. Stuart Madden, The Vital 
Common Law: Its Role in a Statutory Age, 18 U. 
Ark. Little Rock L.J. 555, 558 (1996). As one judge 
has recognized, the common law encompasses " 
'any body of law created primarily through judges 
by their decisions rather than by the framers of stat-
utes or constitutions.' " Id. (emphasis added) 
(quoting Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Juris-
prudence 247 (1990)). Thus, the judicial role in a 
common law system is not solely to apply legislat-
ive enactments. Where the legislature has not acted, 
we frequently exercise the power to articulate rights 
and obligations that have not previously been re-
cognized.^4 The history of tort law, contract law, 
property law, domestic relations law, employment 
law, and even the criminal law reflects this law-
development function of state courts. This case 
raises a question that has not heretofore been ad-
dressed by either the courts or the legislature in 
Utah. We have, however, recognized*824 that in 
some cases a third party ought to have standing in 
proceedings affecting the custody of children and that 
FN4. It is important that this court not ab-
dicate its responsibility to address new and 
difficult legal questions that come before 
it. By examining new issues in relation to 
our common law principles, this court en-
gages in a dialogue with the legislature, 
whose members can benefit from our care-
ful consideration and analysis of the law in 
relation to the changing world in which we 
live. 
[tjhere is no reason to narrowly restrict participa-
tion in custodial proceedings. Indeed, our case 
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law and the legislature's pronouncements indicate 
that the interests of the child are best served 
when those interested in the child are permitted 
to assert that interest. The question of who should 
have custody of the child is too important to ex-
clude participants on narrowly drawn technical 
grounds.... Those who have legal or personal 
connections with the child should not be pre-
cluded from being heard on best interests. 
J.W.F., 799 P.2d at 716 (emphasis added); see also 
Cribble. 583 P.2d at 68. I would therefore recog-
nize de facto parent standing as a common law 
principle in order to serve the broader policy re-
garding a child's right to visitation with an indi-
vidual with whom she has formed a true parental 
bond. To hold otherwise ignores the reality that 
children can and do form parent-child relationships 
with persons with whom they do not share a biolo-
gical legal connection.1^5 For example, 
FN5. As I discuss later in this opinion, the 
fact that such relationships are formed with 
the full consent and participation of a bio-
logical or legal parent is important. A rela-
tionship undertaken without such consent 
and participation should not have de facto 
parent status because of the risk that it will 
undermine the cohesiveness and parental 
control presumed to exist in intact families. 
Daily contact with, continuous reliance on, and 
the development of psychological attachments to 
unrelated persons will often stimulate a sense of 
"family" among biologically unrelated individu-
als. It is within this framework of expanding so-
cial definitions of the family that adults who are 
not the biological parents of the children they 
care for come to be seen as parents. The daily in-
teractions that take place between children and 
their nonbiological caregivers and the corres-
ponding psychological attachments that form 
between them effectively elevate their relation-
ships to that of a parent and a child, rather than 
simply that of a child and a caregiver. As a result, 
children routinely form parent-child relationships 
154P.3d808 
154 P.3d 808, 571 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 2007 UT 20 
(Cite as: 154 P.3d 808) 
Page 20 
with their stepparents, adoptive parents, foster 
parents, and even aunts, uncles, and grandparents 
who care for them on a daily basis. 
Mellisa Holtzman, Definitions of the Family as an 
Impetus for Legal Change in Custody Decision 
Making: Suggestions from an Empirical Case 
Study, 31 Law & Soc. inquiry 1, 9 (2006) (citation 
omitted). As the "nontraditional family" becomes 
more prevalent in our society, children will increas-
ingly form parent-child relationships with third 
parties. 
f 62 While this case is, in part, about parental 
rights, it is also about whether children in nontradi-
tional families, with nontraditional but nonetheless 
real parents, are entitled to have their interests ad-
dressed just as if they had been born into traditional 
families. The child in this case is the product of a 
same-sex relationship, but she just as easily could 
have come from a more traditional one. Her oppor-
tunity to have the courts determine whether visita-
tion with one of her parents is important to her 
present and long-term best interests should not be 
foreclosed. Indeed, children of dissolving, nontradi-
tional relationships are just "as likely to become ... 
victim[s] of turmoil and adult hostility as [are chil-
dren] subject to the dissolution of a [traditional] 
marriage." Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of 
H.S.H-K.), 193 Wis.2d 649, 533 N.W.2d 419,* 421 
(1995), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 975, 116 S.Ct. 475, 
133 L.Ed.2d 404 (1995). These children "need[ ] 
and deserve [ ] the protection of the courts as much 
as [children] of [ ] dissolving traditional relation-
ship^]." Id. To deny the forum of the courts for 
the resolution of children's interests in nontradition-
al contexts would be to deny those children the pro-
tections afforded to all other children. This is con-
trary to "the public welfare and the true interests of 
justice." 15A Am.Jur.2d Common Law § 2 (2000). 
Accordingly, I would hold that de facto parents 
have standing to petition for visitation.'N6 
FN6. The majority repeatedly states that 
parents are the only persons with rights to 
custody of a child. Supra % 39 & n. 9. In 
the case before us, however, we are deal-
ing with the issue of visitation-distinct 
from custody. In the context of visitation, 
the rights of third parties do not "mature" 
only upon the death of a parent or the ter-
mination of parental rights. This is evid-
enced by Utah's grandparent visitation stat-
ute. SeeUtdh Code Ann. § 30-5-2; Uzelac 
v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S. T. T.), 2006 
UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083 (upholding grant of 
visitation to grandparents when the father 
was not unfit or deceased). Additionally, 
the majority states that "parental rights 
shall not be disturbed absent a determina-
tion that the legal parents are unfit." 
Supra f U 39, 28. The United States Su-
preme Court held otherwise in Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 
147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion), 
and this court agreed in In re Estate of 
S.T.T., 2006 UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083, both 
cases discussed infra Section IV. 
By the same token, the majority relies on 
the status of "mother" or "parent." 
Supra | 40. We note that Jones is seek-
ing only rights to visitation with the 
child, not all the rights associated with 
being a parent, an arrangement beyond 
the scope of this opinion. 
*825 TI 63 I am not the first to reach this conclu-
sion; other courts have confronted the visitation 
rights of a de facto parent in the absence of an au-
thorizing statute and have granted standing to de 
facto parents. For example, in 1995 the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court decided H.S.H-K., where two wo-
men who had shared a committed relationship for 
ten years decided to have a child through artificial 
insemination. 533 N.W.2d at 421. As in this case, 
both women actively participated in doctor visits, 
childbirth classes, and the actual delivery. Id. 
When the child was born, the women gave the baby 
a surname that combined both of their last names. 
Id. at 421-22. Thereafter, the two women and the 
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child lived together, both women actively parented 
the child, and they held themselves out as a family. 
Id. at 422. Several years later, the relationship 
between the two women dissolved, and the biolo-
gical mother attempted to terminate the relationship 
between the child and her former partner. Id. The 
partner filed a petition for custody and visitation. Id. 
\ 64 The Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that 
the partner did not have standing under the state's 
relevant custody statute, which conditioned third-
party standing on a showing of parental unfitness. 
Id. at 423-24 (discussing Wis. Stat. § 767.24 
(1991-92)). The partner had not made such a show-
ing. Id. at 424. In addition, the court determined 
that the state's visitation statute did not give the 
partner standing because it applied only when there 
had been a dissolution of a marriage. Id. at 424, 
429-30. Because the parties were a same-sex 
couple, there was no marital dissolution and the 
statute did not apply. Id. The court determined that 
the legislature had not occupied the field and relied 
on its equitable powers to hold that a court may 
hear a petition for visitation when it determines the 
petitioner has a "parent-like" relationship with the 
child and a significant triggering event, such as the 
severance of the relationship between a child and a 
parental figure, justifies state intervention. Id. at 
424-25, 435. 
^ 65 More recently, the Washington Supreme Court 
decided Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of LB.), 
155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161 (2005), cert, 
denied, — U.S. — , 126 S.Ct. 2021, 164 L,Ed.2d 
806 (2006). Like H.S.H-K., LB. involved two wo-
men in an intimate relationship who decided to 
have a baby by artificial insemination. Id. at 164. 
When the child was born, the women and the child 
lived together as a family unit with both women 
sharing parenting responsibilities. Id. The child 
called her biological mother "mama" and the moth-
er's partner "mommy." Id. When the child was 
six, the parties separated, and shortly thereafter, the 
biological mother unilaterally terminated the rela-
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tionship between the child and her former partner. 
Id. The court looked to Washington's statutes and 
found that they were "conspicuously silent" regard-
ing the rights of children in nontraditional families. 
Id. at 169. However, the court found that the stat-
utes displayed an intent to protect the welfare of 
children and did not provide any evidence that the 
legislature intended to preempt the court's common 
law jurisprudence over circumstances not yet con-
templated by the legislature. Id. at 172-73, 176-77. 
Thus the court held that a de facto parent would 
have standing and remanded to the district court for 
a determination of whether the partner qualified as 
a de facto parent.FN7 Id. at 179. 
FN7. LB. and H.S.H-K. are in accord with 
other jurisdictions that have used the com-
mon law to grant standing to a third party 
who has developed a parent-like relation-
ship with a child. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. 
L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 711 N.E.2d 886, 
890-92 (1999), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 
1005, 120 S.Ct. 500, 145 L.Ed.2d 386 
(1999) (determining that the court's equit-
able powers governed the resolution of a 
same-sex partner's de facto parent claim 
despite a lack of statutory authority); I.E. 
v. L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 913, 917 
(2001) (rejecting the argument that a part-
ner lacked standing because the statutory 
scheme did not encompass former partners 
or paramours and finding standing under 
the common law doctrine of in loco par-
entis). 
*826 % 66 Like these jurisdictions, I would recog-
nize common law standing for de facto parents. I 
therefore turn to a discussion of what a third party 
must prove in order to obtain de facto parent status. 
III. THE DE FACTO PARENT TEST AND ITS 
APPLICATION TO JONES 
f 67 The determination that a de facto parent has 
standing to petition for visitation does not end the 
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analysis, which must include consideration of what 
a petitioner must demonstrate to establish that he or 
she is a de facto parent. In Holtzman v. Knott (In re 
Custody ofKS.H-K.), 193 Wis.2d 649, 533 N.W.2d 
419 (1995), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 975, 116 S.Ct. 
475, 133 L.Ed.2d 404 (1995), the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court established a four-part test to determ-
ine whether the petitioner was a de facto parent. Id. 
at 435-36. Under that test, the petitioner must prove: 
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consen-
ted to, and fostered, the petitioner's formation and 
establishment of a parent-like relationship with 
the child; (2) that the petitioner and the child 
lived together in the same household; (3) that the 
petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by 
taking significant responsibility for the child's 
care, education and development, including con-
tributing towards the child's support, without ex-
pectation of financial compensation; and (4) that 
the petitioner has been in a parental role for a 
length of time sufficient to have established with 
the child a bonded, dependent relationship par-
ental in nature. 
Id; see also V.C. v. MJ.B., 163 N.J. 200, 748 
A.2d 539, 551-52 (2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 
926, 121 S.Ct. 302, 148 L.Ed.2d 243 (2000) 
(adopting the H.S.H-K. four-part test to determine 
de facto parent standing); Carvin v. Britain (In re 
Parentage of L.B.), 155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 
161, 177 (2005), cert denied, ~- U.S. — , 126 
S.Ct. 2021, 164 L.Ed.2d 806 (2006) (same). 
% 68 Although Lfind the Wisconsin test very help-
ful, I would revise it slightly. The elements requir-
ing that the petitioner live with the child, assume 
parental obligations, and assume the role of a par-
ent for a sufficient length of time all relate to the 
ultimate question of whether a parent-child rela-
tionship actually existed between the petitioner and 
the child. Thus, I would simplify the test by com-
bining the second, third, and fourth parts of the 
Wisconsin test into one element requiring the peti-
tioner to establish the existence of an actual parent-
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child relationship between the petitioner and the 
child. I would therefore require that a third party 
claiming de facto parent status establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that (1) the legal parent 
intended to create a permanent parent-child rela-
tionship between the third party and the child, and 
(2) an actual parent-child relationship was formed. 
To establish the second element, a third party must, 
at a minimum, present evidence demonstrating that 
the third party lived with and cared for the child 
and that, as a result, a parent-child bond developed 
between the third party and the child. 
T( 69 The facts in this case easily satisfy this test, al-
though I recognize that other cases may not be so 
clear. I therefore emphasize that de facto parent 
status is "limited to those adults who have fully and 
completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, 
committed, and responsible parental role in the 
child's life," C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 
1152 (Me.2004), and that undertaking must gener-
ally be with the full consent, encouragement, and 
cooperation of a fit custodial parent. I would there-
fore require that a petitioner claiming de facto par-
ent status prove the two elements of our test by 
clear and convincing evidence. This burden of 
proof sets a high threshold, not easily cleared or 
automatically met by every person who lives with 
or cares for a child. 
*827 f 70 The majority suggests that the 
"fact-intensive inquir[y]" necessary to determine de 
facto parent status falls outside the bounds of the 
traditional role of standing as a gate-keeping tool in 
litigation. Supra 1J 31. This court, however, has re-
cognized that "some cases require more extensive 
fact-finding in order to assess whether the plaintiffs 
interest in the dispute is sufficient to give rise to" 
standing. Sierra Club v. Sevier Power Co., 2006 
UT 74, U 28 & n. 3, 148 P.3d 960 (noting that the 
determination of whether plaintiffs interests are 
sufficient or too attenuated "must be made on a 
case-by-case basis, taking into account all relevant 
facts and the policies underlying our standing re-
quirement"); see also Washington County Water 
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Conservancy v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, 82 P.3d 1125 
(requiring extensive fact-finding, including a trial 
and expert testimony, to determine if plaintiff had 
standing). While we noted in Sierra Club that in-
stances of intensive factual development at the 
standing phase are rare, they do exist, 2006 UT 74, 
% 28 n. 3, 148 P.3d 960, and de facto parenthood 
cases may present one such situation. While the in-
quiry into whether de facto parent status exists may 
require a fact intensive inquiry at the standing 
phase, it in no way supplants the ultimate issue in a 
visitation dispute-the best interests of the child. 
Thus, a determination of de facto parenthood would 
not replace a trial on the merits. While the determ-
ination of de facto parenthood may burden the legal 
parent with litigation, in instances where the in-
quiry will be factually intensive, a legal parent has 
already allowed a significant relationship to devel-
op between his or her child and a third party, and 
thus, the legal parent's rights must yield in favor of 
the best interests of the child. The issue of de facto 
parent status simply presents an example of the rare 
situation when the determination of standing may 
involve complex factual inquiries that a court must 
consider before it examines the merits of the case. I 
now proceed to discuss each part of the de facto 
parent test and its application to Jones. 
A. Intent of the Legal Parent 
T| 71 A party claiming de facto parent status must 
first show that the legal parent intended the third 
party and the child to form a permanent parent-
child relationship. For this step to be satisfied, the 
court must find that the legal parent's "own actions 
led to the creation of [a] parental bond" between 
the third party and the child, J.C v. C.T., 184 
Misc.2d 935, 711 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 
(Fam.Ct.2000), and that at the time the bond 
formed, the legal parent intended it to be perman-
ent, as opposed to temporary, however long.FNS In 
other words, the legal parent must have consented 
to and fostered the petitioner's formation and estab-
lishment of a parental relationship with the 
child.™9 See V.C, 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539, 
552 (2000), cert, denied, *828531 U.S. 926, 121 
S.Ct. 302, 148 L.Ed.2d 243 (2000). A third party 
can prove this by showing that the legal parent 
"ceded over to the third party a measure of parental 
authority and autonomy and granted to that third 
party rights and duties vis-a-vis the child that the 
third party's status would not otherwise warrant." Id. 
FN8. A parent may delegate to a third 
party a degree of parental authority that the 
parent intends, from the outset, to be tem-
porary. Examples of such temporary deleg-
ation include a parent's appointment of a 
third party to care for a child while the par-
ent completes military service, serves a 
prison sentence, or is hospitalized for an 
extensive period. Third parties that are 
meant to stand in the place of a parent for 
only a temporary period of time are not eli-
gible for de facto parent standing. 
FN9. The majority cites In re Adoption of 
P.N. for the proposition that custody may 
not be awarded to a third party absent the 
termination of parental rights of the natural 
parents. Supra f 39 & n. 10. The majority 
again relies on a case where the parties 
were seeking not only permanent custody, 
but adoption. Furthermore, the language 
from P.N. states that the rights of the bio-
logical parents could not be "permanently 
cut off when the parents "have not been 
found unfit" and when they "have not con-
sented to such placement." A.N v. M.LW. 
(In re Adoption of P.N.), 2006 UT 64, % % 
4, 15, 148 P.3d 927. The facts in P.N. 
were vastly different from those in the case 
before us. Whereas Barlow fostered the re-
lationship between Jones and the child, 
P.N. was placed with the prospective ad-
optive family without the biological fath-
er's consent, and he adamantly objected to 
the custody arrangement with legal 
strangers from its initiation. Id. % 4. The 
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lack of consent by the biological parent in 
P.N. sets that case apart from the predica-
ment that Jones finds herself in today, 
where the biological parent encouraged the 
relationship and is now objecting to its 
continuation in any manner. Additionally, 
in P.N., the complete deprivation of the 
biological parents' rights was at issue; 
Jones does not seek to eliminate the child's 
relationship with Barlow, but merely asks 
to continue her relationship with the child 
because she has acted as a de facto parent 
to the child since birth. 
f 72 The focus of this part of the test is on the legal 
parent's intent at the formation and during the pen-
dency of the parent-child relationship, not at the 
termination of the relationship between the legal 
parent and a third party. Id.; see also T.B. v. 
L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 913, 919 (2001) 
(noting that what is relevant "to an in loco parentis 
determination is the method by which a third party 
gained authority to assume parental status, and 
holding that where the biological parent encouraged 
the partner to assume the status of parent and acqui-
esced as the partner carried out day-to-day care of 
the child, she could not erase the relationship cre-
ated with the child after the parties separated). 
Once the legal parent intentionally creates a de 
facto parent for his or her child, the legal parent 
cannot later change his or her mind and unilaterally 
sever or alter the nature of that relationship. 
However, this does not mandate that a legal parent 
form this intent at the conception or birth of the 
child. The de facto parent's participation in the ac-
tual decision to have a child and the process of con-
ception, while highly probative of intent where 
present, is not required. See V.C., 748 A.2d at 
552-53 (recognizing that the situation in which the 
partner does not participate in the decision to con-
ceive "parallels] the situation in which a woman, 
already pregnant or a mother, becomes involved 
with or marries a man who is not the biological or 
adoptive father of the child, but thereafter fully 
functions in every respect as a father"). A parent 
can intend to create a de facto parent-child relation-
ship with a third party anytime during the child's life. 
K 73 The intent requirement is critical because it en-
sures that the legal parent "has the absolute ability 
to maintain a zone of autonomous privacy for her-
self and her child." Id. at 552. If the legal parent 
wishes to maintain that zone of privacy, he or she 
need only choose not to delegate parental authority 
or encourage the formation of a permanent, parent-
like relationship between his or her child and anoth-
er party, and avoid any overt acts in furtherance of 
such a relationship. Moreover, the intent require-
ment limits the people who can qualify as de facto 
parents. For example, under this standard, a nanny 
or other caretaker will not qualify as a de facto par-
ent because a parent does not intend these relation-
ships to be parental or permanent. Additionally, this 
part of the test prevents roommates, live-in boy-
friends or girlfriends, or significant others from 
automatically qualifying as de facto parents. While 
a party that lives with a legal parent and his or her 
children will likely participate in parental respons-
ibilities to some degree, that participation, by itself, 
is not enough. A claimant in this position would 
have to show by clear and convincing evidence that 
the legal parent intended to create a parent-child re-
lationship and intentionally ceded over a suffi-
ciently significant amount of parental responsibility 
to create a permanent parental relationship between 
the claimant and the child. I believe the intent re-
quirement gives due consideration to a parent's 
right to maintain an autonomous zone of privacy. 
However, if the legal parent wishes to keep intact 
this zone of privacy, he or she cannot give a third 
party "parental authority the exercise of which may 
create a profound bond with the child." Id. 
1 74 A party claiming de facto parent status must 
do more than merely allege intent; the party must 
also point to specific behavior of the legal parent 
that clearly manifests that intent. This is a case-
specific requirement that can be satisfied by a vari-
ety of behavioral evidence. There is not, therefore, 
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any specific factor that is required or that will, on 
its own, be conclusive. Rather, a court must care-
fully examine all of the evidence to determine 
whether proof of the requisite intent is clear and 
convincing. 
^ 75 In the case before us, Barlow's behavior amply 
demonstrates that, even before the child's birth, 
Barlow intended Jones to be an equal, permanent 
parent. Shortly after becoming engaged, Barlow 
and Jones mutually decided to have children togeth-
er and formulated a plan whereby Barlow would 
bear the *829 first child and Jones would bear the 
second. Pursuant to this plan, Barlow allowed Jones 
to participate in the selection of a sperm donor, and 
together the parties selected a donor that shared 
both of their traits. Jones attended all prenatal mat-
ters relating to the artificial insemination and, fol-
lowing conception, participated in prenatal care 
with Barlow and the physician. During the preg-
nancy, Jones and Barlow entered into a civil union 
which, at least in Vermont, conferred rights on each 
of them respecting children born during the union. 
Barlow allowed Jones to be present at the delivery 
and participate to the extent possible. After the 
child was born, Barlow and Jones chose a name that 
would reflect both of their surnames and listed that 
name on the birth certificate. 
1 76 Barlow continued to openly exhibit her intent 
that Jones function in a parental role after the 
child's birth. Barlow, Jones, and the child lived to-
gether and held themselves out as the 
"Jones-Barlow" family. Barlow and Jones both held 
themselves out as the child's parents. The child and 
Barlow both called Jones "Mommy," while Barlow 
was called "Momma." Jones provided financial 
support for the child, attended pediatric appoint-
ments with her, and participated in her daily care 
through such activities as dressing her, feeding her, 
and taking her to child care. Jones would not have 
been able to participate in these activities, at least 
to the extent she did, without Barlow's consent. 
f 77 Perhaps the most convincing fact is that Bar-
low designated Jones as the child's legal co-
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guardian. In fact, the "Verified Petition for Ap-
pointment of Co-Guardians for a Minor" stated that 
"[Jones] is the only other parent that [the child] 
knows or will know" and the Supporting Memor-
andum stated that "[s]ince [the child's] birth, 
[Jones] has served as her other parent in all re-
gards." Jones and Barlow took further steps to en-
sure that Jones could protect the child as she would 
if she were a legal parent, including preparing es-
tate planning documents and naming each other as 
beneficiaries on life insurance policies to ensure 
that the child would be cared for in an emergency. 
TI 78 I do not mean to suggest that designating an-
other party as a co-guardian, standing alone, is de-
terminative. To the contrary, I do not believe that a 
co-guardianship, on its own, would be enough to 
satisfy this part of the test given that co-
guardianships are established for a number of reas-
ons, many of which do not involve the intent to cre-
ate a permanent parent-child relationship. However, 
combined with Jones' participation in bringing the 
child into the world and her daily support there-
after, I find the language and content of the co-
guardianship petition in this case particularly per-
suasive. 
1^ 79 Other jurisdictions have relied on actions sim-
ilar to Barlow's in determining whether a third party 
is a de facto parent. For example, in V.C., the moth-
er and her partner jointly decided to have children, 
chose a sperm donor, and participated in prenatal 
care together. 748 A.2d at 542-43. The children 
called the partner "Meema," and the biological 
mother referred to her partner as the mother of her 
children. Id. at 543. The parties and the children 
lived together as a family, and the partner assumed 
many day-to-day obligations of parenthood and 
provided financial support. Id. The New Jersey Su-
preme Court held that the record supported the con-
clusion that the mother had "fostered and cultiv-
ated, in every way, the development of a parent-
child bond between [her partner] and [her chil-
dren]." Id. at 555. 
TI 80 Likewise, in E.N.O. v. L.M.M., the court held 
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that the mother's partner was a de facto parent. 429 
Mass. 824, 711 N.E.2d 886, 892-93 (1999), cert, 
denied, 528 U.S. 1005, 120 S.Ct. 500, 145 L.Ed.2d 
386 (1999). There, the parties jointly decided to 
have a child, the partner cared for the mother dur-
ing pregnancy, the child was given both parties' 
surnames, the parties sent out birth announcements 
listing them both as parents, and the partner as-
sumed most of the financial responsibility for the 
family and assisted in caring for the child. Id. at 
888-89; see also Carvin v. Britain (In re Parent-
age of LB.), 155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161, 
163-65 (2005), cert, denied, — U.S. — , 126 S.Ct. 
2021, 164 L.Ed.2d 806 (2006) (looking to factors 
such as the parties' mutual decision to *830 have a 
child and selection of a sperm donor, the partner's 
participation in prenatal care and delivery, the 
parties' choice to give the child a name that reflec-
ted both surnames, the parties' decision to live to-
gether as a family unit and hold themselves out as a 
family, the fact that the child called her mother 
"Mommy" and the partner "Momma," and the 
parties' decision to share parenting responsibilities); 
T.B., 786 A.2d at 914-15 (holding that the partner 
was a de facto parent where the parties jointly de-
cided to have a child and thereafter lived together, 
the mother named her partner as a guardian over the 
child in her will, they engaged in financial planning 
to provide for the child, and the partner participated 
in day-to-day child rearing responsibilities, such as 
taking the child to child care); H.S.H-K., 533 
N.W.2d at 421-22 (holding that the partner was a de 
facto parent where the parties jointly decided to 
have a child, the partner was present during prenat-
al appointments and delivery, the parties gave the 
child a name that reflected both surnames, the part-
ner provided primary financial support, and both 
women shared child care responsibilities). 
\ 81 Like the above courts, I find a significant 
amount of evidence manifesting Barlow's intent to 
give parental rights to Jones. Barlow's actions 
clearly and convincingly establish that, up until she 
and Jones separated, she intended Jones to be her 
child's other parent. I therefore would hold that in 
this case the intent requirement has been satisfied. 
B. Creation of an Actual Parent-Child Relationship 
U 82 I now turn to the second part of the de facto 
parent test. To satisfy this part, the petitioner must 
prove that he or she and the child formed an actual 
parent-child relationship. Cf You mans v. Ramos, 
429 Mass. 774, 711 N.E.2d 165 (1999) (holding 
that an aunt was a de facto parent where she and the 
child had developed a substantial mother-daughter 
relationship). A petitioner satisfies this requirement 
by establishing that (1) the petitioner lived with and 
cared for the child on a daily basis, and as a result 
(2) the petitioner and the child formed a parent-
child bond. 
1. Living With and Caring for the Child 
% 83 In order for a third party and a child to develop 
an actual parent-child relationship, the third party 
must have lived with and cared for the child on a 
daily basis. See V.C, 748 A.2d at 551 (requiring 
that a petitioner lived in the same household as the 
child and assumed obligations of parenthood); 
H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421 (same). There is no 
minimum period of time during which a third party 
must have lived with and cared for the child. It is, 
however, appropriate for a court to consider the 
amount of time during which the third party has 
functioned as a parent when determining whether 
an actual parent-child relationship has been created. 
See V.C, 748 A.2d at 553. In other words, the pe-
titioner must have functioned in a parental role for 
a long enough period of time to allow a bonded par-
ent-child relationship to develop. Id. "How much 
time is necessary will turn on the facts of each 
case," including the child's age,FKM0 development-
al stage, and the nature of the relationship. Id. 
FN 10. Research indicates that children can 
begin to form strong bonds at a very early 
age. See, e.g., Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. 
Lamb, Using Child Development Research 
to Make Appropriate Custody and Access 
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Decisions for Young Children, 38 Fam. & 
Conciliation Cts. Rev. 297, 299 (2000) 
("In the attachment phase, which occurs 
between 7 and 24 months of age, the child 
... gives increasingly clear evidence that at-
tachments have been formed."). Thus, 
while the child's age may be relevant in de-
termining the nature of the relationship, I 
do not in any way suggest that a very 
young child is incapable of forming a bon-
ded parent-child relationship with a third 
party. 
^ 84 The care the third party provides to the child 
during this time must be equivalent to the care a 
biological or legal parent would provide. This does 
not require that the third party have the exact same 
relationship with the child or assume the same re-
sponsibilities toward the child as the legal parent. 
Rather, it demands that the third party assume the 
normal "obligations of parenthood" and do so 
without the expectation of financial compensation. 
Id. at 551. These obligations include "taking signi-
ficant responsibility for the child's care, education 
and development,"*831 H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d at 
436, and may or may not include financial contribu-
tions to the child and the household. V.C., 748 
A.2d at 553. As with the other parts of the de facto 
parent test, this inquiry is fact sensitive and will 
vary with each individual case. 
% 85 Turning to the facts of this case, I believe that 
Jones has clearly and convincingly shown that she 
lived with and cared for the child on a daily basis. 
Jones lived with Barlow and the child from the 
child's birth until the child was two years old. Dur-
ing that time, Jones participated in the child's daily 
care as if she were a parent. She took her to doctor 
appointments, dropped her off at child care, and at-
tended "to the child's daily personal needs, such as 
eating and bathing. Jones also provided the child 
with financial security, not only by providing for 
the child in her will and securing a life insurance 
policy, but also by contributing to the household 
expenses. 
Page 27 
If 86 As is the case in most two-parent households, 
Jones' parental obligations and responsibilities were 
not the same as Barlow's. For example, when the 
child was an infant, Barlow, as the nursing mother, 
nearly always fed the child. Likewise, during the 
first fifteen months of the child's life, Barlow 
stayed at home while Jones worked. As the child 
grew, the parties' roles evolved accordingly, with 
Barlow returning to work and Jones assuming more 
care-giving responsibilities. These differences, 
however, do not mean that Jones was not fulfilling 
a parental role. Indeed, this division of roles is 
nearly identical to that frequently found between 
married men and women with children. Like the 
district court, I am convinced that Jones "assumed 
the obligations of parenthood by taking sufficient 
and significant responsibility for the child's care, 
upbringing, future education and well-being ... 
without expectation of financial compensation." 
K 87 I recognize that Jones' role had changed by the 
time she filed her petition for visitation. Barlow and 
the child had moved out, and therefore Jones was 
no longer living with the child and caring for her on 
a daily basis. This is not problematic, however. Un-
like the doctrine of in loco parentis, a de facto par-
ent need not still be living in the same household as 
the child at the time the petition is filed; in fact, it is 
highly unlikely that he or she will be. The third 
party need only petition the court for visitation 
within a reasonable time after the legal parent inter-
feres with the third party's relationship with the 
child. As a practical matter, this interference often 
will not occur until the third party and the child no 
longer live together and the legal parent denies vis-
itation.™11 In this case, Jones filed her petition 
within a reasonable time of Barlow's interference. 
The parties separated on November 7, 2003, Bar-
low denied Jones visitation with the child later that 
same month, and Jones filed her complaint on 
December 19, 2003. Thus, Jones satisfies our re-
quirement that she lived with and cared for the 
child on a day-to-day basis. 
FN11. I do not believe it is necessary to es-
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tablish a definite period of time after the 
petitioner moves from the child's house-
hold in which a petition for visitation must 
be filed. I recognize, and indeed hope, that 
parties will often resolve matters of visita-
tion on their own, without involving the 
courts. I also recognize, however, that 
parties may not be able to resolve their dif-
ferences regarding visitation, or that the 
legal parent may suddenly terminate visita-
tion with the third party after that party has 
enjoyed visitation with the child for 
months or even years. Setting a limitations 
period that begins at the date the petitioner 
moves from the child's household would 
foreclose a remedy to de facto parents and 
their children when a legal parent has 
agreed to allow visitation but later changes 
his or her mind and denies it. I therefore 
would require only that a petition be filed 
within a reasonable time after the legal 
parent interferes with the relationship 
between the third party and the child. 
2. Actual Parent-Child Bonding 
f 88 In addition to,the requirement that a petitioner 
live with and care for the child, to prove the exist-
ence of an actual parent-child relationship, the peti-
tioner must show that the petitioner and the child 
share "a relationship with deep emotional bonds 
such that the child recognizes the person, independ-
ent of the legal form of the relationship, as a parent 
from whom they receive daily guidance and nurtur-
ance." In re RL.M.C, 100 P.3d 546, 559 
(Colo.Ct.App.2004), cert, denied, 2004 WL 
2377164, 2004 Colo. LEXIS S51 ,cert. *832 
denied, 545 U.S. 1111, 125 S.Ct. 2551, 162 
L.Ed.2d 287 (2005). A child can form this type of 
relationship regardless of whether the potential de 
facto parent is biologically related to the child. See, 
e.g., J. Hammond Muench & Martin R. Levy, Psy-
chological Parentage: A Natural Right, 13 Fam. 
L.Q. 129, 152 (1979) ("[T]he child's development 
depends upon the continuity and character of [the] 
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relationship with the adult he perceives as his par-
ent, and ... this perception rather than the fact of 
biological parenthood is the basis of their relation-
ship."(citation omitted)); Smith v. Org. of Foster 
Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
843, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977) 
("[Etiological relationships are not [the] exclusive 
determination of the existence of a family."). 
Rather, bonded parent-child relationships form 
when children "receive sensitive and responsive 
care from familiar adults," who may or may not be 
biologically related, in the course of everyday care-
such as being fed, held, spoken to, played with, 
soothed, and stimulated. Joan B. Kelley & Michael 
E. Lamb, Using Child Development Research to 
Make Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions 
for Young Children, 38 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. 
Rev. 297, 298 (2000); see also Smith, 431 U.S. at 
844, 97 S.Ct. 2094 ("[T]he importance of the fa-
milial relationship, to the individuals involved and 
to the society, stems from the emotional attach-
ments that derive from the intimacy of daily associ-
ation, and from the role it plays in 'promot [ing] a 
way of life' through the instruction of chil-
dren."(citation omitted) (alteration in original)). In 
addition, parent-child bonds develop and grow 
stronger when the child spends time in the third 
party's general proximity. Kelley & Lamb, supra ^ 
88, at 298. 
K 89 There is ample evidence of an actual parent-
child bond in this case. As noted previously, Jones 
lived with and cared for the child for the first two 
years of the child's life. Jones testified that she felt 
bonded to the child during this time, particularly in 
the mornings when she and the child were alone. 
Moreover, as is evident by this lawsuit, Jones seri-
ously wishes to maintain this relationship. I find it 
persuasive that family and friends testified that the 
relationship between Jones and the child mirrored a 
traditional parent-child relationship. The district 
judge found the testimony of these witnesses partic-
ularly persuasive because they witnessed this rela-
tionship "in the home at times that were not merely 
social occasions, but rather in evenings and early 
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mornings." The child's pediatrician echoed these 
witnesses, testifying that "[i]n the office, both 
[Jones and Barlow] seemed to take a very active 
role in [the child's] well-being and be very genu-
inely interested in how she was doing." Like the 
district judge, I find this testimony "extremely im-
portant." 
K 90 It is undisputed that Barlow also shared a close 
mother-daughter relationship with the child. Like 
the district judge, I believe that Barlow may have 
had a closer relationship with the child given that 
she was the biological and nursing mother. I do not 
believe, however, that Barlow's closer relationship 
with the child prohibits the child and Jones from 
also developing an actual parent-child relationship. 
That the third party is not the child's primary care-
giver does not imply that the third party and the 
child do not share a real parent-child bond. Re-
search has shown that children generally form at-
tachments to both parents at the same age, usually 
around six to seven months. Kelly & Lamb, supra ^ 
88, at 300. This is true even where one parent 
spends more time with the child than the other, as is 
the case in the "traditional home." Id. Evidence 
that Barlow was the child's primary caregiver does 
not defeat a claim of an actual parent-child bond 
between Jones and the child. Thus, Jones meets the 
requirement that she formed an actual parental bond 
with the child. 
IV. THE DE FACTO PARENT DOCTRINE IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
T| 91 Finally, my belief that Jones is a de facto par-
ent and thus entitled to standing is constitutional. 
The Constitution of the United States, specifically 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, protects "the fundamental right of parents to 
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of their children." Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) 
(plurality opinion). To *833 protect this fundament-
al right, parents are entitled to a presumption that a 
fit parent acts in the best interests of his or her 
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child. See id at 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (" 'The law's 
concept of the family rests on a presumption that 
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, ex-
perience, and capacity for judgment required for 
making life's difficult decisions. More important, 
historically it has recognized that natural bonds of 
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of 
their children.' " (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 
584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979))). 
This presumption cannot be rebutted "simply be-
cause a state judge believes a 'better' decision 
could have been made." Troxel 530 U.S. at 73, 
120 S.Ct. 2054. 
T( 92 Troxel is the preeminent case addressing a par-
ent's fundamental rights in the context of third-
party visitation. Troxel addressed the application of 
a Washington statute that allowed " 'any person' " 
to petition for visitation rights " 'at any time' " and 
gave a court the authority to grant visitation if it " 
'serve[d] the best interest of the child.' " Id. at 67, 
120 S.Ct. 2054 (quoting Wash. Rev.Code § 
26.10.160(3) (1994)). The plurality held that, as ap-
plied, the statute violated "the fundamental right of 
parents to make decisions concerning the care, cus-
tody, and control of their children." Id. at 66-67, 
120 S.Ct. 2054. According to the plurality, the stat-
ute exceeded the bounds of due process because its 
breadth allowed any third party to bring a visitation 
petition, and it did not afford a parent's decision 
any deference despite the parental presumption. Id. 
at 67-68, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Rather, the visitation 
statute allowed a court to overturn any parent's de-
cision regarding visitation based solely on its de-
termination of the child's best interest, id. at 67, 120 
S.Ct. 2054, which was precisely what the district 
judge in the case had done, id. at 68-70, 120 S.Ct. 
2054. 
H 93 However, the de facto parent doctrine does not 
violate a parent's due process rights under Troxel 
The de facto parent doctrine is not nearly as broad 
as the statute at issue in Troxel It does not grant 
"any" third party standing, but only those persons 
who have satisfied the stringent requirements of de 
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facto parenthood Moreover, a finding of de facto 
parent status does not amount to a judge's determin-
ation that a better decision could have been made 
with regard to visitation, but rather, to a finding that 
the parental presumption does not apply when a 
legal parent creates and fosters a parent-child rela-
tionship between his or her child and a third 
party FN,P Also, when a judge makes a determina-
tion that a party is a de facto parent, the judge is 
only determining that the party has standing and is 
thus entitled to a hearing on the best interests of the 
child Thus, the judge's decision that a party is a de 
facto parent is not a determination of what visita-
tion arrangement is best See TB v LRM 567 
Pa 222, 786 A 2d 913 919-20 (2001) ("A determ-
ination of standing simply implies that the party has 
a substantial interest in the subject matter of the lit-
igation and does not speak to [a third party's] 
chance of success on the merits ") 
FN 12 This case addresses only visitation, 
and I accordingly limit my analysis regard-
ing a natural parent's waiver of the parental 
presumption to this context However, 
some courts have gone further and recog-
nized parity between de facto and legal 
parents, thus enabling de facto parents to 
take advantage of the protections offered 
by the parental presumption See eg 
Caivin v Britain fin te Pclientage oj 
LB) 155 Wash 2d 679, 122 P 3d 161, 178 
(2005) (noting that "the status of de facto 
parents places them in parity with biolo-
gical and adoptive parents" and gives them 
a fundamental liberty interest in the care, 
custody, and management of the child), 
cert denied — US —- 126 S Ct 2021 
164LTd2d806(2006) 
1f 94 Moreover, nothing m Tioxel suggests that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits third-party visita-
tion in all contexts or always requires a rebuttal of 
the parental presumption In fact, the 77 oxel plural-
ity specifically limited its holding to the "sweeping 
breadth" of the Washington statute, noting that it 
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had not considered whether the Due Process Clause 
always requires a showing of harm as a prerequisite 
to third-party visitation 530 U S at 73, 120 S Ct 
2054 The Court also stated that it was not defining 
"the precise scope of the parental due process right 
in the visitation context" hNI Id 
FN 13 Several of the dissenting justices in 
Troxel indicated that they would not be op-
posed to granting visitation to those that 
had a substantial relationship with a child 
530 US at 85, 120 S Ct 2054 (Stevens, 
J , dissenting) (noting that in many circum-
stances it would be "constitutionally per-
missible for a court to award some visita-
tion of a child to a previous caregiver"), 
id al 98, 100-01, 120 S Ct 2054 
(Kennedy, J , dissenting) (noting that there 
may be cases where a third party "has de-
veloped a relationship with a child which 
is not necessarily subject to absolute par-
ental veto" and that "a fit parent's right vis-
a-vis a complete stranger is one thing, her 
right vis-a-vis another parent or a de facto 
parent may be another") 
*834 H 95 Therefore, I do not believe that the Due 
Process Clause is violated under Troxel when a 
judge grants a de facto parent standing in a visita-
tion matter I recognize that a parent has a right to 
make decisions regarding the upbringing of his or 
her child However, a parent exercises this right 
when he or she invites a third party to form a par-
ental relationship with his or her child and there-
after actively fosters the relationship By incorpor-
ating the legal parent's intent into our de facto par-
ent test, I am giving deference to the legal parent's 
decisions However, once a legal parent exercises 
this right and creates a de facto parent relationship 
between the child and another, the legal parent has 
a reduced expectation of privacy and autonomy A 
parent who encourages the formation of such a rela-
tionship cannot later unilaterally sever the connec-
tion or complain that a court has violated his or her 
rights by protecting the relationship As the New 
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Jersey Supreme Court explained in V.C. v. K4.J.B.: 
[A] parent has the absolute ability to maintain a 
zone of autonomous privacy for herself and her 
child. However, if she wishes to maintain that 
zone of privacy she cannot invite a third party to 
function as a parent to her child and cannot cede 
over to that third party parental authority the ex-
ercise of which may create a profound bond with 
the child. 
163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539, 552 (2000), cert, 
denied, 531 U.S. 926, 121 S.Ct. 302, 148 L.Ed.2d 
243 (2000). 
^ 96 This approach is consistent with post- Troxel 
decisions that have granted third parties standing 
where the third party has a substantial relationship 
with the child.rNI4 For instance, this court de-
termined that Utah's grandparent visitation statute 
was constitutional and upheld a grant of visitation, 
against the father's objection, where the maternal 
grandparents had lived with the child and interacted 
with her on a daily basis prior to the death of the 
child's mother. LJzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of 
S.T.T.J, 2006 UT 46, ^ 1-4, 144 P.3d 1083. As re-
cognized in S.T.T., when a family is divided by 
events such as divorce, "a situation may arise where 
the child's interests differ from those of the par-
ent." Id. *l 30. The de facto parent test would 
"provide[ ] guidance to courts in determining 
whether the petitioning [third party] ha[s] estab-
lished circumstances under which the courts can, 
nevertheless, supersede the parent's decision," just 
as courts may do when the third party seeking visit-
ation is a grandparent. Id. ^ 35. As this court has 
previously recognized, situations exist in which vis-
itation with a third party may be in the best in-
terests of a child despite the legal parent's objec-
tions, and like Utah's grandparent visitation statute, 
the de facto parent test would, I believe, survive 
constitutional scrutiny. 
FN14. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C, 100 P.3d 
546, 557, 562 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) 
(rejecting the assertion that a parent must 
be found unfit under Troxel and upholding 
trial court's order granting a partner equal 
parenting responsibilities based on a psy-
chological parent theory because it was 
more than a judge's "better decision" as to 
best interests), cert, denied, 2004 WL 
2377164, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 851,cert, 
denied, 545 U.S. 1111, 125 S.Ct. 2551, 
162 L.Ed.2d 287 (2005); Rideout v. Rien-
cleaiu 761 A.2d 291, 303 (Me.2000) 
("[WJhere the grandparents have acted as 
the children's parents for significant peri-
ods of time, [Maine's] Grandparent Visita-
tion Act serves a compelling state interest 
in addressing the children's relationship 
with the people who have cared for them 
as parents ... [and the Act] may be applied 
... without violating the constitutional 
rights of the parents."); VC, 748 A.2d at 
554 (noting that where a parent has invited 
another to be a de facto parent and thereby 
"altered her child's life by essentially giv-
ing him or her another parent, the legal 
parent's options are constrained"); Rubano 
v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I.2000) 
(finding that lower court's enforcement of 
a visitation agreement between the natural 
parent and the de facto parent did not viol-
ate the Due Process Clause because there 
are circumstances where "even the exist-
ence of a developed biological, parent-
child relationship ... will not prevent others 
from acquiring parental rights vis-a-vis the 
child"). 
*835 K 97 In conclusion, the recognition of de facto 
parenthood would not infringe upon the general 
right of parents to raise their children in the manner 
they deem appropriate. Rather, de facto parenthood 
addresses only the specific circumstances that arise 
when a parent consents to and fosters a de facto 
parent relationship between the parent's child and 
another party. It merely recognizes that when a par-
ent encourages another to form a de facto parent re-
lationship with a child, the parent and the third 
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party are not the only parties affected by the de-
cision. There is another interested party: the child. 
In these situations, in order to properly address the 
best interests of the child, it is appropriate to grant 
the de facto parent standing. 
| 98 I therefore conclude that under Utah common 
law, de facto parents should have standing to seek 
visitation, despite the objections of a biological or 
legal parent. De facto parenthood recognizes that 
when a natural parent fosters such a relationship, 
the child is also affected and ought to be protected 
from losing a relationship with someone who is, as 
far as the child is concerned, a parent. 
Utah,2007. 
Jones v. Barlow 
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loco parentis to his stepchild and if so whether it 
was in child's best interest to grant him right of vis-
itation, and further, whether that right was to be 
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ELLETT, Chief Justice: 
This case arises out of a divorce action filed by the 
respondent against the appellant. Respondent has a 
minor child, her offspring by a previous marriage, 
born about two months before his mother's mar-
riage to the appellant. Although four children were 
born to the respondent and the appellant during the 
time they were together, all four died either at birth 
or in their infancy. Because of this and because the 
appellant, the child's stepfather, had never formally 
adopted him, respondent did not seek child support 
in her divorce complaint. Appellant counter-claims 
that he should be entitled to reasonable visitation 
rights with respondent's son. He claimed that he has 
treated the child as his own son, feels very close to 
him, and is concerned about his future welfare. Ap-
pellant further offered to pay fifty dollars a month 
into a trust account for the child's benefit until he 
reaches eighteen years of age. Appellant lived with 
the child from the time he was two months old until 
the respondent and the appellant separated, roughly 
four years later, and it is uncontested that the child 
has had no contact with his biological father. 
Respondent objected to visitation rights being 
awarded to the appellant. The trial court held as a 
matter of law that the appellant (stepparent) was not 
entitled to a hearing on the issue of visitation. The 
sole issue raised on appeal, therefore, is whether the 
appellant stepfather is entitled to a hearing on the 
issue of visitation rights. 
[l][2][3]Utah Code Ann., Sec. 30-3-5 (1953), as 
amended, provides guidelines regarding*66 custody 
and visitation in divorce actions: 
When a decree of divorce is made, the court may 
make such orders in relation to the children, prop-
erty and parties, and the maintenance of the parties 
and children, as may be equitable. The court shall 
have continuing jurisdiction to make such sub-
sequent changes or new orders with respect to the 
support and maintenance of the parties, the custody 
of the children and their support and maintenance, 
or the distribution of the property as shall be reas-
onable and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents and other relatives shall take into con-
sideration the welfare of the child. (Emphasis ad-
ded.) 
The 1975 Legislature amended Sec. 30-3-5 to in-
clude the last sentence, thereby codifying tradition-
al common law rules permitting an equitable invest-
igation into whether it is in the welfare of the child 
that parents, grandparents, or other relatives be ac-
corded visitation rights. In proceedings to determ-
ine custody and/or visitation, the welfare of a minor 
child is of paramount importance,[FNl] and di-
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vorce courts have broad equitable powers in safe-
guarding this interest.[FN2]The last sentence of 
Sec. 30-3-5 indicates the legislative intent to pro-
tect the relationships which affect the child whose 
parents are being divorced, and to be sensitive to 
the fact that relationships beyond those of parent-
child may be important enough to protect vis-a-vis 
visitation. For the appellant to assert visitation 
rights, he must, therefore, stand in the relationship 
of parent, grandparent, or other relative to this 
child, keeping in mind the paramount concern of 
the child's welfare. 
FN1. Arends v. Arends, 30 Utah 2d 328, 
517 P.2d 1019 (1974); Robinson v. Robin-
son, 15 Utah 2d 293, 391 P.2d 434 (1964). 
FN2. Dehm v. Dehra, Utah, 545 P.2d 525 
(1976); Mecham v. Mecham, Utah, 544 
P.2d 479 (1975). 
[4] At common law, the stepparent and stepchild re-
lationship conferred no rights and imposed no ob-
ligations. [FN3] In some states this rule has been 
statutorily amended to require stepparents to 
provide for their stepchildren so long as the rela-
tionship continues. [FN4] The Colorado Supreme 
Court in In re Estate of latino, [FN5] went so far as 
to conclude that the word "stepchild" in an inherit-
ance tax statute included the Former stepchildren of 
a marriage that ended in divorce prior to the step-
parent's death. 
FN3. Estate of Smith v. Nicholson, 49 
Wash.2d 229, 299 P.2d 550 (1956). 
FN4. Estate of Griffen v. Haugland, 86 
Wash.2d 223, 543 P.2d 245 (1975); State 
v. Gillaspie, 8 Wash.App. 560, 507 P.2d 
1223 (1973). 
FN5. 542 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1975). 
[5][6] Utah has no statutory provision obligating 
stepparent support, however; and if nothing more 
existed in the relationship between the appellant 
and respondent's child, the appellant would not 
have standing to assert his claims. However, it ap-
pears that the appellant may have assumed the 
status of one in loco parentis to the child which 
would put him in a different position. The term "in 
loco parentis" means in the place of a parent, and a 
"person in loco parentis" is one who has assumed 
the status and obligations of a parent without form-
al adoption. [FN6] Whether or not one assumes this 
status depends on whether that person Intends to as-
sume that obligation.[FN7] 
FN6. Workman v. Workman, 498 P.2d 
1384 (Okl.1972); Sturrup v. Mahan, 261 
Ind. 463, 305 N.E.2d 877 (1974). 
FN7. Fevig v. Fevig, 90 N.M. 51, 559 P.2d 
839 (1977). See also 59 Am.Jur.2d, Parent 
& Child, s 88. 
"[7] Where one stands in loco parentis to another, 
the rights and liabilities arising out of that relation 
are, as the words imply, exactly the same as 
between parent and child."[FN8]The Washington 
Supreme Court in In re Hudson, [FN9] discussed the 
rights of parental custody and control and classified 
*67 parental rights and those of persons in loco par-
entis together as having apparent equivalent status: 
FN8. Sparks v. Hinckley, 78 Utah 502, 5 
P.2d 570 (1931); see also In re Tanner, 
Utah, 549 P.2d 703 (1976). 
FN9. 13 Wash.2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). 
. . . Parents or those standing in loco parentis to 
minor children primarily have the constitutional 
right to the custody and control of such minor chil-
dren and may give to those children such attention 
and training as in the judgment of such parents or 
guardians may seem best for the welfare of the 
child or children and for the good of society. [FN 10] 
(Emphasis added.) 
FN 10. Id., 126P.2dat775. 
[8] In the instant case, the appellant claims to have 
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lived with his stepson since the child was two 
months old, treated him "as his own son," and feels 
concerned about his future. If these claims are true 
and if they indicate his desire to stand in the place 
of a parent, then appellant's relationship may entitle 
him to the same rights accorded to natural parents. 
Implicit in the due process clause of our state Con-
stitution [FN 11] is that persons be afforded a hear-
ing to determine their rights under the law. If we 
are to find that the status of loco parentis confers 
the same rights upon a stepparent as those enjoyed 
by a natural parent, then A fortiori, the rights of the 
stepparent cannot be terminated without an oppor-
tunity to be heard on the matter. 
FN 11.Utah Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 7. 
[9] The loco parentis status has been terminated, 
however, by divorce, [FN 12] although termination 
by divorce has been determined only in the context 
of the person in loco parentis making the choice to 
terminate the status; and not, as here, in the context 
of the one in loco parentis wishing to continue the 
status against the wishes of the natural parent. The 
common law concerning termination of the loco 
parentis status is that only the surrogate parent or 
the child is able to terminate the status [FN13] at 
will, and the rights, duties, and obligations continue 
as long as they choose to continue the 
relationship. [FN 14] 
FN 12. Franklin v. Franklin, 75 Ariz. 151. 
253 P.2d 337 (1953). 
FN 13. Taylor v. Taylor, 58 Wash.2d 510, 
364 P.2d 444 (1961); Chestnut v. Chestnut, 
247 S.C. 332, 147 SJB.2d 269 (1966). 
FN 14. See the discussion re stepparents as 
standing in loco parentis in 59 Am.Jur.2d, 
Parent and Child, Sec. 91. 
[10][11] This is an unusual case. Respondent even 
admits that the appellant loves the child. There is a 
presumption that the best interest of a child is for it 
to be reared by its natural parent, although this pre-
sumption is one of fact and not of law and may be 
overcome by sufficient evidence; [FN 15] and, as 
stated previously, the welfare of the child is con-
trolling. Important also is that the appellant does 
not seek custody; he wishes only to exercise visita-
tion privileges. Because Sec. 30-3-5 conceivably al-
lows visitation where custodial rights would not ex-
ist,[FN16] this Court feels that there is greater flex-
ibility in determining visitation than there is in de-
termining custody. 
FN 15. Walton v. Cofrman, 110 Utah 1, 
169 P.2d 97 (1946); Baldwin v. Niclson. 
110 Utah 172, 170P.2d 179(1946). 
FN 16. For example, two natural parents di-
vorce, with custody of their child granted 
to the mother and visitation rights granted 
to the father. The mother then dies. Cus-
tody would go to the father absent evid-
ence of his unfitness, incapacity, etc. as 
against the child's maternal grandparents. 
Even though the maternal grandparents 
would not have a custodial right as against 
the father, they would have visitation 
rights which they previously did not have, 
assuming the court found it in the child's 
best interest to give visitation rights to the 
grandparents. 
A case in point is that of Spells v. Spells, [FN 17] a 
Pennsylvania decision concerning the right of a 
stepfather to seek visitation rights with his ex-wife's 
children. The court there said: 
FN 17. 250 Pa.Supcr. 168, 378 A.2d 879 
(1977). 
. . . It is our belief that a stepfather may not be 
denied the right to visit *68 his stepchildren merely 
because of his lack of a blood relationship to them. 
Clearly, a stepfather and his young stepchildren 
who live in a family environment may develop deep 
and lasting mutual bonds of affection. Courts must 
acknowledge the fact that a stepfather (or stepmoth-
er) may be the only parent that the child has truly 
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known and loved during its minority. A stepparent 
may be as devoted and concerned about the welfare 
of a stepchild as a natural parent would be. Rejec-
tion of visitation privileges cannot be grounded in 
the mere status as a stepparent. (Emphasis added.) 
Case law is clear that 'the guiding star for the court 
in coming to a conclusion (in a child custody case) 
is the welfare of the child. To this the rights of par-
ents and all other considerations are subordinate.' . 
. . Thus, it is clear that visitation rights of a parent 
not in custody must be carefully guarded. . . . Ac-
cordingly, when a stepparent is 'in loco parentis' 
with his stepchildren, courts must jealously guard 
his rights to visitation.... 
The Pennsylvania court remanded the case to the 
trial court in order to determine whether or not the 
stepfather actually stood in loco parentis to his 
stepchildren; and if so, to permit the stepfather to 
demonstrate that his interest in visitation should be 
protected. 
We believe this is a sound view and one which we 
should adopt. 
[12] In view of the foregoing, it appears that the ap-
pellant may be in loco parentis to respondent's child 
and that only he or the child, and not the respond-
ent, can terminate that relationship. If appellant is 
in loco parentis, he should be considered a parent 
for purposes of Sec. 30-3-5. It is consistent with 
both the statutory intent and with the requirements 
of due process that he, like a natural parent, grand-
parent, or any other relative, have a hearing to de-
termine his rights to visitation. 
The appellant made no offer to pay child support, 
and certainly he has no legal duty to do so. He did 
offer to set up a trust fund on behalf of the child 
and to make monthly contributions to that fund. It 
may be that if a stepfather standing in the status of 
loco parentis is given the opportunity to seek visita-
tion rights as a right afforded a natural parent, that 
he should not be permitted to escape the duties and 
obligations of the loco parentis status as long as 
that relationship remains intact. A hearing could de-
termine not only the right to visitation, but could 
determine whether that right should be conditioned 
on a requirement that the stepfather accept an oblig-
ation to assist in the support of the child. This is not 
only consistent with the concept of loco parentis 
but may well be necessary to the child's welfare. 
Loco parentis does not envision that a stepparent be 
permitted to enjoy the rights of a natural parent 
without also accepting the responsibilities that are 
incurred. 
The case is reversed and remanded to the trial court 
for a hearing to determine whether the appellant 
stands in loco parentis to his stepchild and if so, 
whether it is in the child's best interest to grant the 
appellant a right of visitation; and, further, whether 
that right should be conditioned by appellant's 
agreement to pay a proper share for child support. 
No costs are awarded. 
CROCKETT, MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, 
JJ., concur. 
Utah, 1978. 
Gribble v. Gribble 
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Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (2008) 
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children ~ 
Division of debts - Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time -
Determination of alimony ~ Nonmeritorious petition for modification 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include 
the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for 
the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the 
court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, 
current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning 
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If 
the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent 
children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial 
parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for 
the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the 
mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents 
and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the 
court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a 
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered 
parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court 
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable 
attorneys1 fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that 
the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation 
order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or 
parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to the 
prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the 
prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered 
visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor 
spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor 
spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time 
of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the 
court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, 
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of 
short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the 
income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be 
considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If 
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing 
the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children 
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each 
party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs 
of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not 
be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the 
payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that 
a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or 
death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void 
ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to 
the action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with 
another person. 
§30-5a-101. Title 
This chapter is known as the "Custody and Visitation for Persons Other than Parents Act." 
§30-5a-102. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Parent" means a biological or adoptive parent. 
(2) "Person other than a parent" means a person related to the child by marriage or blood, including: 
(a) siblings; 
(b) aunts; 
(c) uncles; 
(d) grandparents; or 
(e) current or former step-parents, or any of the persons in Subsections (2)(a) through (d) 
in a step relationship to the child. 
§ 30-5a-103. Custody and visitation for persons other than a parent 
(1) In accordance with 
1. Section 62A-4a-20L it is the public policy of this state that parents retain the 
fundamental right and duty to exercise primary control over the care, supervision, 
upbringing, and education of their children. There is a rebuttable presumption that a 
parent's decisions are in the child's best interests. 
(2) A court may find the presumption in Subsection (1) rebutted and grant custodial or 
visitation rights to a person other than a parent who, by clear and convincing evidence, 
has established all of the following: 
(a) the person has intentionally assumed the role and obligations of a parent; 
(b) the person and the child have formed an emotional bond and created a parent-child 
type relationship; 
(c) the person contributed emotionally or financially to the child's well being; 
(d) assumption of the parental role is not the result of a financially compensated surrogate 
care arrangement; 
(e) continuation of the relationship between the person and the child would be in the 
child's best interests; 
(f) loss or cessation of the relationship between the person and the child would be 
detrimental to the child; and 
(g) the parent: 
(i) is absent; or 
(ii) is found by a court to have abused or neglected the child. 
(3) A proceeding under this chapter may be commenced by filing a verified petition, or 
petition supported by an affidavit, in the juvenile court if a matter is pending, or in the 
district court in the county in which the child: 
(a) currently resides; or 
(b) lived with a parent or a person other than a parent who acted as a parent within six 
months before the commencement of the action. 
(4) A proceeding under this chapter may be filed in a pending divorce, parentage action, 
or other proceeding, including a proceeding in the juvenile court, involving custody of or 
visitation with a child. 
(5) The petition shall include detailed facts supporting the petitioner's right to file the 
petition including the criteria set forth in Subsection (2) and residency information as set 
forth in Section 78B-13-209. 
(6) A proceeding under this chapter may not be filed against a parent who is actively 
serving outside the state in any branch of the military. 
(7) Notice of a petition filed pursuant to this chapter shall be served in accordance with 
the rules of civil procedure on all of the following: 
(a) the child's biological, adopted, presumed, declarant, and adjudicated parents; 
(b) any person who has court-ordered custody or visitation rights; 
(c) the child's guardian; 
(d) the guardian ad litem, if one has been appointed; 
(e) a person or agency that has physical custody of the child or that claims to have 
custody or visitation rights; and 
(f) any other person or agency that has previously appeared in any action regarding 
custody of or visitation with the child. 
(8) The court may order a custody evaluation to be conducted in any action brought under 
this chapter. 
(9) The court may enter temporary orders in an action brought under this chapter pending 
the entry of final orders. 
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»e it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
[*1] Section 1. Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 257, Laws of Utah 1991, as amended to 
ead: 
0-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children -- Division of debts -- Court to have continuing 
jrisdiction - Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meritorious petition for 
lodification. 
1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or 
bligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent 
hildren; 
b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and 
ental care insurance for the dependent children; and 
:) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
icurred during marriage; 
i) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
abilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
ii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders. 
I) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child 
are expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If 
le court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may 
iclude an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the 
mployment or training of the custodial parent. 
3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, 
le custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property and obligations 
>r debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
\) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other [D> relatives <D] [A> MEMBERS OF THE IMMEDIATE 
<\MILY <A] , the court shall consider the [D> welfare <D] [A> BEST INTEREST <A] of the child. 
5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
utomatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
itio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are 
stermined. 
>) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony 
»at the former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further established by the person receiving 
imony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
7) [D> When <D] [A> IF <A ] a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a court order is made and 
snied, the court [D> may <D] [A> SHALL <A] order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the 
availing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted [A> OR DEFENDED 
GAINST <A] in good faith. 
\> (8) IF A PETITION ALLEGES SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH A VISITATION ORDER BY A PARENT, A GRANDPARENT, OR 
THER MEMBER OF THE IMMEDIATE FAMILY PURSUANT TO SECTION 78-32-12.2 WHERE A VISITATION RIGHT HAS BEEN 
DEVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE COURT, THE COURT MAY AWARD TO THE PREVAILING PARTY COSTS, INCLUDING ACTUAL ATTORNEY 
EES AND COURT COSTS INCURRED BY THE PREVAILING PARTY BECAUSE OF THE OTHER PARTY'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE OR 
KERCISE COURT-ORDERED VISITATION. <A ] 
* 2 ] Section 2. Section 30-5-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 123, Laws of Utah 1977, is amended to read: 
)-5-2. Visitation rights of grandparents and other immediate family members. 
\> (1) <A] The district court may grant grandparents [A> AND OTHER IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS <A] reasonable rights of 
sitation [D> to grandchildren, <D ] if it is in the best interest of the [D> grandchildren <D] [A> CHILDREN <A] . 
V> (2) GRANDPARENTS AND OTHER IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS MAY PETITION THE COURT AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 78-32-
1.2 TO REMEDY A PARENT'S WRONGFUL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH A VISITATION ORDER. <A ] 
* 3 ] Section 3. Section 63-63a-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 253, Laws of Utah 1992, is amended to read: 
3-63a-8. Children's Legal Defense Account. 
) There is created a restricted account within the General Fund known as the Children's Legal Defense Account. 
) The purpose of the Children's Legal Defense Account is to provide for programs that protect and defend the rights, safety, and 
jality of life of children. 
) The Legislature shall appropriate money from the account for the administrative and related costs of the following programs: 
) relating to the effects of divorce on children as provided in Sections 30-3-4, 30-3-7, 30-3-10.3, 30-3-11.3, 30-3-15.3, and 30-3-
J, Mandatory Educational Course on Children's Needs for Divorcing Parents - Pilot Program, and Sections 30-3-15.3, 30-3-18, and 
)-3-19 through 30-3-31, Mediation Pilot Program - Child Custody or Visitation; 
) implementing the use of guardians ad litem as provided in Sections 30-3-5.2, 78-3a-44.5, 78-3a-63, 78-3a-65, 78-11-6, and 78-
9, and termination of parental rights as provided in Sections 78-3a-39, 78-3a-42, 78-3a-47, and 78-3a-101 through 78-3a-115. 
his account may not be used to supplant funding for the guardian ad litem program in the juvenile court as provided in Section 78-
a-63; [D> and <D] 
:) requiring community service for violation of visitation orders or failure to pay child support as provided in Section 78-32-12.1 
A> ; AND <A] 
JV> (D) ENFORCING AND ADMINISTERING THE PILOT PROGRAM AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 78-32-12.3 ESTABLISHING THE 
ANCTIONS FOR SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH VISITATION ORDERS AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 78-32-12.2 <A] . 
I) The following withheld fees shall be allocated to the Children's Legal Defense Account: 
0 an additional fee of $ 10 shall be withheld on every marriage license issued in the state of Utah as provided in Section 21-2-2; 
nd 
)) a fee of $ 2 shall be withheld from the existing civil filing fee collected on any complaint, affidavit, or petition in a civil, probate, or 
joption matter in every court of record. 
>) The Division of Finance shall allocate the monies described in Section (4) from the General Fund to the Children's Legal Defense 
:count. 
* 4 ] Section 4. Section 78-32-12.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 253, Laws of Utah 1992, is amended 
• read: 
3-32-12.1. Community service for violation of visitation order or failure to pay child support. 
) If a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent has refused to comply with the minimum amount of visitation 
dered in a decree of divorce, the court [D> may <D] [A> SHALL <A] order the parent to: 
) perform [A> A MINIMUM OF 10 HOURS OF <A] community service; and 
) participate in workshops, classes, or individual counseling to educate the parent about the importance of complying with the court 
der and providing a child a continuing relationship with both parents. 
) If a custodial parent is ordered to perform community service or undergo court-ordered education, there is a rebuttable 
esumption that the noncustodial parent be granted visitation by the court to provide child care during the time the custodial parent 
complying with community service or education in order to recompense him for visitation time wrongfully denied by the custodial 
irent under the divorce decree. 
) If a noncustodial parent is ordered to perform community service or undergo court-ordered education, the court shall attempt to 
hedule the community service or education at times that will not interfere with the noncustodial parent's visitation with the child. 
) The person ordered to participate in court-ordered education is responsible for expenses of workshops, classes, and individual 
unseling. 
) If a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an obligor, as defined in Section 78-45-2, has refused to pay child 
pport as ordered by a court in accordance with Title 78, Chapter 45, Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, the court [D> may <D] 
> SHALL <A] order the obligor to: 
) perform [A> A MINIMUM OF 10 HOURS OF <A] community service; and 
) participate in workshops, classes, or individual counseling to educate the obligor about the importance of complying with the court 
jer and providing the children with a regular and stable source of support. 
) The obligor is responsible for the expenses of workshops, classes, and individual counseling ordered by the court. 
> If a court orders an obligor to perform community service or undergo court-ordered education, the court shall attempt to schedule 
i community service or education at times that will not interfere with the obligor's visitation with the child. 
I The [D> penalties <D] [A> SANCTIONS <A] that the court [D> may <D] [A> SHALL <A ] impose under this section do not 
>vent the court from imposing other [D> penalties <D] [A> SANCTIONS AS <A] provided [D> by <D] [A> IN SECTION 78-32-
.2 OR OTHER PROVISIONS IN <A] this chapter, or prevent any person from bringing a cause of action allowed under state or 
leral law. 
The Legislature shall allocate the money from the Children's Legal Defense Account to the judiciary to defray the cost of enforcing 
j administering this section. 
5 ] Section 5. Section 78-32-12.2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read: 
> 78-32-12.2. <A ] Definitions - Sanctions. 
> (1) FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION: <A] 
A> (A) "MAKE UP VISITATION" MEANS VISITATION WHICH IS: <A] 
A> (I) OF THE SAME TYPE AND DURATION OF VISITATION AS THAT WHICH WAS DENIED, INCLUDING VISITATION DURING 
VEEKDAYS, WEEKENDS, HOLIDAYS, AND DURING EXTENDED VISITATION PERIODS; <A ] 
:A> (II) TO BE MADE UP WITHIN ONE YEAR AFTER THE COURT HAS ENTERED ITS ORDER OF MAKE UP VISITATIONS; AND <A] 
;A> (III) IN THE MANNER CHOSEN BY THE AGGRIEVED PARENT IF IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD. <A ] 
> > (B) "PETITION" MEANS A PETITION BROUGHT BY A PARENT, A GRANDPARENT AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 30-5-2, BY OTHER 
MMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS, OR UPON THE COURTS OWN MOTION ALLEGING THAT A PARENT IS NOT COMPLYING WITH A 
/ISITATION ORDER IN A DECREE OF DIVORCE OR A SUBSEQUENT VISITATION ENFORCEMENT ORDER WHICH MAY BE BROUGHT AT 
DIFFERENT STAGES IN THE ALLEGED PATTERN OF NONCOMPLIANCE: <A] 
[A> (I) A FIRST PETITION IS A PETITION TO ENFORCE AN ORIGINAL ORDER OF VISITATION OR A PETITION FILED AFTER THREE 
fEARS FROM THE LAST VISITATION ENFORCEMENT ORDER; <A ] 
[A> (II) A SECOND PETITION IS A PETITION FILED WITHIN THREE YEARS FOLLOWING ENTRY OF THE FIRST VISITATION 
ENFORCEMENT ORDER; AND <A] 
[A> (III) A THIRD PERSON IS A PETITION FILED WITHIN THREE YEARS FOLLOWING ENTRY OF THE SECOND VISITATION 
ENFORCEMENT ORDER. <A] 
[A> (C) "SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE" MEANS CONDUCT WHICH: <A ] 
[A> (I) SUBSTANTIALLY INTERFERES WITH A COURT ORDERED VISITATION SCHEDULE; OR <A] 
[A> (II) INTERFERES WITH PARENTS RIGHT TO FREQUENT, MEANINGFUL, AND CONTINUING ACCESS WITH HIS CHILD AND WHICH 
SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRS THAT PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP. <A] 
[A> (D) "VISITATION ENFORCEMENT ORDER" MEANS AN ORDER TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH AN ORIGINAL VISITATION ORDER 
THROUGH THE USE OF SANCTIONS. <A ] 
[A> (2) UPON A FIRST PETITION, THE COURT SHALL ORDER: <A ] 
[A> (A) IF THE FIRST PETITION IS UNCONTESTED, BY DEFAULT: <A] 
[A> (I) A PERMANENT INJUNCTION ENJOINING THE NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE COURTS VISITATION ORDER; <A ] 
[A> (II) MAKE UP VISITATION FOR THE AGGRIEVED PARENT AND CHILD; AND <A] 
[A> (III) PARTICIPATION IN WORKSHOPS, CLASSES, OR INDIVIDUAL COUNSELING TO EDUCATE THE PARENT ABOUT THE 
IMPORTANCE OF COMPLYING WITH THE COURT ORDER AND PROVIDING THE CHILD WITH A CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH 
BOTH PARENTS AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION 78-32-12.1 (1)(B); OR <A] 
[A> (B) IF THE FIRST PETITION IS CONTESTED, THE COURT SHALL HOLD A HEARING TO DETERMINE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF 
THE EVIDENCE WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE VISITATION ORDER. <A ] 
[A> (3) UPON A FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE, THE COURT SHALL ORDER: <A] 
[A> (A) ACTUAL COSTS INCLUDING ACTUAL ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS TO THE PREVAILING PARTY; <A] 
[A> (B) MAKE UP VISITATION FOR THE AGGRIEVED PARENT AND CHILD; <A ] 
[A> (C) A MINIMUM OF 10 HOURS OF COMMUNITY SERVICE AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION 78-32-12.1 (1)(A); AND <A] 
[A> (D) A PERMANENT INJUNCTION ENJOINING THE NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE COURTS VISITATION ORDER. <A] 
[A> (4) UPON A FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE, THE COURT MAY ORDER: <A] 
[A> (A) MEDIATION WITH THE REQUIREMENT TO REPORT BACK TO THE COURT ON THE RESULTS OF MEDIATION WITHIN 30 DAYS; 
<A] 
[A> (B) PARTICIPATION IN WORKSHOPS, CLASSES, OR INDIVIDUAL COUNSELING TO EDUCATE THE PARENT ABOUT THE 
IMPORTANCE OF COMPLYING WITH THE COURT ORDER AND PROVIDING THE CHILD WITH A CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH 
BOTH PARENTS AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION 78-32-12.1 (1)(B); OR <A ] 
[A> (C) A FINE OR JAIL SENTENCE OR OTHER APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS AS PROVIDED UNDER CONTEMPT OF COURT IN SECTION 
78-32-10. <A] 
[A> (5) UPON A SECOND PETITION, THE COURT SHALL ORDER: <A] 
;A> (A) IF THE SECOND PETITION IS UNCONTESTED, BY DEFAULT: <A] 
;A> (I) ACTUAL COSTS INCLUDING ACTUAL ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS; <A] 
A> (II) MAKE UP VISITATION TO BE PROVIDED FOR THE AGGRIEVED PARENT AND CHILD; <A] 
A> (III) A MINIMUM OF 10 HOURS OF COMMUNITY SERVICE AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION 78-32-12.1(1)(A); AND <A] 
A> (IV) IMPOSE A FINE OR JAIL SENTENCE OR OTHER APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS AS PROVIDED UNDER CONTEMPT OF COURT IN 
iECTION 78-32-10; OR <A] 
A> (B) IF THE SECOND PETITION IS CONTESTED, THE COURT SHALL HOLD A HEARING TO DETERMINE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF 
HE EVIDENCE WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE VISITATION ORDERS. <A] 
A> (6) UPON A FINDING OF A SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE, THE COURT SHALL ORDER: <A] 
A> (A) ACTUAL COSTS INCLUDING ACTUAL ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS TO THE PREVAILING PARTY; <A] 
A> (B) MAKE UP VISITATION TO BE PROVIDED FOR THE AGGRIEVED PARTY AND CHILD AT TWICE THE AMOUNT OF TIME 
REVIOUSLY WRONGFULLY DENIED AND UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTIONS 78-32-12.2(3)(A) 
HROUGH (C); <A] 
A> (C) A MINIMUM OF 20 HOURS OF COMMUNITY SERVICE AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION 78-32-12.1(1)(A); <A] 
A> (D) A CONTEMPT ORDER WHICH IMPOSES A FINE OR JAIL SENTENCE AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 78-32-10; AND <A] 
A> (E) THE VIOLATOR TO POST BOND OR SECURITY IN THE AMOUNT DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO INSURE FUTURE 
OMPLIANCE. <A] 
«V> (7) THE COURT MAY IMPOSE ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WHICH MAY INCLUDE ANY ADDITIONAL REMEDIES, TERMS, OR 
ONDITIONS WHICH ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S PREVIOUS ORDER. <A] 
* > (8) UPON A THIRD PETITION, THE COURT SHALL ORDER: <A] 
\ > (A) IF THE THIRD PETITION IS UNCONTESTED, BY DEFAULT: <A] 
\ > (I) ACTUAL COSTS INCLUDING ACTUAL ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS; <A] 
\> (II) MAKE UP VISITATION TO BE PROVIDED FOR THE AGGRIEVED PARTY AND CHILD AT TWICE THE AMOUNT OF TIME 
DEVIOUSLY DENIED AND UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTIONS 78-32-12.2(3)(A) THROUGH (C); <A] 
V> (III) A MINIMUM OF TEN HOURS OF COMMUNITY SERVICE AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION 78-32-12.1(1)(A); AND <A] 
V> (IV) IMPOSE A FINE OR JAIL SENTENCE OR OTHER APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS AS PROVIDED UNDER CONTEMPT OF COURT IN 
ECTION 78-32-10; OR <A] 
V> (B) IF THE THIRD PETITION IS CONTESTED, THE COURT SHALL HOLD A HEARING TO DETERMINE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF 
iE EVIDENCE WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE VISITATION ORDERS. <A] 
i> (9) UPON A FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE, THE COURT SHALL ORDER: <A] 
i> (A) ACTUAL COSTS INCLUDING ACTUAL ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS TO THE PREVAILING PARTY; <A] 
i> (B) A FINDING THAT THERE HAS BEEN A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING OF A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH IS 
GAINST THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD FOR PURPOSES OF MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY AND ORDER A TEMPORARY CHANGE 
:
 CUSTODY FOR A DURATION TO BE DETERMINED BY THE COURT; AND <A] 
> (C) A FINDING THAT THERE HAS BEEN A PROBABLE CAUSE SHOWING OF CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE AS PROVIDED IN 
CTION 76-5-303 AND ORDER THE CASE TO BE REFERRED TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY FOR PROSECUTION. <A] 
> (10) THE COURT MAY DECLINE TO ISSUE AN ORDER WITH THE ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTIONS 78-
-12.2(2) THROUGH (9) ALTHOUGH THE PETITIONER HAS MET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF IF THE COURT PROVIDES FINDINGS ON 
IE RECORD EXPLAINING WHY A SANCTION OR SANCTIONS WERE NOT IMPOSED. <A] 
> (11) THE NONCUSTODIAL PARENT SHALL GIVE THE COURT AND THE CUSTODIAL PARENT WRITTEN NOTICE OF HIS INTENTION 
EXERCISE THE MAKE UP VISITATION AT LEAST SEVEN DAYS BEFORE THE PROPOSED VISIT IF IT IS TO BE ON A WEEKDAY OR 
EEKEND, AND AT LEAST 30 DAYS BEFORE THE PROPOSED VISIT IF IT IS TO BE ON A HOLIDAY OR AN EXTENDED VISITATION 
RIOD. <A] 
> (12) THE COURT SHALL SUSPEND ANY PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 78-32-12.2 IF SUBSTANTIAL ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD 
USE OR CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION OR A CASE IS PENDING IN THE COURTS ON THE ALLEGATIONS. <A] 
\> (13) THE FILING OF ANY PETITION UNDER THIS SECTION WHICH IS FOUND TO BE WITHOUT MERIT AND NOT ASSERTED OR 
EFENDED AGAINST IN GOOD FAITH SHALL BE SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS AS DETERMINED BY THE COURT. <A] 
(V> (14) THIS SECTION SHALL BE IMPLEMENTED ONLY AS A PILOT PROGRAM IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT AS PROVIDED IN 
ECTION 78-32-12.3. <A ] 
;*6] Section 6. Section 78-32-12.3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read: 
A> 78-32-12.3. <A ] Pilot program — Purpose ~ Evaluation of pilot program — Exceptions. 
A> (1) THERE IS ESTABLISHED A MANDATORY SANCTIONS FOR SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH VISITATION ORDERS PILOT 
ROGRAM IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT TO BE ADMINISTERED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS BEGINNING 
ULY 1, 1993, TO JULY 1, 1994. THE MANDATORY SANCTIONS PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A PETITIONER WITH A SPEEDY 
JMD EFFECTIVE REMEDY FOR SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE TO VISITATION ORDERS AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 78-32-12.2. <A] 
A> (2) THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL SHALL ADOPT RULES TO IMPLEMENT AND ADMINISTER THIS PILOT PROGRAM. <A ] 
A> (3) AS USED IN THIS SECTION, A PETITIONER WHO FILES A PETITION UNDER SECTION 78-32-12.2 IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
)ISTRICT AS DEFINED IN SECTION 78-1-2.1, WHERE THE PILOT PROGRAM IS ADMINISTERED, IS GOVERNED BY THIS SECTION. 
CA] 
; A > ( 4 ) THE A D M I N I S T R A T I V E OFFICE O F T H E COURTS SHALL ADOPT A PROGRAM TO EVALUATE T H E EFFECTIVENESS OF T H I S 
>ILOT PROGRAM. PROGRESS REPORTS SHALL BE PROVIDED T O T H E JUDICIARY I N T E R I M COMMITTEE ON T H E DATE OF 
MPLEMENTATION OF T H I S SECTION A N D ON T H E RESULTS B E G I N N I N G OCTOBER 1 9 9 3 A N D APRIL 1 9 9 4 . THE CRITERIA USED TO 
DETERMINE T H E RESULTS SHALL INCLUDE A SURVEY OF THE: < A ] 
."A> (A) PETITIONERS A N D RESPONDENTS I N T H E FIRST JUDIC IAL D ISTRICT W H O PARTICIPATED I N THE PILOT PROGRAM A N D THE 
REMEDIES THEY RECOVERED FOR SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE W I T H A V I S I T A T I O N ORDER OR ORDERS; < A ] 
[ A > (B ) PARTICIPANTS I N T H E PILOT PROGRAM, I N C L U D I N G PETITIONERS, RESPONDENTS, PRACTITIONERS, COURT 
ZOMMISSIONERS, A N D JUDGES O N T H E ISSUES OF NONCOMPLIANCE W I T H V I S I T A T I O N ORDERS; < A ] 
[ A > (C) PETITIONERS A N D RESPONDENTS I N T H E SECOND JUDIC IAL D ISTRICT W H O D I D NOT PARTICIPATE I N T H E PILOT 
PROGRAM A N D T H E REMEDIES THEY RECOVERED FOR SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE W I T H A V I S I T A T I O N ORDER OR ORDERS; 
MMD <A] 
[A> (D) PRACTITIONERS, COURT COMMISSIONERS, AND JUDGES IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT ON THE ISSUES OF 
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH VISITATION ORDERS. <A ] 
[A> (5) THE COURT SHALL SUSPEND ANY PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 78-32-12.2 IF SUBSTANTIAL ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD 
ABUSE OR CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION OR A CASE IS PENDING IN THE COURTS ON THE ALLEGATIONS. <A] 
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